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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is concerned with developing a theoretical understanding of the role that
municipal borrowing plays in the financing of urban infrastructure. Historically, the growth of
long-term debt has paralleled the growth of cities. Although the municipal bond market has been
the main source of financing for large scale capital projects, recent evidence suggests that many
large cities face an infrastructure crisis--a growing gap between capital needs and the'ability to
finance them. The reduction of federal aid directed towards infrastructure has served to compound
the financial hardships faced by many large American cities.
Large municipalities, therefore, face a double-edged sword. On the one hand, cities need to
invest in their capital plant to ensure continued growth and economic viability. On the other
hand, raising the necessary capital, through the two traditional sources of funding--the bond
market and the federal government--has become more difficult than ever before.
By examining the structure and operation of the market, the history of municipal
borrowing, and reviewing the related developments in infrastructure research, public finance,
and organizational theory, this dissertation sets. out to explain why borrowing practices differ so
widely between municipalities.
The research is based upon financial data on the 37 largest U.S. cities over the period,
1965-82. The first part of the empirical analysis involves a cross-sectional analysis of
borrowing and investment patterns. The results of several different statistical analyses
measuring the relationship between attributes (size, density, growth, etc.) and levels of capital
spending and borrowing are included.
While some significant results emerged from the cross-sectional analyses, it is argued
that an approach focusing on the decision-making process of financial officers is likely to yield a
better understanding of municipal borrowing. Different behavioral models are developed which
illustrate how the process and outcome of borrowing can vary under different assumptions. Two
regression models are formulated and tested on the largest cities over time. The results suggest
that in over one-half of the cities examined, capital spending could be accurately predicted on the
basis of two independent variables: long-term debt and federal aid. The existence of different
behavioral patterns is confirmed by interpretation and analysis of 18 year time series data on
municipal debt, capital outlays, and intergovernmental aid.
The overall results suggest that the further development of behavioral models holds great
promise, not only for explaining capital investment and borrowing, but other activities of
municipal government as well.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Plannning
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Why Do Cities Need to Borrow?
In order to function effectively as centers of social, economic, and
political activity, our cities must make large investments in public works.
We have come to expect our cities to have adequate roads, streets, bridges,
sewers, water mains, public buildings, and other forms of infrastructure.
Although infrastructure is essential to our existence, we tend to take it for
granted. We assume that the water we drink is safe, that the bridges won't
fall, and that somehow, the infrastructure will continue to work. The
expression, "out of sight, out of mind," captures quite nicely the prevailing
attitudes towards urban infrastructure.
To then embark upon a study of infrastructure, one is immediately
impressed by several obvious concerns. The study of infrastructure is,
potentially, one of the more soporific topics that one could choose in the
field of urban planning. Certainly there are more glamorous topics to delve
into than the financing, construction, and maintenance of infrastructure.
For whatever reasons, urban scholars have tended to steer away from the
study of infrastructure; there is relatively little formal academic literature
on infrastructure planning. There is no rich tradition of research on
infrastructure, nor many who claim status as infrastructure illuminati,
and certainly there is little, if any, heated political debate over the need
for infrastructure.
Compare the topic of providing infrastructure to the topic of
providing virtually any other public service. Public education, health care,
and public safety are topics which are typically endowed with a strong
ideological or philosophical heritage. In contrast, the topic of urban
infrastructure is striking in the sense that such readily identifiable
markings have not yet evolved. Virtually all would agree that
infrastructure is necessary, that it acts as a foundation for further
economic and social development, and that the public sector, rather than the
private sector should play the dominant role in financing, building, and
maintaining most forms of large scale infrastructure.
Radicals and conservatives alike share in the belief that
infrastructure is an important, essential public sector activity. Although
as expected, there is considerable disagreement over who should shoulder
the costs of infrastructure and who should benefit most from it, there is at
the same time, a general consensus that most forms of infrastructure quite
closely approximate a "pure public good." As such, many would argue that
infrastructure is government's first or even its only responsibility. Clean
water, clean air, the removal of noxious wastes, and other benefits of
infrastructure are universally desired ends. More to the point: both
radicals and conservatives need properly functioning toilets.
The traditional means of financing infrastructure has been through
the use of borrowed funds. Long-term debt has played and will continue to
play an important role in infrastructure finance.
Not until recently has the topic of infrastructure finance become an
subject of some concern within the field of urban planning. In the past,
problems associated with the financing of capital expenditures have
generally been treated as part of larger concerns with the allocation of
public expenditures. In spite of differences between operating and capital'
expenditures, researchers either lumped both together, or, more often,
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ignored capital spending altogether. Even less can be said about the
empirical research on municipal borrowing. Although there have been
numerous. studies conducted from the perspective of the investment
community, there has been very little empirical or theoretical work from
the perspective of municipal governments.
Infrastructure finance and long-term borrowing practices, therefore,
stand out as pristine areas for inquiry and theory building within the field
of urban planning. There is ample room for exploration and the testing of
new ideas and paradigms. Because of developments in related areas (i.e.,
determinants of municipal expenditures, state and local tax policy, and
public sector decision-making) there are some intellectual foundations
which this study can draw upon to better direct this inquiry into
infrastructure finance.
The Field of Infrastructure Finance
The topic of infrastructure finance is, by nature, an interdisciplinary
subject. When we speak of infrastructure, we are referring to physical,
in-ground, public investments which retain value and provide service for
many years, perhaps decades. It is convenient to think of at least three
basic intellectual foundations which support this field: engineering, public
finance, and organizational theory.
Engineering standards help to establish minimum levels of acceptable
performance for infrastructure systems. Standards are not without
problems. There are difficulties associated with the translation of
environmental constraints (population dynamics, land use, composition of
industrial base, etc.) into realistic standards which are usable both today
and in the future. The determination of appropriate engineering standards,
-3-
therefore, stands out as a particularly important component of
infrastructure finance.
Once acceptable standards can be identified, an estimate of
infrastructure costs can be derived. Financing infrastructure raises a set
·of issues which are, perhaps, best dealt with from a public finance
perspective. First, what is the public's willingness to pay for additional
infrastructure? Second, how can the costs be handled in the most
equitable and efficient manner? Financing infrastructure involves the
pooling of available debt and non-debt resources and the subsequent
allocation of these funds to complete the project. Because of the
magnitude of infrastructure costs and because of the fact that most
infrastructure systems last for many years, cities often resort to the use
of borrowed funds. Borrowing enables a city to raise the necessary funds
when needed and then by spreading the repayment-of debt over time, to
ensure that future generations benefiting from the facility, share in its
costs.
Perhap.s the best way in which to envision the integration of
engineering standards, the public's willingness to pay, and the allocation of
infrastructure costs and benefits, is from within an organizational context.
Given engineering standards and economic criteria, how are decisions
reached? What are the main factors which influence decision-making
regarding infrastructure and debt? Can borrowing decisions be interpreted
in light of recent developments in organizational theory? How can the
analysis of capital spending and debt contribute to the overall understanding
of municipal government decision-making.
The Municipal Government Context
-4-
There are many different types of local governments (cities,
villages, towns, special districts, school districts, and various authorities).
While there are only 50 state governments, and one federal government,
there are over 70,000 units of local government. Local government's
primary function involves the allocation and provision of public goods.
Higher levels of government (state and federal) are responsible for other
functions of the public sector. The system of government in the U.S.
requires that local governments play a strong role in the planning, financing,
and delivery of infrastructure services.
This research focuses on municipalities, those general-purpose
governments responsible for providing a full array of public services.
According to the 1982 Census of Government figures, there are 19,076
municipal governments. The majority (18,657) of these have a 1980
population of less than 50,000. In this study., I will draw particular
attention to the largest cities in the nation, each with a 1980 population of
at least 300,000. Altogether, about 39 million people live in these
municipalities. This amounts to about 28 percent of the 141 million
people living in municipalities and 18 percent of the total U.S. population.
This group of cities was chosen for several reasons. First, these cities
provide the widest array of public services, suggesting that trade-offs
between current and capital spending, and, between beneficiaries of
services and bearers of cost, are most complicated. Second, as a group,
these cities have the highest per capita expenditures, capital outlays, and
debt of all municipalities. As such, these cities have the most advanced
infrastructure systems as well as the most elaborate systems for financing
and delivering public services. Third, t is conventional wisdom that the
largest cities face numerous problems (e.g., crime, congestion, poverty, and
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other social problems) which have proved, over time, to be quite resilient to
remedy. Tinkering with the planning, delivery, and management of urban
services stands out as an opportunity to contribute to the betterment of
these areas.
The intent of this work, therefore, is to contribute to the general
theoretical knowledge of how decision-making pertinent to long-term
borrowing occurs in the public sector. Other secondary and tertiary
objectives of this study include the description, analysis, and discussion of
problems associated with the financing and delivery of infrastructure in the
largest American cities. To the extent possible, this study will attempt to
strengthen the linkages between theory and practice.
Why Do Municipalities Borrow?
The most important reason why municipalities borrow is to finance
capital expenditures. There are, however, other reasons why a city may
resort to the use of borrowed funds. Cities borrow to balance their
budgets. Municipal governments are required by law to show a balance
between expenditures and receipts at the end of each fiscal year. The
general practice is to use short-term debt to bridge gaps between revenues
and expenditures on an annual basis. Short term debt is classified as debt
which remains outstanding for less than one year. It is retired upon receipt
of sufficient general revenues and as such is a form of general obligation
debt. There are a variety of different short term notes such as TANs (tax
anticipation notes), RANs (revenue anticipation notes), BANs (bond
anticipation notes), and other types of short term debt (e.g., construction
notes, etc.) which municipalities use to bridge gaps between initiation of
projects and receipt of funds.
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The need to use borrowed funds, therefore, can result from a variety
of factors. An increase in tax delinquencies, or other unforeseen events
(e.g., abnormally high snow removal costs) leading to unexpectedly large
expenditures may foster the need to borrow.
Another reason why municipalities may be nclined to borrow is to
hedge against inflation. Rational economic behavior suggests that to the
extent possible, municipalities should borrow more when interest rates are
low and defer borrowing during periods of high interest rates. Although it
is unlikely that municipalities would accumulate large surpluses during
periods of low interest rates, there is some evidence to suggest that high
interest costs can lead to the postponement of borrowing and delays in the
completion of capital projects
Arbitrage is the practice of taking borrowed funds and putting the
proceeds into another investment paying a higher rate of interest. Since
the interest costs on municipal debt range between several hundred basis
points (a basis point s equal to 1/100th of a percentage point) below the
costs of corporate securities, cities would be tempted to practice
arbitrage, were it not for the Internal Revenue Code, which imposes controls
over the re-investment of municipal bond funds. Basically, IRS regulations
cap the allowable interest spread that is permitted on reinvested borrowed
-7-
This is such a small spread that t would be
hardly worth the while of municipal issuers to engage in arbitrage.'
In summary, municipalities borrow for reasons other than financing
capital expenditures. Short term debt (TANs, RANs, BANs, etc.) is used to
balance revenues and expenditures. To the extent possible, municipalities
will also hedge against inflation, borrowing more when interest rates are
low and less when rates increase. Although constrained by IRS restrictions,
municipalities will engage in arbitrage, placing the proceeds from
borrowing in high yielding investments or retiring old debt carrying higher
interest costs.
Capital Expenditures and Municipal Borrowing
While borrowed funds may be used for purposes other than financing
public works projects, this research focuses exclusively on the relationship
between capital expenditures and debt. We begin with the premise that
municipal governments are responsible for the provision and financing of
infrastructure.
1A general exception to these arbitrage rules occurs when borrowed funds
are used to make loans to the general public for housing, education, or
charitable organizations. With this type of funding arrangement, cities are
allowed to earn a spread of up to 150 basis points. Arbitrage is justified
here on the grounds that such loan programs impose administative costs to
the issuer. Another exception to IRS arbitrage rules involves the use of
debt service funds. Upon borrowing funds, a municipality may invest a
maximum of 15 percent of the total borrowed amount, without yield
restrictions, if it is part of a reserve or replacement fund. This 15 percent
amount, though specified, in Section 103c of the Internal Revenue Code, has
been re-interpreted to mean a deposit equal to the maximum amount of
combined interest and principal paid in any one year. Similarly,
restricitons apply to the potential earnings from advanced refundings.
Advanced refunding occurs when a municipality borrows for the purpose of
retiring outstanding debt.
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funds to 12.5 basis points.
Although there are non-debt sources of revenue which can be applied
to financing infrastructure, these resources are less reliable and less
appropriate than debt financing. Traditionally, municipalities use current
revenues (e.g., income from taxes and fees and charges) to finance operating
expenses. In order to use current revenues to finance capital expenditures,
cities must either cut operating expenses (e.g., salaries and wages), or,
raise taxes or fee schedules. Both of these options are politically
unpopular. State and federal grants represent another potential non-debt
source of financing for infrastructure. The use of grants, however, may be
subject to conditions or limitations imposed by outside agencies.
Moreover, changes in funding criteria may lead to abrupt loss of support,
making them, in general, a less predictable and stable source of financing
for infrastructure.
Operating expenses tend to claim the "lion's share" of current
revenues and non-debt resources. Debt financing provides a means of
earmarking a share of these current revenues, over time, for capital
investment. Debt financing also provides a means of raising a large amount
of capital in a short period of time. Given the nature of budgetary decisions
which tend to be incremental, raising the necessary funds for capital
investment in the absense of borrowing privileges would be virtually
impossible. Finally, debt financing provides a means of spreading the
costs of a capital facilty over time, ensuring that future beneficiaries share
in its costs. By matching the repayment schedule to the life expectancy of
the infrastructure system, debt financing provides a built-in mechanism for
cost-sharing.
Municipal borrowing, therefore, has become an important component
of public sector decision-making. Over the past 50 years, municipal debt
-9-
has increased greatly. in 1932, total outstanding municipal debt was only
$9.8 billion, approximately one-tenth its present size. In 1982 alone,
municipalities issued over $11.4 billion in long-term debt. During that
year, municipalities with population greater than 300,000 issued more than
$4.1 billion in long-term debt.
In 1982, municipalities collected $138 per capita in property taxes,
$44 in per capita general sales taxes, and $78 per capita in federal aid.
Municipalities issued more than $81 per capita in long-term debt, making
debt a greater revenue source than either general sales or federal aid.
In 1982, cities such as Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, Philadelphia,
San Antonio, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. each issued more than $100
million in long-term debt. New York City issued over $1.3 billion in long-
term debt.
In 1982, the total amount of long-term debt issued by state and local
governments exceeded $87.5 billion. Long-term borrowing by municipalities
accounted for about 13 percent of this amount. Non-federal governments
have issued debt to finance a broad array of capital projects (See Figure I-
1). For example, in 1982, state and local government entities issued some
$4.7 billion for education, $6.2 billion for transportation, $5.0 billion for
water and sewer, and $7.1 billion for public power projects. These
governments also borrowed $14.3 billion for housing programs, $12.7 billion
for industrial development projects, $.5.3 billion for pollution control, and
$9.5 billion for hospitals.
While state and local governments borrowed an estimated $87.5
million in 1982, they made only $66.8 billion in total capital outlays.
These governments made capital outlays of $10.8 billion for education,
$18.1 for transportation, $12.6 billion for environment and housing, and $2.2
-10-
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billion for public safety. Differences between annual amounts of debt
issuance and annual capital outlays are to be expected; cities generally
borrow in anticipation of making actual capital outlays. In order to specify
the nature of the relationship between capital outlays and borrowing, a
multiple year time frame needs to be constructed.
The Organization of This Study
The starting point of this analysis is that the primary reason why
municipalities incur debt is to raise the necessary capital to build or
refurbish roads, sewers, water systems, public buildings, and other forms
of infrastructure.
The next chapter (Chapter 2) describes the municipal bond market.
The purpose of this chapter is not only to describe the mechanics of issuing
and selling municipal bonds, but also to identify the wide range of
participants in the municipal bond market. It is argued that there are very
diverse groups which all hold different stakes in the outcomes of municipal
borrowing decisions. Chapter 3 contains a historical overview of
municipal borrowing in the United States. In this chapter, the evolution of
borrowing is describe. The connections between debt and development are
traced. Over time, a logic of borrowing, which, as it is argued in this
chapter, is inexplicably linked to the history of municipal governments.
The purpose of the fourth chapter, is to identify key issues in municipal
borrowing as they relate to infrastructure. This chapter describes the so-
called "infrastructure crisis" as well as some of the most recent studies on
infrastructure. In addition to evaluating the existing research, this chapter
specifies research needs and points explicitly to need to better understand
borrowing decisions. In a sense, Chapter 4 contains the raison d'etre for
the future chapters. The next chapter (Chapter 5) contains a discussion
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of theories relevant to municipal borrowing. Numerous theoretical
approaches could be employed to explain borrowing: some would treat
borrowing as stricly economic activity, while others would focus more on
the political dimensions of the debt issuing process. This chapter puts
research on debt and infrastructure into a theoretical perspective.
Chapter 6 contains a cross-sectional analysis of debt and capital outlays.
In this chapter particular attention is paid to the ways in which municipal
attributes (size, density, growth, etc.) affect borrowing and capital
spending. In addition to examing the statistical relationship between
attriubtes, debt, and outlays, Chapter 6 concludes by suggesting that
conventional, cross-sectional analyses are of limited value. In Chapter 7,
a theoretical approach to understanding the financial behavior of large
American cities over time is develped. The emphasis in this chapter is on
developing an understanding of the rationale used by decision-makers in the
issuance of debt. Behavioral approaches are superior to other alternatives
because of their flexibility, their intimate connections with human thought
and decision-making, and the extent to which such models can be used to
inform or alter patterns of decision-making. In Chapter 8, the theory is
tested on the 37 largest cities. In this chapter, each city is treated as an
independent entity, and patterns of decision-making pertinent to capital
outlays and debt are described. The central feature of Chapter 8 is a set of
case histories on all 37 cities. In addition to describing each city's pattern
of outlays and debt, this chapter contains the results of two models for
explaining the relationship between outlays, debt, and federal aid. Chapter
9 contains an evaluation of this study as well as some conclusions which
can be drawn from the analysis. The conclusions suggest a need for more
research, particularly in terms of formulating behavioral models for
-13-
predicting municipal borrowing. The significant empricial findings are
also reviewed and the implications of this study (beyond the academic
community) are discussed. It is suggested that through a deeper
understanding of decision-making, cities can better plan for infrastructure
in the years ahead. At the same time, increased attention to infrastructure
as a subject of scholarly research stands out as one of the more potent
topics in the field of urban planning.
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Chapter 2
The Municipal Bond Market
Basic Concepts and Terminology
The municipal bond market channels funds from investors to
governments In need of resources.' Investors have surplus funds.
Governments, on the other hand, need capital to finance their programs and
projects. The bond market helps to ensure smooth transactions between
borrowers (issuers) and lenders (investors). A bond, moreover, means one
thing to an issuer and something else to an investor. To an issuer, a bond is
a type of loan, a promise to pay interest and principal according to a fixed
schedule. In other words, to an issuer, a bond is a liability, a claim on
future assets, and a financial obligation. To the holder of a municipal bond,
however, t is an opportunity for earning additional income, similar to any
other investment. In exchange for relinquishing funds, an investor receives
a claim to a stream of interest income, as well as eventual repayment of
principal.
When the bond market works efficiently, governments can raise the
necessary funds for their endeavors. Investors receive compensation for
use of their surplus assets, as well as some rate of return on their
investment. The critical juncture for issuer and investor is, therefore, the
Interest on the bond. To ssuers, this represents the costs of borrowing.
1The traditional perspective views investors as providing the "supply" of
funds, and state-local governments as comprising the "demand" for funds;
Light, J. and W. White (1979) The Financial System. Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
Homewood, Illinois. p. 433. point out that a financial market performs two
critical functions: ) channel funds between suppliers and demanders; and,
2) establish "fair" market prices for securities by continuously assessing
risks and establishing the expected rates of return. -
To investors, Interest represent yield on their Investment. Issuers hope to
lower Interest costs, whereas Investors hope to increase yields, as well as
ensure the security of their Investment.
Default 2 is the term used to describe the failure on the part of
borrowers to meet either interest or principal payments on schedule. A
technical default occurs whenever there Is a delay, but eventual payment.
Both investors and issuers seek to minimize the likelihood of default. By
doing so, the market will operate efficiently. Investors will be willing to
provide funds for government. At the same time, interest costs will remain
low enough so that Issuers can afford to borrow the funds necessary to
finance their projects.
The term municipal bond has come to include all of the publicly
offered debts of state and local government.3 There are several reasons
why state securities are Included under the term "municipal." At times, the
entire sub-national government debt market has been dominated by
municipal issuers (e.g., following the Depression of the 1840s). Moreover,
while there are only 50 state governments, there are, literally, tens of
thousands of local government entities authorized to issued bonds. Finally,
all local units of government derive their powers, including the ability to
issue debt from state governments.4 As such, It seems appropriate to use
21n 1978, Congress adopted Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
which provided a more flexible legal procedure for municipalities to seek
protection from bondholders under bankruptcy laws.
3 includes Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
4according to Dillon's Rule (named an Iowa state judge),if a function is not
expressly granted or specified in the charter, a municipality Is forbidden to
do it out; in other words, In all activities, including the issuance of debt,
the municipality derives its authority from the state government.
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one term--municipal bond--to refer to the collective lot of state and local
securities.
Traditionally, municipal bonds are categorized into general
obligations and revenue (non-guaranteed) debt. General obligations are
backed by the full taxing power of the Issuer; all sources of revenue will be
used to pay of r the debt. In recent years, a number of states 5 have enacted
restrictions on state and local taxation. In these states, governments have
fewer revenues with which to back their general obligations. The bonds
issued by these governments, are called "limited tax" bonds. When no
limits on taxing authority exists, general obligations may be termed
"unlimited tax" bonds.
Project revenues rather than tax sources, are used to pay nterest and
principal on revenue bonds. In other words, self-liguldating enterprises
(highways, bridges, parking lots, convention halls, stadiums, and housing
developments) generate the funds necessary to retire revenue bonds.
Double-barreled bonds6 are those backed by both project revenues and
tax revenues. Technically, however, these are considered as revenue bonds.
Other hybrid bonds7 (combining characteristics of both general obligations
and revenue bonds) include: 1) special tax bonds - bonds backed by a
single ear-marked tax source (e.g., highway bonds backed by gasoline taxes);
5 limitations on taxing authority Include California's Proposition 13,
Michigan's Headlee Amendment, and Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2.
6Publlc Securities Association (1982) Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds.
Public Securities Association. New York. p. 16.
7 1bid. p. 17
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and, 2) moral obligation bonds8 - similar to general obligations, yet
these bonds carry only a "moral" rather than a legally-binding pledge to use
all tax sources to pay interest and principal.
The most Important characteristic of all municipal bonds is their
tax-exempt status. Interest income on municipals has always been
exempt from the federal Income tax. This exemption is based upon the
"Doctrine of Reciprocal Immunity" contained in the U.S. Constitution.
This doctrine holds that states cannot interfere in the operations of the
federal government and vice-versa. The taxation of municipal securities, it
is argued, would impair the ability of states to finance and carry out its
operations. While this exemption s contained in Section 103(a) of the
8 Glastris, P. (1985) "The Government Debt Racket" The Washington Monthly.
February. pp. 12-22. describes how Nelson Rockefeller, as Governor of New
York state introduced the moral obligation bond. "Almost In desperation,
Rockefeller turned to a bond attorneyt with a venerable New York firm who
had made his name n the thirties as an innovator in this very fileld--housing
revenue bonds. The lawyer's name was John Mitchell, and he brought to the
governor's dilemma the same crafty pragmatism that he would later show as
Richard Nlxon's attorney general. In 1960, Mitchell's sly deed was the
invention, for Nelson Rockefeller, of the moral obligation bond...Under the
terms of Mitchell's moral obligation, the govenor was to notify the
legislature when and if the revenues from the public housing were
insufficient to meet the payments on the bonds. The legislature was not
obligated in any way to pay the bondholders a dime; it merely had to
consider doing so. The devious brilliance of Mitchell's scheme was that it
made everyone think they had what they wanted..."
-18-
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, some have argued that this tax
exemption Is based more on political rather than constitutional grounds.9
Congress has on several occasions amended the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 to restrict the statutory exemption of Interest Income. This
happened in. 1969, as well as in 1982 and 1983. These revisions have
limited the uses of tax-exempt financing, put ceilings on the size of tax-
exempt Issues, and have added additional reporting and public approval
requirements. As recently as the 1985 Congressional session, efforts to
eliminate the tax exemption on state and local securities were not
successful.
In addition to exemption from Federal Income taxes, many state
governments exempt Interest Income from state taxation, particularly on
bonds issued within the state. 10 Some states, however, tax income earned
on out-of-state bonds. Municipalities generally exempt interest Income
from local income taxes as well. The attractiveness of a municipal bond,
relative to a corporate bond is obviously greater for those Investors facing
high federal, state, and local Income taxes.
9Fabozzi, F. (1983) Federal Income Tax Treatement of Municipal Bonds in S.
Feldstein, et. al. eds., The Municipal Bond Handbook. Dow Jones Irwin,
Homewood, Illinois. p 31, points out that several proposals in Congress
would terminate or modify this statutory exemption. Among the proposals
include the formation of an Urban Development Bank which would lend funds
to states and localities at rates lower than those prevailing on taxable
securities. The Urban Development Bank would procure Its funds by issuing
taxable securities. Another proposal calls for states and localities to Issue
taxable securities. The higher costs to issuers would be offset by an
interest subsidy provided by the Federal government.
10 interest Income from securities Issued by the territories of the United
States (Guam, Puerto Rico, etc.) and, Washington D.C., as well as certain
local and urban agencies operating under the auspices of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development are exempt from all federal and all state and
local taxes.
-19-
There Is some historical evidence that the tax exempt status or
municipals helped to reduce Interest costs for municipal borrowers. In
1913, the 16th Amendment to Constitution was adopted. This amendment
which created the Federal income tax, provided for the tax exempt status of
municipal bonds. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Income tax, interest
rates on municipal bonds was roughly equivalent to rates on corporate
bonds. After 1913, however, Interest rates on municipals fell in relation to
corporate bonds and have remained lower. 11 Over the past decade, Interest
rates for municipals ranged between 61 and 75 percent of corporate rates. 12
The reason that Investors are willing to receive lower yields on
municipal bonds is because of their tax exempt status. The after-tax
Income from municipals may, for some investors, be greater than the after-
tax Income coming from taxable securities. Generally speaking, the tax
advantages of municipals materialize for those nvestors In at least a 30
percent tax bracket (meaning each additional dollar of income is taxed at a
rate of approximately 30 percent or more). According to Federal income tax
tables, 13 the rate approaches 30 percent when taxable Income on joint
return exceeds $30,000, and for single taxpayers In the mid $20s.
Generally, the difference between taxable and tax-exempt yields Is about 30
11Public Securities Association, (1981) op. cit. p. 135-136 reports that "in
1980, long term municipal rates averaged approximately 65 percent of rates
on equivalent corporate securities. At the end of World War II, rates on
municipals were as low as 41 percent of corporate rates. The gap slowly
began to narrow..."
12GAO (1983) op. ct. p. 9 "in 1969, the ratio reached 87.2 percent because
Congress was actively attempting to eliminate the tax-exemption for
municipal bonds. When that effort failed, the market returned to its normal
trends. However for 1 1 of the past 20 years, the ratio was below the 70
percent mark and between 1977 and 1980 was under 65.5 percent due to a
heavy demand for tax-exempts by institutional buyers."
13 effective July 1, 1983
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percent. Therefore, if taxable bonds are yielding about 12-1/2 percent,
similar municipals should yield about 8.75 percent (30 percent less).
Obviously, an Investor in less than a 30 percent tax bracket would be better
off purchasing the higher yielding taxable security. A simple calculation,
known as taxable yield equivalent enables Investors to calculate the
yield that a taxable security must pay in order to match the yield of a tax-
exempt security:
TYE = TFY/( 100% - MTB)
where,
TYE = taxable yield equivalent
TYF = tax free yield
MTB = marginal tax bracket
From this formula, it is easy to see that as the tax bracket (MTB) increases,
so too do the tax advantages of municipals. Using the formula, an investor
In the 34 percent tax bracket purchasing a municipal bond yielding 10-1/2
would require that a taxable return of approximately 15.9 for an equivalent
after-tax return. An investor In a higher income tax bracket, say, 48
percent bracket, buying the same municipal bond, would need to find a
taxable security paying a yield of at least 20.2 percent.
Participants in the Municipal Bond Market
The participants of the municipal bond market can be divided into two
groups--the "nner" circle and the "outer" circle. 1 4 The inner circle
consists of the issuer and those called upon in the preparation and sale of a
14This is a perspective employed by Standard and Poors.
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bond (bond counsel, financial advisor, and underwriter). Investors, portfolio
managers, fiduciaries, and others in the investment community who
purchase, trade, and deal in municipal bonds stand in the outer circle .
Included in this group of "outsiders" are the rating agencies, bond Insurers,
and the financial publishers. (See Figure 11-1).
There are approximately 80,000 units of state and local government
in the United States. Of these, some 50,000 have issued municipal bonds. 15
Unlike the market for corporate securities, the municipal bond market
consists largely of smaller Issues. Approximately 44 percent of the
municipal bonds Issued over the past decade have been for $1 million or less
and 81 percent of all issues have been for $5 million or less.16
It is on the basis of their tax-exempt status that various Issuers,
through their financial ntermediaries (underwriters and dealers), attempt
to lure Investors to purchase, trade, and hold municipal bonds. The result is
a pattern of savings and Investment made possible by the bond market.
Three types of Investors are attracted to tax exempt securities:
commercial banks, property and casualty Insurance companies,
and high Income households. In 1982, these three groups held almost
90 percent of all outstanding municipals.1 7 Although some non-profits,
state-local governments, public pensions funds, etc., may hold municipals,
these groups are generally exempt from Income taxation, and, as such, the
advantages of holding municipals are relatively fewer.
Throughout the 1960s, commercial banks held the largest share of the
market, which amounted to over two-thirds of all new issues. In the 1970s,
'sPublic Securities Association (1982) op. cit. p. 47
16 1bid.
17Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (1982) Flow of Funds
Account. Federal Reserve.
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Figure II-1
Participants in the Municipal Bond Market
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however, insurance companies and ndividuals Increased their holdings to
more than two-thirds of the market, leaving less than a third for
commercial banks and others. Individuals have become Increasingly
important to the municipal bond market. They have not, however, attained
the level of importance as they have in the corporate securities market,
where individuals own two-thirds of all outstanding corporate stock.
Commercial banks tend to be heavy investors In municipal bonds18
when loan demand Is weak and credit s readily available. In addition, to
taking advantage of the tax exempt feature, municipal bonds, can also be
counted as part of reserve requirements for public deposits and used as
collateral at the Federal Reserve discount window. When the economy is
slack and Interest rates are low, banks purchase municipals with their
surplus funds. Bank purchases of municipal bonds are generally related the
"business cycle." As the economy moves further into the next business
cycle, demand for loans gradually picks p. Credit begins to tighten and
banks, therefore, slow their acquisition of municipal bonds. This pattern
has been consistent since the end of World War 11.19
Commercial banks Increased their holdings of municipal bonds
following the creation of certificates of deposit (CDs) In 1961.20 This gave
banks greater flexibility in terms of the management of their assets and
liabilities. When banks needed new funds, they could Issue more CDs. This
additional liquidity enabled them to invest more heavily in municipal bonds.
Municipal bonds, moreover, were particularly attractive because of their
high after-tax returns.
s8Commerical banks like to Invest in short and medium term securities to
provide a reasonably liquid, yet high yielding Investment portfolio.
19Public Securities Association (1982) op. cit. p. 96
2Olbid.
-24-
In the 1970s, however, banks found other, more lucrative methods 2 1
to reduce their tax liabilities than by purchasing municipals. Through
leasing operations they could take advantage of the investment tax credit.
Foreign tax credits were also popular among some banks during this period.
Another explanation for decreased bank purchases of municipals is that in
general, profits for banks were much lower in the 1970s. When their profits
decreased, so too did their tax liabilities, making tax exemption less
necessary and attractive.
Like commercial banks, casualty insurance companies view
municipal bonds22 as a means for counteracting high tax rates. Insurance
companies tend to invest most heavily in municipals when their profits are
the greatest. Influenced by factors such as inflation and government
regulatory actions, their profits tend to be cyclical. In the mid-1970s,
state insurance regulators granted rate increases. As profits increased, so
too did bond purchases. Inflation, during later years, cut into profits
largely because the costs of claims increased. Because of declining profits,
municipal bond purchases also decreased.
Another reason why insurance companies find municipal bonds
attractive is that unlike corporate stock, bonds are recorded on their
financial statements at cost rather than at market value.23 Insurance
companies must record stock at their market value rather than at cost.
These assets figure into the amount of insurance a company can write.
21 Ibid.
221n terms of bond selection, insurance companies tend to favor long term
maturities because they produce the highest yields. At the same time, they
tend to be risk averse--selecting high quality bonds for their portfolios.
Insurance companies have also shown a general preference for revenue bonds
which on the average produce greater returns than general obligations.
23 1bid. p. 98
-25-
With municipal bonds, the Insurance company not only gains the advantages
of tax exemption, but also s not penalized by fluctuations in market price
as they are with corporate stock.
Individuals constitute the third major group of investors in the
municipal bond market. They tend to be most sensitive to interest rate
fluctuations, so that when bond rates are near their highest peaks,
individual Investors are likely to be drawn to the market. In 1969 when
municipal Interest rates peaked, Individuals purchased almost 97 percent2 4
of all new municipals. Individuals expressed similar levels of enthusiasm
in 1974 and 1975 when municipal bond rates climbed to unusual high levels.
Another factor Important to the behavior of individuals investing In
municipal bonds is the effect of Inflation. "Bracket creep" pushes the entire
tax paying population into higher income tax brackets, thereby increasing
the number of individuals who can take advantage of the tax exemption on
municipal bonds. As incomes and tax liabilities increase, so too does the
relative advantage of municipals over other forms of investment.
Issuers derive their legitimacy from state constitutions or statutes.
There are, moreover, numerous state laws that regulate borrowing. These
regulations may be in the form of limits or ceilings on the size debt,
restrictions as to purposes for which governments may issue debt, and
stipulations regarding the type of public approval necessary to authorize a
bond sale.
Virtually all municipal bonds are accompanied by a legal opinion
prepared by a nationally recognized bond counsel. This opinion provides
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2 4 1bid. p. 99
assurance to the Investor as to the validity, security, and tax-exempt nature
of the bonds. The legal opinion states that:2 5
the bonds are valid and binding obligations of the issuer
enforceable in accordance with their terms and that the
interest income on the the bonds is exempt from federal income
taxes. The assurance provided by the legal opinion stays with
bonds as long as they remain outstanding, passing from one
owner to another. The owner of a municipal bond cannot expect
to sell it unless he delivers with it a copy of the bond counsel's
approving legal opinion. For this reason, a copy of the bond
counsel's opinion is often printed on the back of the bonds
themselves...
The profession of bond counsel emerged in the late 1800s, when local
governments were busy financing the railroad industry and other internal
Improvements. When many of these bonds went into default, bondholders
brought suit against the issuers. In order to avoid payment, issuers cited
technical defects In the procedures for the authorization and sale of the
bonds. They argued that because of these defects, they were not obligated
to pay for the defaulted bonds. In order to remedy this situation,
underwriters developed the practice of hiring an attorney of their choice,
independent of the issuer, to review the procedures followed by the
government unit. If the bond counsel found any technical defects, he would
not render an opinion.
The role of the bond counsel has changed considerably. Initially, the
bond counsel was independent of the issuer. As the restrictions on
borrowing increased, issuers began to seek the advice of bond attorneys to
guide them though the legal maze. Bond counsels began to play a much more
central role, standing in the "inner" circle, providing advice directly to
2sKraft, J. (1 983)"The Role of Bond Counsel in Public Agency Financing" in F.
Fabozzi, et. al. The Municipal Bond Handbook. Dow Jones Irwin. Homewood,
Illinois. p. 228.
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issuers. A recent event which helped make the role of bond counsel even
more important was the New York City fiscal crisis in 1975.26 Following
defaults on general obligation bonds27, the SEC issued a report criticizing
the bond counsel's activities, particularly in the areas of financial
disclosure. 2 8 Another reason why the responsibilities of the bond
counsel have increased is the proliferation of revenue bonds and non-
traditionalhomeg bonds grew from a total of $1.6 billion to $14.3 billion. 2 9
The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 198030 placed state by state
limits on aggregate bond sales, required that most eligible hoome buyers be
first time homeowners, and limited the purchase price of houses. The Act
also elimiated the tax exemption on these bonds for all single family
housing bonds Issued after December 31, 1983. Over the past decade there
26Congress created the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board in 1975 an
organ of the Securities Exchange Commission responsible for regulating the
municipal bond industry.
27New York City defaulted on short term notes (which are considered general
obligations) and had "near defaults" on several other general obligations.
28Many different authors have documented the causes of New York City's
fiscal crises. The overuse of short term debt (BANs, TANs, and RANs),
unusual and improper budgeting practices, utilizing debt to finance current
operations, and many other improrieties have been cited as factors
contributing to a hidden deficit of at least $600 million.
29General Accounting Office (1983) op. cit. p. 45-46; General Accounting
Office (1983) The Costs and Benefits of Single-Family Mortgage Revenue
Bonds: Preliminary Report," General Accounting Office. Washington, D.C.;
and Congressional Budget Office (1982) The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act
of 1980: Experience Under the Permanent Rules. Congressional Budget
Office, Washington, D.C.
301bid.
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has been significant growth In tax exempt financing for pollution control, 31
hospital facilities, 3 2 and student laons.33 While Congress has been slower
to clamp on new restrictions on these areas, such legislation is impending.
Increasingly, the bond counsel s called upon to certify that a particular
issue is In compliance with federal laws and that the interest income is,
indeed, exempt from federal income taxation. Other new duties of bond
counsel include a re-assessment of the security backing bonds because of
the passage of tax limitations 34 such as Proposition 13 in California and
Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts. These limitations have altered the
concept of unlimited ability to tax--which in the past helped to make
municipal bonds a secure and attractive investment.
Financial advisors, like bond counsels provide technical
information to state and local governmental units involved in the issuance
of debt. They too, stand in the inner circle. Moak states: 35
3 lAlthough pollution control bonds are a type of IDB, they are generally
exempt from the dollar restrictions placed on IDBs. They are the largest
category of IDB now being issued. The Water Pollution Control and Clear Air
Acts of the early 1970s mandated large scale investments by industry.
States and localities used their tax exempt status to provide low cost loans
to the private sector. In 1982, approximately $5.3 billion in pollution
control bonds was issued. See also, Peterson, G. and H. Galper (1975) " Tax
Exempt Financing of Private Industry's Pollution Control Investment. Public
Policy. Spring.
32The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that over 80 percent of the
state-local debt issued for hospital financing is issued on behalf of private,
non-profit facilities.
33Tax exempt financing for student loans started in 1976. Presently some
12 states operate loan programs for state residents. Another five states
have special authorities which permit colleges to issue their own tax
exempt debt. Dartmouth College, In 1982, was the first private university
to issue tax exempt debt for its students.
34Beebe, J. (1979) Proposition 13 and the Cost of California Debt. National
Tax Journal. add date here...
35 Moak, L. ( 1982) op. cit. p. 135
There is a danger that the issuer will view the issuance of debt
as merely a series of routinized steps that can be easily
mastered through limited experience. Few assumptions are
likely to be more erroneous....The more frequent and the more
complex the fundings, the greater the need for competent staff
and usually for consulting assistance. To proceed without the
benefit of competent financial services is to invite
development of an unwise plan that would prove faulty In
execution...
Financial advisors are called upon during the early planning stages of a bond
issue. They ascertain whether or not borrowing is appropriate or necessary.
Once a decision to float a bond has been made, the financial advisors can
help design the structure and terms of the Issue, help with the selection of
an underwriter, and provide advice on matters such as requesting a bond
rating. Financial advisors act as an extension of governmental units, and
like engineers, architects, and other consultants which may brought in from
the private sector, they add expertise and specialized skills which the
issuer may lack.36
Underwriters 37 also stand in the "inner" circle. They play a critical
role.38 They purchase the issuer's bonds and then resell them to investors.
36Following the New York City fiscal crisis and similar events, financial
advisors have moved more towards the center of the "inner circle." Changes
in federal policy shifting additional financial responsibilities to localities
have also increased the importance of financial advisors.
37 Prior to the Civil War, bankers often served as middlemen, acting as
either a "loan contractor" or "loan negotiator." The negotiators set up the
deals between the issuers and loan contractors who would subscribe to the
bond issues, hoping to sell them at a profit.
38a recent article in Investment Dealer's Digest, "Volume Impressive" March
1, 1983, p. 13 reported that most of the underwriting s handled by the
nation's top 15 underwriters, listed in order as, Merrill Lynch, Salmon
Borthers, E.F. Hutton, Byth Easton, Goldman Sacks, Smith Barney, Shearson,
Kidder Peabody, Dean Wltters, Bear Stearns, Prudential Bache, Lehman Kuhn
Loeb, Dillon Reed, and L. F. Rothschild.
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The underwriter's profit is called the spread. The spread is the difference
between what they pay for the bonds and the amount they receive upon
selling them. There are two 39 different methods of underwriting. With
competitive sales, underwriters bid against each other and the issuers
selects the underwriter on the basis of the lowest bid. The underwriter
offering the lowest interest cost (highest price) to the issuer wins. With
the negotiated sales method, there is no bidding. The underwriter is
selected prior to the sale of the bonds. The issuer accepts the interest
cost and price negotiated prior to sale of the bonds. With both methods of
underwriting, the underwriter assumes complete risk for marketing and
reselling the bonds upon delivery from the issuing government.
There has been a substantial increase in the volume of bonds sold
through negotiated sales. Often an issuer may have no choice as to the
method of underwriting.4 0 Local laws may require the sale of general
obligations through competitive bidding.4 1 The proportion of bonds sold by
negotiated sales has increased greatly, rising from 17 percent in 1970 to 68
percent in 1982.42 Revenue bonds are generally sold through the negotiated
sales approach. Because of the increase in revenue bonds,43 the proportion
of bonds sold through negotiated sales has also increased. Evidence can be
39 A third method of sale is through private placement; these are bond sales
which involve transactions directly between issuer and investor.
40Each bond issue must have specific authorization; the instrument
authorizing the bonds is refered to as the bond resolution.
4 1Competitive bids are required in virtually every state (except
Pennsylvania for the sale of general obligation bonds. In some states,
general obligations can be sold through negotiated sales if the issuers fail
to receive two or more bids for issues that have been competitively offered.
4 2 General Accounting Office (1983) op. cit. p. 17
43As pointed out earlier, the revenue bonds now account for more than two-
thirds of the volume of new bond sales. In 1970 general obligation bonds
accounted for two-thirds of the volume of new bond sales.
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drawn from the fact In 1982, only 12 percent of general obligations were
sold through negotiated sales, while 76 percent of the revenue bonds were
sold through negotiated arrangements.4 4
There are important differences between the two methods45 of sale.
With competitive sales, underwriters become involved in a much later stage
of the debt issuing process than do underwriters engaged in negotiated
sales. With competitive sales, much of the work pertaining to the nature
and structure of the bond has been completed by financial advisors and
others prior to the scheduled date of sale. The issue is prepared without
assistance from any bidding underwriter. Several weeks prior to sale, a
notice orf sale appears In a publication such as the Daily Bond Buyer.
Aggressive Issuers may also contact prospective underwriters directly to
alert them of the impending sale. The underwriter then prepares a bid. The
decision as to whether or not to prepare a bid depends factors such as
overall market conditions, the issuer's reputation, and the firms capacity to
carry additional debt. The underwriter in a competitive sale has little time
to make a decision as to whether or not to offer a bid, since there are only a
few weeks between the notice of the sale and the date of the sale.
If the underwriter decides to enter a bid, additional work must be
completed. The underwriter must estimate the yields required to attract
potential investors and prepare a bid with some chance of coming in lower
441bid.
45 This description of the underwriting process is based on a synthesis of
the literature including the following works: Moak, L. (1982) "Sale and
Delivery of Bonds" in Municipal Bonds: Planning, Sale, and Administration.
Chapter 19. pp. 185-298; Lamb, R. and S. Rappaport (1980) Municipal Bonds:
The Comprehensive Review of Tax Exempt Securities and Public Finance.
McGraw Hill. New York; and, Rabinowitz, (969)Municipal Bond Finance and
Administration. Wiley-lnterscience. New York.
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than all of the competing underwriters. The winner underwriter then tries
to resell the bonds at a price high enough to cover the costs of researching
the market, preparing the bid, as well as make a profit. Losing
underwriters, on the other hand, must charge off all of their costs on to
other Issues for which they are the winning bidders.
The underwriter plans to resell the bonds in a matter of days
following the sale. The bonds are physically transported by the issuer to
the underwriter 30 to 60 days from the date of the sale. The underwriter
must pay the issuer upon delivery. Generally, underwriters have few funds
tied up in the issue prior to delivery, except for a small "good faith" check
to the issuer. By the time of the delivery, the underwriter should have
already resold the bonds, making either a profit or loss on the deal.
With negotiated sales, the underwriter enters the debt issuing
process at a much earlier stage. Issuers opting for this method solicit an
underwriter, perhaps the same one used on previous issuances.
Underwriters in negotiated sales act much like financial advisors,
assisting with the design of the bond's terms and structure, contacting
rating agencies, and providing other services to the issuer. The negotiated
underwriter may restructure the bond to make it more attractive or even
postpone the date of sale because of poor market conditions.
On the average, bonds sold by competitive bid tend to have lower
interest costs than those sold by negotiated sales.4 6 This is true, even
after adjusting for the additional services provided by the negotiated
46 Kessel, R (1974) "A Study of the Effects of Competition in Tax-Exempt
Bond Market," Journal of Political Economy. July-August. and West, R.R.
(1965) "New Issue Concessions on General Obligation Bonds: A Case of
Monopsony Pricing." Journal of Business. Both of these studies point out
that new issue borrowing costs are lower with an increase in the number of
bids received.
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underwriter. 4 7 There are, however, some advantages of negotiated sales
over competitive sales, particularly for small units of government, with
little experience in the bond market. 48 The municipal bond market is a
national market, putting investors across the country in touch with many
different and diverse issuers. For many issuers, a negotiated underwriter
can help inspire investor confidence and drum up additional support for a
bond sale. The underwriter, therefore, can serve as an important bridge
between the public sector and the investment community.
With competitive sales, the Issuer determines the winning
underwriter on the basis of lowest Interest costs. This is a simple
computation if term bonds4 9 have been issued. It is more complicated with
serial maturities. To simplify this problem the bond industry has
developed a quick formula which ignores the time value of money, yet gives
a measure for comparing total interest costs among competing bids. The
computation, known as Net Interest Cost (NIC) is found by adding the
total of interest payments for issue (adding discounts or subtracting
47 Joehnk, M. D. and D. S. Kidwell (1979) "Comparative Costs of Competitive
and Negotiation in the State and Local Bond Market" Journal of Finance.
June. See also, Municipal Finance Officers Association (1973) Costs
Involved in Marketing State-Local Bonds. Municipal Finance Officers
Association. Chicago.
48Ederington, L. H. (1976) "Negotiated versus Competitive Underwriting of
Corporate Bonds" Journal of Finance. March. and, Fabozzi, F. and R. R. West
(1981) "Negotiated versus Competitive Underwritings of Public Utility
Bonds: Just One More Time" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis."
September. These authors suggest add that the advantages of negotiated
sales may be particularly noticeable during periods of unstable market
conditions.
49With term bonds, the entire principal matures on one date. With serial
bonds, the principal is repaid over a series of periodic payments over the
life of the issue.
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premiums) and dividing by the amount of bonds times years outstanding
(bond year dollars):
NIC = total interest payment + discount (or. - Dremium)
bond year dollars 5O
Critics of the net interest cost argue that the method ignores the
time value of money because the formula accounts for the total amount of
interest regardless of when interest payments are due. An alternative
calculation, true interest cost (TIC) does account for the time value of
money. It is the yearly interest rate an issuer would be paying if all .future
cash payments discounted so that the sum of their present values equals the
bond payments. There is no single algebraic formula for calculating total
interest costs--present value tables or computers can be used to calculate
this interest rate.51
The difference between net and true interest cost is that the net'
interest calculation ignores the time value of interest payments. The
Center for Capital Market Research (University of Oregon) has conducted
extensive research on the problems associated with the use of net interest
5 0bond year dollars equals the par value of issue multiplied by the average
life.
5 1the function of TIC is to determine a rate of discount which, when applied
to each dollar payment of debt service, will produce an aggregate amount
equal to the money delivered to the issuer at settlement. The formula for
discount of each amount is the basic present value formula:
pv = [1/(1 +i)n] x A, where i = semi-annual interest rate used for
discounting; n=number of semi-annual periods from issue date to payment
date for the amount; and, A=amount of debt service payable at the end of n
semi-annual periods.
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cost as a basis for awarding underwriters. 52 With NIC, there is no
difference between an issue structured such that all interest payments are
due in the first year and an issue structured such that all interest payments
are due in the last year. It would be possible, therefore, to design an issue
with very high interest costs in the early years of the maturity and low
interest costs in later years, while still maintaining a relatively low net
interest cost. This "high-low" technique penalizes issuers by forcing them
to pay out heavy interest costs sooner than would otherwise be necessary.
True interest cost adjusts for these variations in when interest is due.
True interest costs would increase if payments are high in early years and
decreases if the interest payments are spread out over a longer time period.
There are a number of strategies to help bring NIC and TIC closer
together.5 3 The issuer can, for example, place a limit on the coupon rate to
prevent bonds in earlier years from having excessive Interest costs. Limits
can also be placed on the size of allowable discounts, since they can also
raise interest costs. Another tactic is to require interest costs on
succeeding maturities equal or surpass the rate on preceding maturities.
This will minimize the "high-low" problem.
Once an underwriter's bid wins, it becomes the underwriters
responsibility to resell the bonds. There are several different financial
intermediaries which help to facilitate the bond market. Underwriters are
classified as investment banks, because they do not provide many of the
conventional banking services that commercial banks provide. Commercial
52 see for example, Hopewell, M. and G. Kaufman (1977) Improving Bidding
Rules to Reduce Interest Costs in the Computation of Municipal Bonds: A
Handbook for Municipal Finance Officers. Center for Capital Market
Research, Eugene
531bid.
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banks, however, sometimes engage In underwriting as well as trading or
municipal bonds. The term "dealer" s used to describe either commercial
banks or investment banks which both underwrite new issues in the primary
market and trade bonds in the secondary market. In 1980, there were about
1,800 dealers and dealer banks registered with the SEC.54 Perhaps one-
third of these are active. Many dealers are small local underwriters who
handle only their community's business. As issues become larger and more
complex, the major dealers In New York, Chicago, and San Francisco have
come to take an increasingly larger share of the bond business. The largest
25 firms, for example, managed more than half of the total volume of new
issues In 1980. 5 5
"Traders" are those actively involved in the buying and selling of
bonds.56 They may specialize In a certain type of bond, for example, general
obligations, short term notes, sinking funds, and others. A trader 57 can be
employed by an Investment firm, or, perhaps, may work for a large
institution, such as a commercial bank, insurance company, or bond fund. A
"bond broker," on the other hand, is an agent who works between two traders
or dealers for a commission. They specialize in bonds that are difficult to
sell. A syndicate or underwriter experiencing difficulty in selling bonds
54Public Securities Association (1982) op. cit. p. 65
551bid.
56Delahanty, D. and A. Goldstein (1982) "The Roles of Traders and Brokers" in
Fabozz, F. ed., The Municipal Bond Handbook. Dow Jones Irwin. pp. 181-189,
describe the various functions a trader performs, "1. Making money for the
firm; 2. Assessing the value of various types of bonds; 3. Committing the
firm's capital in the most efficient fashion; 4. Acting as a merchandising
manager not unlike a department store buyer; 5) Creating ideas for
customers; and 6. Execution--i.e., the actual handling of the trade.
57A New York University anthropologist, Janet Marks, who has studied the
behavior of traders compares them to the Yanomamo, a primitive peole
living in South America.
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may contact a broker. The broker then finds a willing buyer and receives a
commission, generally equal to 1/8 of a point ($1.25 per bond) on the
transaction. There are relatively few bond brokers.5 8
Moving further outside the "inner circle," the perspective of
participants in the bond market changes from issuer to investor. The
secondary market becomes Increasingly important. The secondary
market, larger and more diverse than the primary market, represents the
entire stock of outstanding bonds. In this market, there are many bonds to
choose from and a range of different investment opportunities.
In deciding whether or not to invest in particular bonds an investor
may opt to examine bond ratings. A rating is essentially an opinion as to
the quality of the bond. It measures the likelihood that the issuer will
make all interest and principal payments on time. The agencies which
provide these ratings play an important role because of the large number of
different government entities bringing their bonds to market. Ratings have
become virtually obligatory for the sale of all major bond issues.59
58 The most well known bond broker Is J.J. Kenny's. Bond brokers have
earned almost a "mystical" position in the market, Delahanty, D. and A.
Goldstein, ( 1982) op. cit., describe it, "For example, we had been looking for
a large block of turnpike bonds one day; simultaneoulsy a broker rang our
wire and showed us a block of $10 million of these, which we promptly
bought. Lucky? Smart? We have always asked ourselves how he knew. We
probably will never find out, but it doesn't matter. The fact remains that he
was there at the right time with the right bonds..."
59Lamb, R and S. Rappaport (1980) Municipal Bonds: The Comprehensive
Review of Tax Exempt Securities and Public Finance. McGraw Hill. New
York. p. 51 "Despite the faith of most institutions and individual investors
in ratings, many other observers of the municipal bond business, especially
in government, are by no means as positive in their appraisal of the rating
agencies. One critic went so far as to argue that given the number of
municipal bonds and the number of rating analysts, the average bond rating
would only take 20 seconds..."
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Moody's began rating municipal bonds In 1918. Standard & Poor's,
the other major rating agency, began rating municipal bonds in the 1940s.
Moody's, considered the older and more established agency, rates
approximately 4,500 issues per year. Standard & Poor's rates about 1,500
issues annually. Unlike Moody's, Standard & Poor's will not rate most short
term notes nor certain types of revenue bonds.
Both agencies charge a fee for their services. The fee depends on the
size of the Issue and the amount of analysis necessary to conduct a rating.
Generally, the Issuer requests the rating, and the agency maintains and
updates the rating until the bond has been redeemed. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, these services were provided free of charge. The agencies
supported themselves through the sale of publications to investors and
others in the financial community. The growing volume and increased
complexity of conducting ratings led the agencies to Impose fees for their
services.
The rating agencies enter the picture soon after a decision has been
made to sell an issue. They are not involved in the actual structuring or
planning of the bonds. The terms, maturities, and other provisions are
decided upon by the issuer, financial advisor, bond counsel, underwriter, and
others who stand in the "inner circle." Rating agencies occupy a position
that In the "outer circle." Investors and others standing in the "outer
circle" depend upon the rating agencies to provide an independent and
unbiased judgement as to the quality of municipal bonds.
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Bond ratings are based on a combination of In-house data and
information relevant to the specific bond Issue.60 Upon receiving a rating
request, the agency conducts a preliminary analysis. Next, a meeting is set
up between the issuer and the agency's analytical team. The issuer
generally makes a presentation to the agency. At this time specific
questions as to the issue and issuer's financial condition can be addressed.
Following this meeting, the agencies rating committee examines all the
relevant Information and issues a rating. Once a rating decision has been
reached, then Issuer is notified and given an opportunity to appeal the
decision. At this point, the rating may be modified. Once a final decision
is reached, the issuer is notified, the rating becomes public and is entered
Into the agency's database. Once established, a rating will stay in effect
for the life of the bond, and as long as the issuer continues to furnish
financial information. For general obligations, the agencies require periodic
information such as audits, budgetary documents, and annual reports. For
revenue bonds, the agencies may also request quarterly progress reports on
the project itself. The failure to provide this information could result in
either a suspension or withdrawal of the rating.
Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's are thought to be remarkably
similar. They emphasize "independence, objectivity, and
disinterestedness."61 They attempt to remain sheltered away from
corporate or government influence. At the same time, both agencies
6OThe following discussion is based upon a number of sources including,
Lamb, R. and S. Rappaort (1980) op. cit., pp. 50-72; Petersen, J. (1975) The
Rating Game. The Twentieth Century Fund. New York; Moody's Investors
Services, Inc. (1977) Pitfalls in Issuing Municipal Bonds. Moody's Investors
Services, New York; and, Standard and Poors (1983) Credit Overview:
Municipal Ratings. Standard and Poors Corporation. New York.
6 1Lamb, R. and S. Rappaport (1980) op. cit. p. 54
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maintain that their ratings do not serve as a recommendation to purchase,
sell, or hold a security. Although a rating may have an effect on yields and
prices, 62 these are not considered when ratings are assigned. Moreover, the
agencies maintain that the presence of a rating does not mean that the
agency has conducted an audit, nor does it attest to the authenticity of the
data provided by the issuer. Ratings, moreover, can be changed, withdrawn,
or suspended, as the agencies deem necessary. The bond rating is a static
measure and the agencies are very much aware of its limitations.
The extent to which Moody's and Standard & Poor's are similar
becomes even more apparent when their rating symbols and definitions are
examined.
Table II-163
Municipal Bond Ratings and Definitions
Moody's Standard & Poor's . . Definitions
Aaa AAA Highest rating,
Extremely likely to
meet all debt service
requirements;
Aa AA Very strong capacity to
pay interest and
principal;
A A Strong capacity to pay
62 Phelps, C.( 1961) "The Impact of Tightening Credit on Municipal Capital
Expneditures in the United States. Yale Economic Review. Fall.; Jantscher,
G. (1970) "The Effects of Changes in Credit Rating on Municipal Borrowing
Costs" Brookings Reprint 177. The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C.;
and Rubinfeld, D. (1977) "Credit Ratings and the Market for General
Obligation Bonds" National Tax Journal. Vol. XXVI. pp. 17-27. These authors
support the contention that credit ratings can affect municipal borrowing
costs.
6 3 1bid. p. 55,
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interest and principal;
Baa BBB Adequate capacity to pay
interest and principal;
May be negatively
affected by adverse
economic conditions;
Ba BB All of these are
B B considered speculative
Caa CCC with request to capacity
Ca CC to pay interest and
C principal;
D C No interest is being
paid.
In addition to the similarity between rating symbols and their meanings,
both agencies base their ratings on similar types of data. There are four
types of information that both agencies collect: 1) debt structure and debt
history; 2) budgetary operations; 3) tax and revenue sources; and, 4) socio-
economic data. Information regarding debt is particularly important. The
rating agencies collect data such as debt per capita, debt as a percentage of
real estate valuations, debt as a percentage of personal income, and debt of
overlapping debt issuing entities. The rating agencies examine these data
over time, looking for trends and patterns in the issuance of debt. They
also examine budgetary operations, checking that the issuer has maintained
balanced budgets as well as control over expenditures. The rating agencies
also examine tax and revenue sources to see that they are stable and
predictable. Issuers with patterns of unstable revenue collection or
excessive dependence on outside sources will not fare well under the
scrutiny of the rating agencies. Finally, both rating agencies examine the
socio-economic base of the community issuing debt. They examine trends
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in population, employment, income, and other variables to determine the
overall financial position of the issuer.
Although Moody's and Standard & Poor's use the same general criteria
in assigning ratings, they differ in terms of the emphasis that they place on
the various criteria. The main difference between the two is that Moody's
emphasizes debt variables, while Standard & Poor's emphasizes those
variables which describe the economic base of the issuer. The emphasis
that Moody's places on debt and debt burden is reflected in the following
statement: 64
The analyst is concerned with the total impact of all debt
obligations on the reasonable ability of the taxpayers of the
issuing unit to meet them. To this end, his central and first
task is to derive a measure of the debt burden. In simplest
terms this is the relationship between the total debt burden on
the tax base in the governmental unit and wealth located
there...
In contrast, the Standard & Poor's philosophy regarding credit analysis
focuses on the economic base of the issuer: 65
We consider an issuer's economic base as the most critical
element in our determination of municipal bond ratings. It is
axiomatic that a community's fiscal health derives from its
economic health. Virtually all revenue sources, from sales and
income taxes, to permits and property taxes are affected by
economic conditions...
6 4 Moody's Investors Services (1977) op. cit. p. 16.
65Standard & Poor's (1980) Municipal and International Bond Ratings: An
Overview. Standard & Poor's Corporation. New York. p. 12.
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There are other ways in which Moody's and Standard & Poor's differ. 66 For
example, Standard & Poor's is inclined to give state government general
obligation bonds higher ratings than municipal corporations because states,
in general, have broader powers of taxation and are not subject to the same
restrictions applicable to local government (e.g., home rule). Moody's tends
to treat a state issuer just as it would treat a local government unit.
Another difference is that Standard & Poor's regards a "moral obligation"
backing as almost as good as a "full faith and credit" backing. Moody's does
not have the same faith in "moral obligation" bonds. Consequently, the Non-
Profit Housing Project Bonds of the New York State Housing Finance Agency,
the General Purpose Bonds of the New York State Urban Development
Corporation, which had "moral obligation" backing by the state government,
received a speculative investment rating (Ba) from Moody's and a strong
investment grade rating (A-) from Standard & Poor's.67
There are other cases where Moody's and Standard & Poor's depart.
Standard & Poor's is inclined to view as a positive credit feature the
automatic withholding and use of state aid to pay defaulted debt service. A
number of states including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
Indiana, South Carolina, and West Virginia have enacted legislative
measures which allow bondholders to collect defaulted local government
debt service payments from state government. Standard & Poor's rates the
bonds of local entities in these states, at most, one or two notches below
the ratings assigned to the state itself. Moody's, on the other hand, is
6 6Much of this discussion is based on Feldstein, S. and F. Fabozzi (1983) The
Municipal Bond Rating Agencies and Their Analytical Differences. in
Fabozzi, F. et. al., eds., The Municipal Bond Handbook. Dow Jones Irwin,
Homewood. pp. 140-151
6 7 Ibid. p. 146
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inclined to view the rating as a measure of the issuer's ability to avoid
default, regardless of any protections for bondholders set up by the state.
Another difference between the two agencies is in terms of how they
view the accounting practices employed by the issuer. Standard & Poor's
has stated that it will view issuers that do not prepare its financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), negatively in its rating process. Moody's tends to place greater
emphasis on the historical performance of an issuer (3-5 years), and does
not regard GAAP as essential to high ratings.
A final difference between the two agencies is how they regard
municipal bond insurance. Moody's bases its rating on the merits of the
issuer alone and its ratings do not reflect the existence of insurance.
Standard & Poor's considers bond insurance as a positive factor in assigning
its ratings. In rating bonds covered by insurance, Standard & Poor's
examines the creditworthiness of the underlying insurance companies. It
has given automatic AAA or AA ratings to insured bonds.
While there are a number of differences between the two agencies, in
most cases, the differences only occasionally show up in terms of
differences in the actual ratings. Since both agencies are explicit about
the factors they consider to be important, the way to view differences is
perhaps in terms of their complimentary nature. That s, when both
agencies provide ratings, 68 a more comprehensive picture emerges because
of their analytical differences.
The question as to whether or not Insurance affects bond ratings
introduces yet another participant standing in the "outer circle." Insurance
68The SEC and several other agencies recommend that an issuer solicit at
least two ratings for each new bond issue.
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for municipal bonds has been available since 1971 and has continued to
grow. Bond insurance is an unconditional contractual guaranty by a
property and casualty insurance company to pay bondholders any debt
service payments which for whatever reason has not paid by the bond issuer.
There are two69 principal Insurers--the American Municipal Bond
Assurance Corporation (AMBAC) and the Municipal Bond Insurance
Association (MBIA). As of June 30, 1981, they over 3,000 policies
providing coverage to some $23 billion in total interest and principal
payments.70 Both of these insurers exist as conglomerate corporate
entities, formed out of the alliance of many separate insurance companies.
For example, the insurance companies holding at least a 5 percent share In
AMBAC include Allstate Insurance Company, Continental Casualty Company,
Fremont Indemnity Company, Home Insurance Company, INA Reinsurance
Company, Travelers Indemnity, and Unigard Mutual Insurance. Bond
insurance can improve ratings for issuers, particularly, those who receive
ratings from Standard & Poor's.71
In addition to rating agencies and bond insurers, there other
participants in the municipal bond market. Several organizations provide
information on bond offerings and financial transactions. These
publications and wire services help ensure that there is an adequate amount
of information available to underwriters, dealers, traders, investors, and
69A third, smaller municipal bond issuer is Finance Guarantee Insurance
Corporation.
7 0Feldstein, S. (1983) "Muncipal Bond Insurance and Pricing" in Feldstein, S.
et. al. The Municipal Bond Handbook. Vol. . Dow Jones Irwin, Homewood. pp
405-406.
71A recent General Accounting Office study determined that municipal bond
insurance premiums are dangerously low and that "insurance companies
themselves have admitted that they don't have a good method of pricing."
Kapner, B. (1985) Investment Dealer's Digest, December. p. 6.
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others Interested in municipal bonds. The Blue List, Bond Buyer, and
publications issued by Moody's and Standard & Poor's provide up-to-date
information on market conditions. Advances n telecommunications
technology have helped to create services such as the Munlfacts Wire,
Dow Jones Capital Market Wire, and Telerate which provide on-line
data retrieval and analysis capabilities. In addition, conventional new
services, such as the Wall Street Journal, numerous magazines and trade
journals, provide information to those concerned with municipal bonds.
These Information services play a critical role in the municipal bond
market. Unlike the stock market, there is no central exchange. The entire
market for municipal bonds operates largely over a nationwide network of
underwriters, dealers, and investors. Virtually all transactions occur
through communication systems (telephone lines, satellite transmissions,
and other means of telecommunications), where the expression "dictum
meum pactum" (my word is my bond) still dominates.
The final set of participants are those involved with the regulation
of the municipal bond market. In 1975, the federal government passed
legislation creating a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(MSRB).72 This is largely a self-regulating body, drawing membership
primarily from the municipal bond industry, but also subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
It is interesting to note that municipal bonds are exempt from many of the
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. This legislation requires strict registration and reporting for
72A complete description of the rules developed by the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board is contained in Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
( 1981 ) MSRB Manual. Commercial Clearinghouse Incorporated. Chicago.
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corporate securities. The 1975 legislation coincided with the development
of full disclosure standardS7 3 which the municipal bond industry
voluntarily agreed to adopt. Full disclosure is the provision by a
governmental Issuer of all pertinent facts regarding its financial condition,
the security pledged to meet all debt service requirements, projected uses
of bond funds, and other facts relevant to Issuers. Groups such as the
National Committee on Governmental Accounting (NCGA) and the
American Institue of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) have
contributed to the development of uniform standards of public sector
accounting.
Prior to enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,74
many of the activities of those In municipal bond market were largely
unregulated. The most important aspects of the 1975 legislation include:
* organizations involved in the sale and purchase of municipal
bonds were required to register with the SEC;
* a rule-making body (MSRB) was created and charged with
developing a set of rules for the entire industry;
* the SEC, the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.
(NASD), and federal bank regulatory agencies (Comptroller of
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) were given
additional authority to examine and discipline municipal
securities brokers, dealers, and others in the municipal bond
industry for violation of board rules;
Under this legislation, however, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
has no powers of inspection nor enforcement; its role is to develop and
maintain an appropriate set of industry standards. The board has organized
73The Municipal Finance Officer's Association is responsible for
spearheading the movement to develope full disclosure standards.
74 1n April, 1975, th Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs sent the 1975 Amendments to the Senate. These amendments were
signed into law on June 4, 1975.
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741n April, 1975, th Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs sent the 1975 Amendments to the Senate. These amendments were
signed into law on June 4, 1975.
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its rules into: 1) administrative; 2) definitional; and 3) general.
Administrative rules pertain to the operations of the MSRB itself,
specifying procedures for election of board members, rulemaking
procedures, fees for membership, and other internal matters. Definitional
rules define the terms used in Board rules. General rules contain the
substantive regulation developed by the Board. They include:
* qualifications and examinations for all brokers, dealers, and
others involved in the municipal bond industry;
* procedures for record-keeping, processing, and settlement of
transactions in the municipal bond market;
* rules for syndicate operations;
* fair practice and standards of ethical conduct in municipal
bond transactions;
In short, the rules serve as guidelines for most of the individuals who work
in the municipal bond industry.
In summary, the municipal bond market draws together a wide range
of participants. Local governments are primarily interested in debt as
means of financing large capital expenditures. The bond counsel and
underwriter assist in the design and sale of debt in the primary market.
Outstanding issues are traded by brokers and dealers in the secondary
market. The rating agencies are essential to a smoothly functioning
national market because they provide information to prospective investors.
Equally Important is the role of financial publications. Although the
Municipal Securities Rule-making Board has established some basic ground
rules, the municipal bond market is largely self-regulated.
The preceding description of the municipal bond market serves to
illustrate some of the complexities associated with floating a bond issue.
In addition to the selection of bond counsel and underwriter, municipal
governments must consider a variety of new debt instruments, as well as
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factors such as bond ratings and bond insurance. The municipal government
which decides to enter the long-term bond market must rely upon a variety
of actors (investors, underwriters, brokers, and others) outside their
traditional domain. It is, moreover, incumbent upon local officials to
develop the necessary relationships with key participants outside of
government in order to ensure that process of borrowing occurs in a timely
manner, at the lowest possible cost to the city. Relationships between
city officials and members of investment community, while an important
topic of inquiry, is beyond the scope of this present study.
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Chapter 3
A Historical Overview of Municipal Borrowing
Historically, cities have used municipal bonds to finance
infrastructure. While the exact date of the first municipal bond is not
known, New York City sold securities as early as 1812 and issued its first
water supply bonds in the late 1800s. Boston's bonded debt grew from about
$100,000 in 1822 to over $1.5 million in 1840.1 By most accounts, the
decades of 1820 to 1840 mark the "real beginnings of municipal bonded
indebtedness in the United States." 2
Although cities used bonds to finance war-related expenditures3, or
financial emergencies created by natural disasters (fires, plagues,
hurricanes, etc.), the major purposes for local debt were urban
infrastructure, transportation systems (canals, railroads, highways), and
other large scale public works projects.
Water systems were among the first public works projects to be
financed with debt. As urban populations grew and densities increased, the
needs for water increased, to ensure cleanliness, to combat disease, and to
extinguish fires. At first, a system of private provision emerged, but these
systems were inadequate. In the 1830s, New York began construction of the
great Croton Aqueduct. Some years later, Boston started construction on
the Cochuitate Waterworks. By the 1860s, there were some 68 public water
'Studenski, (1930) Public Borrowing. National Municipal League. New York
City. p. 5
2Hillhouse, A. M. ( 1936) Municipal Bonds--Century of Experience. Prentice
Hall. New York. p. 32
3Studenski described how New York City borrowed to construct
fortifications, jails, and to purchase arms during the Revolutionary War.
systems. 4 Debt financing proved to be a successful way in which cities
could generate the necessary revenues to finance construction and then
spread repayment of debt over the life of the project. Cities were able to
provide what the private market could not--plentiful, affordable water.
Cities began to use debt financing for ambitious projects, such as the
construction of water filtration systems in Patterson, New Jersey and
Lawrence, Massachusetts. Chicago, which drew its water from Lake
Michigan, reversed the flow of the Chicago River, so that its sewage
emptied into the Mississippi River instead of into Lake Michigan. The
Burnham Plan for Chicago called for major public works investment, the
construction of railway stations, parks, boulevards, civic centers, and other
forms of infrastructure. His plan also detailed how bond issues would be
required to finance the vast public works proposals. One historian has
estimated that Chicago built about $300 million ($2 billion in 1980 dollars)
of public improvements. during the first fifteen years of plan
implementation.5
Cities began to borrow when their need for public works began to
exceed their abilities to finance such infrastructure using current revenues.
In the past, "modest capital expenditures were made from loans, sales of
public land, donations, subscriptions, lotteries, or current taxation."6 The
use of borrowed funds represents a major transformation in city finances, a
4for a discussion of early water systems, see Blake, N. (1956) Water for the
Cities. Syracuse University Press. Syracuse.
sScot, M. (1969) American City Planning Since 1890. University of
California Press. Berkeley. p. 102. and, So, F. et. al., (1979) The Practice of
Local Government Planning. International City Management Association,
Washingtion, D.C. p. 129.
6 Hillhouse, A. M. (1936) op. cit. p.31
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shift from a "pay-as-you-go" financing scheme to a "pay-as-you-use"
orientation. "Pay-as-you-use" meant that future generations would be
obliged to support interest and principal payments, through the tax system
for projects planned and constructed in the present. This provides a means
for spreading the large, "lumpy," costs of construction over the useful,
expected life of the project, ensuring that beneficiaries share in its costs.
The growth of debt, therefore, parallelled the growth of cities. Just
as urban public works (roads, sewers, buildings, etc.) took on Increased
scale and magnitude, so too did the levels of outstanding municipal debt.7
As cities grew into major centers of social and economic activity, cities
themselves became major financial actors, issuing larger and larger
amounts of debt. By the turn of the century, cities had expanded their
repertoire of municipal services to include power plants, gas works, police
stations, fire stations, hospitals, asylums, libraries, school buildings,
museums, and other services. Some of the more unusual municipal owned
projects8 included slaughter houses, printing plants, ice plants, asphalt
plants, bath houses, laundries, coal yards, milk pasteurization plants, and
ferries. The advent of borrowing certainly opened up a wide realm of new
possibilities for America's cities.
The Connections Between Debt and Development
Debt financing helped to expand the purview of municipal services,
and, arguably, helped to broaden the definition of public goods. The
relationship between private enterprise and local government took on new
7Hillhouse reported that "bonds for elaborate boulevards took the place of
bonds for plank streets. " p. 36
8 Aldrich, M. (1979) A History of Public Works in the United States 1790-
1970. U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration.
p. 45.
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dimensions when municipal bonds were used to finance railroads and
speculative development. The use of bond funds was justified In that
"public purposes" were being served--canals and railroads connected cities
together, new developments generated population, housing, and jobs.
Perhaps, local government should never have been in the business of
financing the railroads, communication lines, and other forms of speculative
development. Initially, states9 were actively involved in the construction
of "nternal improvements." The Erie Canal, completed in 1817, was one of
the first public projects to be financed with debt. Its construction costs
were approximately $7 million; before work was completed, the tolls
exceeded the interest charges, and within ten years, the bonds Issued for its
construction were selling at a premium. to The success of New York State's
Erie Canal prompted many states across the nation to undertake similar
projects, financed with debt. Canals began to appear in Ohio, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and other states. Within a period of 20
years, from 1820 to 1840, state debt grew from $12.8 million to over $ 170
million. As one observer 11 noted:
This frightful career of debt involved in its course even the
youngest and weakest states and some of the territories, and
the result of the whole was a larger debt contracted in that
brief period by about one-half of the states than the whole
Union owed at the highest point in our national debt for all its
wars and acquisition of territory--The Revolutionary War, the
Louisiana and Florida purchases, all inclusive....
9For detailed discussion of state borrowing, see Ratchford, B. (1941)
American State Debts. Duke University Press. Durham, N. C.
1OMcGrane, R. (1935) Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts. New
York. p. 5.
1 'speech by Senator Thomas Benton before United States Senate, Janurary,
1840, quoated in Tenth Census, Vol VII. p. 530.
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Many states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Indiana, Illinois, Florida, Mississippi,
and Arkansas) began to default during and after the Panic of 1837. In state
after state, disgruntled investors passed strict limitations or outright
prohibitions of state borrowing. Rhode Island, although free of debt at that
time, limited total outstanding state debts to $50,000. New Jersey put a
$100,000 ceiling on state debt, a mandatory 35 year period of retirement,
and the requirement of majority rule among the electorate to authorize any
new state bond issue. New Jersey's legislation became the model upon
which many other states patterned their limitations.
By the beginning of the Civil War, restrictions or prohibitions
against such aid had been written into practically all the
constitutions...with state aid for internal improvements
checked, municipal aid filled the gap.12
Earlier, it was noted that 1840 to 1860 marked the beginnings of municipal
indebtedness. This period also marked the end of state borrowing.
The extent to which municipalities and local government picked up
the slack created by the exodus of state government borrowers is striking.
See Figure Ill-, which shows how municipal debt overtook state debt in the
1860s. One observer noted' 3:
Local subsidies have been granted in all sections of the country
to an extent which is practically impossible of determination.
All communities wished to share in the business prosperity
which followed the opening of new railroad connections, and
cities and towns which needed little urging upon the part of
promoters to induce them to become financially interested in
their projects. They have endorsed the bonds of railroad
companies, and exchanged their bonds for railroad shares.
12 Hillhouse, A.M. (1936) op. cit.
13 Ibid.
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Local subsidies have also been given in the form of donations of
money, bonds, and lands.
Here, the logic of public purpose appears twisted. Because states were
prohibited from issuing debt, the business of financing internal
improvements was turned over to municipalities. In order to secure public
financing, railroad promoters convinced the public that railroads would
bring prosperity and development.14 Local officials then issued debt on
behalf of private railroad companies, turning over the proceeds for railroad
stock. Some of these officials expected these stock dividends to not only
cover debt service, but also to fund a portion of local expenditures, as well.
Many municipalities experienced what happened to those state governments
which were led down a similar course of borrowing to support "Internal
improvements," some decades earlier. In the 1870s, following numerous
defaults by municipalities, limitations on local debt were enacted. 15 These
laws limited the size of debt, purposes for borrowing, the maturity of debt
14for a detailed description of railroad bonds, see Hillhouse, A. M. ( 1936)
Municipal Bonds--A Century of Experience. Chapter VII. Prentice Hall, New
York. pp. 143-199. It is clear from this description that the issuance of
railroad aid bonds was characterized by corruption, incompetence, and
profiteering.
15The first state to enact legislation limiting municipal borrowing, Iowa,
did so In 1857, and put a 5 percent of valuation limitation on debt. The
majority of legislation came during and immediately after the Depression of
1873.
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instruments, and required that popular referendum be held on bond issues. 16
For a summary of the various limitations on local debt imposed by state
governments, see Table 111-1. Given the experience of state governments
and their default problems several decades earlier, history had a knack for
repeating itself.
The Evolution of New Debt Instruments
In spite of these limitations on local debt, debt financing proliferated
in the 20th century. From 1902 to 1932, outstanding municipal debt grew
from $1.63 million to over $15.21 million. In addition to issuing greater
amounts of debt, cities introduced new debt mechanisms. The first bonds to
appear were general obligations - bonds supported by the full faith and
credit of the taxing district. Another type of bond, general-special bonds,
were first supported by special assessments7 levies, but if these proved
inadequate, the bonds became general obligations of the municipality.
Special-special bonds were bonds supported entirely by special assessment'
16Debt limits established during the 1870s were generally expressed as
some percentage of assessed valuation. The laws often exempted debt
issued for self-liquidating projects (e.g., municipal power plants, and,
waterworks). Many of the debt laws (e.g., New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Viriginia, Texas, Utah, etc.) enacted specified that the funds could not be
loaned to any individual, corporation, or non-government entity.
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota have attempted
to have the life of the bond issue correspond to the probably life of the
public facility built with the borrowed funds. The more general pattern was
to set the maturity at some arbitrary length, perhpas 20 years. Most of
states also enacted legislation requiring some sort of popular vote (either
simple majority or two-thirds majority) on bond issues.
17Special assessments are levies against real property, in addition to
property taxes, to defray some or all of the costs of a public improvement,
such as sidewalks or street lighting, which benefit individual properties.
The use of special assessments enabled cities to recover costs associated
with a public improvement. At times, special assessments rivaled the
general property tax as a source of revenue for some localities.
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Table III-1
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LIMITS
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Del aware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
ON
APPLIED
C OR S PERCENT AGAINST
both 20 LAV
No limitations
C 4 EAV
No limitations
S 15 LAV
C 3 EAV
restricted to 2-1/4 times
S 3-12 LAV
S 10 LAV
C 7 LAV
both 15 MV
S 15 MV
both 5 EAV
C 2 LAV
C 5 MV
S 8-20 EAY
C 3-10 MV
C 10 LAV
C 7.5 LAV
no limitations
S 5 EAV
S 10 EAV
S 20 EAV
S 10 LAV
both 5 EAV
both 5 EAV
no limitations
S 10 LAV
S 1.75 EAV
S 3.5 EAV
C 4 LAV
C 7 MV
C 5 EAV
S 10 LAV
C 5 LAV
S 3 MY
S 15 LAV
S 3 LAV
C 8 LAV
C 5 EAV
no limitations
no limitations
C 4 MV
S 10 LAV
both 18 LAV
C 5 LAV
both 5 LAV
both 5 EAY
C 2 EAV
MUNICIPAL BORROWING
PROVISIONS
FOR EXTENDING
none
simple majority
none
none
latest tax receipts
none
none
simple majority
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
none
approval
none
none
none
2/3
simple majority
none
none
approval
none
none
two-thirds
none
none
none
varies
none
none
simple majority
simple majority
none
none
varies
none
varies
varies
C - constitutional; S - statutory
MV - full market value; LAV - locally established assessed value;
EAV - state equalized assessed value;
simple majority - debt limit can be exceeded with referendum;
approval - debt limit can be exceed with permission of
financial board; varies - provisions for exceeding
limit vary.
Source: ACIR (1976) Understanding the Market for State and Local Debt.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Washington.
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levies. The holder of such an obligation had no claim against revenues other
than those coming from the specific property benefiting from the
improvement.
Special assessment debt grew in popularity, so that between 1910
and 1931:18
This type of debt increased fivefold, so that cities over 30,000
had accumulated over a half billion dollars of such obligations,
an amount equal to about five percent of total municipal debt
for these cities. Cities over 100,000 had special assessment
obligations n 1930 totaling over $400 million.
There are several factors which contributed to the growth of special
assessment debt. The use of special assessment obligations and other
revenue bonds became a means of evading the limits on conventional debt
(general obligations) established following the Depression of 1870. Special
assessment financing, moreover, was seen as means of accommodating real
estate booms which occurred in Florida, California, and a number of other
states during the early 20th century. Hillhouse described Florida's real
estate boom as:19
one of the greatest in history, bringing a flood of immigration
by railroad and automobile. The cause of the boom has been
attributed to various factors: surplus wealth seeking
investment, the state's climate, activities of millionaire real
estate owners in Florida, faulty bond laws, and absence in the
state of an inheritance tax. For several years in the 1920s,
cities went mad with speculation fever. General-special
obligations were issued at a fast and furious obligations. Much
of this indebtedness was authorized not by a vote of the people
but by the real estate speculators themselves, who had, by
various means become the town councilmen...No other state
could keep pace with Florida's per capita issue. Florida cities
18Donovan, C. H. (1957) "Special Assessments--Their Plance in Municipal
Finance" Municipal Finance, Vol. XXIX, No. 4., May. p. 157.
19Hillhouse, A. M. (1936) op. cit., p. 83
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that had been mere swamps n the the 1920s had debts of
$1,000 or more per capita six or seven years later. By 1925,
Florida was leading the nation in debt issuance; and the 1926
record far surpassed that of the previous year...
Before long, Florida cities soon lead the nation in defaults. By the time of
the Great Depression, some 43 percent (621 of 1,456) of all of the taxing
districts in the state had defaulted on their bonds.20
Debt and Depressions
During the major periods of economic depression, governments
experience difficulties in meeting their debt service requirements.
Depressions leading to defaults occurred in the 1840s (with states), in the
1870s (with cities), in the 1890s (with special districts), and in the 1930s
(with all units of state and local government). State and local borrowing
has tended to be cyclical, that is, during good economic times, when demand
for construction is high, when money is available for investment, states and
localities tend to act as private producers, issuing debt to finance their
various public works projects. When hard economic times hit, investment
pools dry up, state and local governments tend to cutback on new
investment, cancelling or postponing projects until interest rates fall.
The defaults during the Great Depression were serious.
Approximately 3,500 units of local government defaulted on either interest
or principal. Some 350 counties, 850 cities and towns, and similarly large
numbers of school districts and special districts were involved. Virtually
every type of government, in all geographic areas were affected. Municipal
assets were frozen in closed banks. Property values dropped 18 percent
20Hillhouse points out that approximately 20 percent of all defaults in the
nationa at that time could be attributed to the single state of Florida.
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nationwide, and property tax revenues, the most important source of
revenues for local government, plummeted. Tax delinquencies increased
from 10 percent in 1930 to 26 percent in 1933. At the same time, local
expenditures (particularly for public welfare functions) increased greatly.
The combined effects of reduced revenues and increased service costs
forced many municipalities into default.
While the total amount of debt in default during the 1929 Depression
was much greater than in earlier default periods. The amount in default,
however, was only 15 percent of the total outstanding debt, a proportion
smaller than either the 1837 or 1870 depression periods. Although the
loss of interest and principal amounted to $100 million, this represented
about one-half of one percent of the total debt outstanding. Moreover, state
and local governments recovered more quickly from this default period than
they did in earlier default periods21:
Most of the large state and local units in default made
repayment of all due debt service charges within a few years.
For example, all of the 48 cities with population over 25,000
that were in default in this depression period were reportedly
out of default by 1938.
Although the Great Depression was serious, cities appeared to have "learned
their lessons" from past default periods. Most of the debt in default was
eventually repaid. Unlike in previous periods,2 2 few governments repudiated
debt. Although the depression period caused some cities to experience
21
Hemnnel, G. (1971) The Post War Quality of State and Local Debt. National
Bureau of Econcnic Research. Report 94. ew York. p. 23.
221n the 1840s, when many state governments went into default, some
(including) Forida, Georgia, and Arkansas simply repudiated large portions of
their outstanding debt. This, no doubt, angered investors and encouraged
voters to enact strict laws against state borrowing.
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revenue shortages and thereby default on their bonds, it can not be said that
depressions were the sole cause of defaults. A number of useful studies 2 3
identifying the causes of default, preventative measures, and adjustment
policies emerged. The immediate causes of municipal default included: tax
delinquency, unbalanced budgets, and bank failures; the indirect causes
included "low price level, real estate overdevelopment, excessive debt,
changes in revenue systems, and economic factors affecting the ability of
the community to pay".24
Municipalities have defaulted in good times as well as bad.
Following the Gold Rush, San Francisco found itself saddled with debt
incurred during the boom years which it could no longer support.
Philadelphia's default has been blamed on a reorganization plan which
involved the consolidation of old districts into a single new corporate
entity. As soon as some of the old districts realized that consolidation was
to occur, they voted in massive mprovements and shifted the debts to the
larger corporate entity. The new city inherited some $17 million in
outstanding debt, about one quarter of which had been created within thirty
days prior to consolidation.2 5 In Pittsburgh, some years later, a similar
folly took place, starting with reorganization and ending in default. In
Chicago, when the Depression of 1857 struck, large numbers were forced
into unemployment. Since the city provided financial assistance to these
unemployed workers, it had difficulty meeting its debt obligations. Cities
in every geographic region, of every size and type have, at one time or
23 see for an example, Chatters, C. (1933) Municipal Debt Defaults: Their
Prevention and Adjustment. Municipal Finance Officers Association.
Chicago.
24 1bid. p. 8-9
25Philadelphia debt-consolidation story.
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another, experienced default. Mobile, Alabama26 was the first to default
(1839). Duluth, Minnesota,2 7 Rahway, New Jersey,New Orleans, Louisiana, 28
Middlesborough Kentucky, Cimarron, Kansas, and many others followed. In
most of these cases, there was some degree of incompetence, poor planning,
corruption, and bad luck. 2 9
During the Great Depression and for some time afterwards, municipal
borrowing in the United States actually declined. There' are several
explanations. First, it was as if the sleeping giant of federal government
was finally awakened. Roosevelt and the policies of the New Deal
introduced sweeping changes in national economic policy, which were to
have profound effects upon the economy and government itself. The most
important was the introduction of counter-cyclical economic measures. Up
until this point in history, government spending and borrowing tended to be
pro-cyclical, expanding and contracting with general economic conditions.
26an outbreak of yellow fever and the arrive of the Panic of 1837 have been
cited as causes for Mob ile's default.
27Monkkonen's case study on Duluth, In Monkkonen, E. (1984) "The Politics of
Municipal Indebtedness and Default 1850-1936" in The Politics of Urban
Fiscal Policy, ed., T. J. McDonald and S. K. Ward. Sage Publications, Beverly
Hills, points out that collusion between local officials and profiteers
spurred on by fiancier Jay Cooke's grandiose plans for the Northern Pacific
Railroad led to high expectations about building a major metropolis,
financed with debt. When the growth and prosperity failed to materialize,
the city went into default.
26A combination of excessive railroad aid, reduced property values
following the Civil War, and "carbetbagger mismanagement" were cited as
causes for New Orlean's default.
29 Memphis' default in the late 1800s was blamed on the yellow fever plague,
in which more than 5,000 people died (amounting to about 1/8th of the
city's population). Galveston, Texas was struck by a hurricane in 1900 and
subsequently went into default. Similarly, Astoria, Oregon was devasted by
a fire, an "act of God" leading to default.
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Under Roosevelt, new measures, introduced as a cure for depression,
expanded public works construction and put unemployed workers back on the
Job. The Federal government started building roads, bridges, sewers,
waterworks, public buildings, housing, hospitals, parks, docks, dams,
wharves, airports, power plants, and many other forms of infrastructure
which were previously the responsibilities of local governments. New
federal agencies such as the Federal Public Works Administration, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the United States Housing Authority
set up programs for funneling federal grants and loans to sub-national
governments. With these federal assistance programs in place, it can be
argued, that the need for municipal spending and borrowing decreased.
A second factor, perhaps more persuasive, than the New Deal in
explaining the decrease in municipal borrowing in the post-Depression
period was the advent of World War II. During the war, state and local
governments were forced to cut back on capital outlays. A Special
war-time commission, the Capital Issues Commission, screened and
regulated all proposed public capital projects. Those projects which were
deemed as not contributing to the war-time effort were cancelled or
postponed. This curtailed much of the planned debt of cities and other
units of government.
During the post-war period, municipalities began to borrow heavily.
There was a large backlog of public construction projects. There was, in
addition, a general increase in the need for public investment. High birth
rates and rising incomes pushed families into the suburbs and fostered
demand for more schools and recreational facilities. The number of
automobiles continued to grow, straining the existing system of roads,
streets, and highways. Increased demand for higher education, fueled in
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part by the GI bill led to the construction of more colleges and universities.
At the same time, cities began to make large investments in public housing
and health services. New public facilities had to be built; the mood of the
country was optimistic and borrowing began to increase.
The Post War Period
The most exhaustive study of borrowing practices of state and local
government during the postwar period was produced by Roland . Robinson.30
He noted that governments borrowed primarily to finance capital outlays.
Borrowing to finance deficits in current expenditures was rare. Some
states borrowed large amounts for veteran's bonuses, but this was the only
non-capital item financed with debt. Robinson also pointed out that state
and local government capital expenditures were not subject to an evident
cyclical influence during the post war period. In other words, borrowing
appeared to be unaffected by the three modest dips in business activity. He
states, the "planning and execution of these works has such a massive
momentum that it is not likely to be disturbed by short-term business
fluctuations." 3 1 Robinson suggests, that in the postwar period, borrowing
by state and local governments to finance capital expenditures had more of
a counter-cyclical than cyclical character.
One of the main reasons, according to Robinson, that city governments
borrow for capital spending is that in many states it was easier for a local
government to get tax power to cover debt service than to make a capital
outlay directly. 32 Moreover, cities were more likely to dependent on
30Robinson, R. . (1960) Postwar Market for State and Local Government
Securities. The National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton University
Press. Princeton, N.J.
31lbid. p. 6.
3 2 1bid. p. 37
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borrowing than state governments. State governments frequently had large
budgets and detailed plans in which they coordinated the receipt of current
revenues (e.g., gasoline taxes) to large capital expenditures (e.g., highway
and road expenditures). The proportion of capital expenditures financed by
debt at the local levels of government, during the postwar period, was
"considerably larger than the proportion of capital expenditures at the
state level that is so financed."
Robinson's study was also contributed to an understanding of the
process by which borrowing decisions were made In the postwar period. He
determined that 33
governments traditionally arrange financing fully before
making any capital expenditures; in other words, financing
leads outlays.
According to Robinson, anticipatory borrowing was common during the
postwar period. The low rates interests on tax exempt debt that prevailed
during this period stimulated borrowing of funds not immediately needed3 4.
State and local government units could borrow with tax-exempt
obligations and turn about and invest the proceeds in Treasury
securities which were taxable obligations to many other
holders. Since state and local governments are tax exempt
institutions per se, they used the privilege of tax exemption on
their own issues to help to solve their liquidity problems.
While the total amounts of capital expenditure and borrowing increased
rapidly, between 1946 and 1951, the ratio of new construction expenditures
to borrowing in the same year dropped from over 70 percent to under 50
percent. However, when Robinson compared the long-term borrowing of
each to new construction outlays of the following year, the results were
33 1bid. p. 39
341bid. p. 41
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different--remaining fairly steady, thereby supporting the view that
borrowing anticipated new construction expenditures by about one year.35
Another important finding 36 by Robinson was that although the one-
year lag between borrowing and new construction was a reasonable
estimate, for some projects, such as toll roads and bridges, the period of
anticipation was much longer than one year. On smaller projects, the degree
of anticipation was less than one year.
Robinson's study was particularly useful in that it described some
elements of the borrowing process. He maintained that "law and tradition
control much of the borrowing process; the margin left for policy
determination by finance officers s modest."37 Among the decisions made
by finance officers is the timing of offerings. At the same time38,
many full faith and general credit offerings, however, leave the
finance officer relatively little latitude. If the public demand
for projects involved is considerable, there is not much public
sympathy with waiting because the 'market is temporarily
weak'
Robinson estimated that "margin of maneuver" is not more than a few
months. In addition to the timing of offerings, finance officers also can
influence the maturity structure of most public offerings. While municipal
bonds are "sometimes geared to the life of the asset being financed,"
Robinson suggested that it is more common to find the maturity tied to
some estimate of revenues.
3 5 1bid. p. 44
3 6 1bid. pp. 44-45
3 7 1bid. p. 46
3 8 1bid.
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In summary, Robinson described the postwar period as one in which
the demand for funds by cities was great, fostered by urbanization and the
growth of suburbs.. Cities resorted to borrowing in order to finance a wider
array of capital expenditures. In Robinson's words, 39
this strong and insistent public demand often encounters the
obstacle that our forefathers frequently put rigid limits on the
power to tax and to borrow in state constitutions or into
statutes creating local governmental units.
Legal and political issues became increasingly relevant to the issuance of
debt. In the postwar era, a great deal of borrowing, "while legal, has had to
be tailored into a pattern of legality by considerable indirection." 40 Among
the tactics for evasion of debt limits include the creation of new or "novel"
types of governmental organizations--the various authorities and districts
granted authority to tax and borrow, overlapping the boundaries of existing
units.
The New York City Fiscal Crisis
The New York City Fiscal Crisis was one of the most important events
in recent history to have influenced the municipal bond market. The fiscal
crisis can be defined as the chronic inability to match expenditures and
revenues resulting in a deficit so large that the City teetered on brink of
bankruptcy. The crisis was so serious that banks and other financial
institutions closed their doors on the city, refusing to provide the short
term loans that city routinely used to finance its operations. The inability
to borrow, therefore, was both a cause of, as well as, a consequence of the
fiscal crisis in New York City.
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3 9 1bid. p. 50
4 0 1bid. p. 51
It is useful to distinguish between short term and long range causes
of New York's fiscal problems. The long-term factors contributing to the
1975 crisis include: 1) a weakening of the city's economic base;41 2) an
increasing share of residents dependent upon municipal services; 4 2 3) a lack
of support from the state and federal government;43 and 4) increased labor
costs. 4 4 On the other hand, short term causes such as: 1) the recession of
the mid 70's;45 2) loss of investor confidence in New York City obligations;
3) poor financial management on the part of city officials; 4 6 4) duplicity on
the part of financial institutions; 4 7 and 5) over-dependence on short-term
notes; were of a fundamentally different nature.
41see for example, Epstein, J. (1977) The Last Days of New York; Sternlieb,
G. and J. Hughs (1977) Metroppolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts,
Sale, K. (1977) in R. Alcaly and D. Mermelstein. The Fiscal Crisis of
American Cities, Vintage Books. New York.; also, Congressional Budget
Office (1976) Causes of New York City's Fiscal Crisis. Political Science
Quarterly. Vol. 90. No. 4. pp. 659-674.
42 Auletta, K. (1980) The Streets Were Paved With Gold. Vintage Books. New
York., Piven, F. ( 1977) The Urban Crisis: Who Got What and Why in Alcaly, R.
and D. Mermelstein, op. cit.;
43Melman, S. (1976) The Federal Rip-off of New York's Money. Public
Employee Press. March 12. Muchnick, D. (1976) Death Warrant for the
Cities. Dissent. December; Newfield, J. and P. Dubrul, The Abuse of Power:
The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York. Viking Press. New
York.
44Peters, C. (1975) We Could Have Saved New York. The Washington Monthly.
December.
45Shefter, M. (1977) New York City's Fiscal Crisis: The Politics of Inflation
and Retrenchment. The Public Interest. Summer.
46Ring, J. A. (1979) Anatomy of a Fiscal Crisis. The Public Interest. Winter.
"to accumulate a debt as massive as New York City's more than $33 billion
overall, takes persistent mismangement."
47Hentoff, N. (1977) How the Banks Mugged New York in Order to Save It.
Social Policy. May; and, Newfield, J. and P. Dubrul. (1977) op. cit.; and
Sales, W. (1975) New York City: Prototype of the Urban Crisis. Black
Scholar. November.
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A chronology of key events leading to the fiscal crisis is presented In
Figure 111-2. While this timeline begins in late 1974, symptoms of New
York's fiscal llness had been identified in numerous studies over the
previous decade.48 Perhaps the most serious blister in city finances was
the use of short term debt, which grew from $747 million in 1969 to over
$4.5 billion in 1 975.49 By March 31, 1975, New York had outstanding debts
in excess of $14 billion, including $7.8 billion in long-term debt and over
$5.9 billion in TANs, BANs, and RANs.50 It was this mounting level of debt
which prompted several groups such as the Comptroller's Technical Debt
Committee (CTDC) and the rating agencies to privately express concern over
the city's financial condition.
Nonetheless, the City continued on its course of borrowing, floating
major issues throughout the end of 1974 and into early 1975. The
uneasiness expressed privately in meetings between city officials, bankers,
and members of financial community continued to swell. Mayor Beame
urged banks to "sell" city issues more, urging them to market New York City
nationwide. Bank officials, in justifying all-time high interest costs, cited
stiff competition for funds, and "poor" market conditions. In order to
smooth over relations between city officials and bankers, the Financial
Community Liason Group (FCLG) was formed. More short term debt was
48Temporary Commission on City Finances (1965) Report of the Temporary
Commission on City Finances. New York City; Fleishman Report on the
Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary Education in New York ( 973)
Viking Press, New York; Netzer, D. (1970) The Budget: Trends and Prospects:
in L. O. Fitch and A. H. Walsh Agenda for a Ctiy, Sage Publications, Beverly
Hills.
49 Securities Exchange Commission (1977) Staff Report on Transactions in
Securities of the City of New York. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. p. 3
5 0 lbid. p. 2.
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issued. The city continued on a collision course with disaster. Short term
borrowing was necessary to maintain municipal operations; the banks
continued to loan at extremely high rates of interest. The gap between
revenues and expenditures continued to widen. The market was soon
flooded with New York City short term debt.
In March of 1975, the financial markets closed their doors on New
York City. For once, the City could no longer borrow the short term debt on
which it had become addicted. New York faced an extreme financial crisis.
Thousands of city employees faced losing their jobs, city services began to
shut down. On March 23, 1975, Mayor Beame went public, announcing
massive expenditure reduction and the elimination of city services and
public facilities. The city's appeal.for assistance from the Federal
government (President Ford, Treasury Secretary Simon, and Federal Reserve
Chairman Burns) fell largely on deaf ears. New York City faced a genuine
financial disaster.
One avenue open to the city, which it did not follow, was filing for
bankruptcy. Under bankruptcy proceedings, a federal court would have
assumed control over city finances, resulting in messy and lengthy
arbitration. Bondholders would have had to stand in line with welfare
recipients, city workers, and others seeking a claim against city assets.
Governor Hugh Carey took the initiative in bailing out New York City.
In the months after financial markets closed to the city, the state advanced
the city some $600 million (against future revenue sharing funds). The
state, ultimately, would have been responsible for restoring order in New
York in event of the city government's total collapse. The state then set up
the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), an independent public
corporation authorized to sell bonds to meet the city's borrowing needs.
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MAC bonds were backed first by a "moral obligation" of the state, and second
by a set of dedicated taxes, which Included the city sales and stock transfer
taxes. In order to uses these revenues, these taxes were converted from
local option taxes into state taxes, and dedicated to the repayment of MAC
bonds. MAC was initially authorized to issue up to $3 billion in state bonds.
Its first offering of $1 billion in July, 1975, was the single largest offering
in history. Over 200 banks and underwriters participated in the sale.
Moody's gave these MAC bonds a A rating, Standard & Poor's rated them A+.
The offering yield 9.5 % was one of the highest ever.
The second billion dollar offering, later in the summer of 1975,
encountered difficulties. Unlike the first offering which sold out in about
three weeks, these bonds were more difficult to market. Several different
factors contributed to uncertainties among investors. City finances were
still under attack and the image of poor management was difficult to erase.
In spite of promises to cutback on services, the perception was that
expenditures were still out of control. Moreover, several years earlier,
moral obligation bonds issued by another state agency, the Urban
Development Corporation (UDC) went into default. Finally, these two billion
dollar offerings saturated the market. By the time of the second offering,
the performance of the first MAC bonds in the secondary market was sliding
greatly. The perception was that MAC bonds were almost as lousy as New
York City notes.
While MAC served an important financial function, it did little in
terms of taking the city's finances "by the horn" and bringing the beast under
control. Governor Carey's plan for restoring fiscal order to New York was
contained in the Financial Emergency Act which created a watchdog agency,
the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB). Through this act, the state
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appropriated some $750 million in state funds to the city, authorized
purchase of MAC bonds with state employee pension and insurance funds,
enacted into state law a wage freeze, and created a new position (Special
Deputy Comptroller) responsible for overseeing New York City finances. The
Deputy Controller reported directly to the State Comptroller. The EFCB
(later the Emergency was dropped to form acronym FCB) played a key role in
not only restructuring the city's overall debt policy, but in ensuring that
New York adopted sound financial management, reporting, and practices.
The abuses committed by the city government were described as:51
every expense budget has been balanced with an array of
gimmicks, revenue accruals, capitalization of expenses,
residing reserves, appropriation of illusory fund balances,
suspension of receivables, and finally, the creation of a public
benefit corporation whose purpose is to borrow and bail out
expenses...
Estimates of the deficit in June of 1975 exceeded $5 billion. Since reliable
data were not available, the city's exact financial condition was unknown.
The SEC report stated that "New York City's accounting and reporting
practices effectively served to obfuscate the city's real revenues, costs,
and financial position." 52 Accounting methods included the recording of
cash due in later years as receivables, the failure to record liabilities of
the current year until later year, leading to an overestimate of assets and
an underestimate of liabilities.
The City routinely issued RANs secured by general fund revenues and
federal/state aid received in the next fiscal year to meet current cash
needs. In addition, New York made heavy use of TANs, backed by real estate
tax revenues. One report found that over 80 percent of the real estate taxes
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listed by the city as receivable were neither collectible nor readily
available.53 The city included in its taxable base properties not subject to
real estate taxation (publicly owned property, diplomatic property,
Mitchell-Tama property, property in foreclosure, and the properties of the
bankrupt Penn Central Company).
At the same time, New York City delayed reporting of expenses, and
maintained a cash basis for payables, "carefully preserving the fiction that
incurred expenses did not exist until the bills were paid."54 The city
continued to spend more than it received in revenues. Another shady
technique routinely employed by the City was the capitalization of current
expenses. Between 1965 and 1975, amounts borrowed through the capital
budget to finance appropriations in the expense budget grew steadily from
$26 million to over $722 million. 55 In summary, there was a lack of
internal control over expenditures, a failure to conform to acceptable
accounting practices, and an inability to keep current and capital accounts
separate.
While a good deal of the blame for New York City's fiscal crisis can be
attributed to city officials, an SEC report stated that although underwriters
were subject to intense pressure by city officials to underwrite and market
city securities, "they recognized the immediate and catastrophic
consequence of the failure to continue to market city securities to the
public, and the fact that full disclosure would have eliminated this
530ffice of the State Comptroller, State of New York ( 1975) Audit Report on
New York City. August.
541bid.
55 Citizen's Budget Committee (1974) A Presentation to Mayor Beame's
Council of Economic and Business Advisors. November 8.
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market."56 The report also pointed out, "as the city's financial crisis
worsened, the public was subjected to a confusing and contradictory
financial picture." 57 Perhaps the most questionable tactic employed by
the investment banking community was the marketing of city notes in
smaller denominations, from $100,000 to $10,000; effectively shifting the
risks from large institutions (already weary about New York City debt) to
individual investors (attracted by exceptionally high yields). The SEC also
reported that between 1974 and 1975, certain underwriting banks ceased
purchase of city securities for their fiduciary trusts, yet continued to
market the same securities to the general public. These investment banks
did not disclose their change in investment strategy.
Although there was some degree of incompetency and duplicity on the
part of those involved, overall, one senses that city officials and bankers
were floundering as if being pulled towards some inevitable doom. The
city was overly dependent on short-term debt. Banks continued to
underwrite the debt, accepting higher and higher interest premiums. Soon
the market was flooded with city paper. Banks continued to underwrite
more debt because to do otherwise would imply a loss of faith in the city's
creditworthiness. At the same time, the confidence of inside investors,
namely the banks, began to wane. They stopped purchase of New York City
securities for their own fiduciary trusts. When the banks realized that city
would not be able to meet the loan commitments, they stopped issuing debt
to the city.
What was learned from New York's experiences? There were
numerous studies examining the New York City fiscal crisis. The SEC and
-78-
56SEC, op. cit. Chapter 4.
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.other agencies closely inspected the city's financial practices. The list of
abuses committed prior to the crisis reads like a litany of what not to do.
The extent to which a large number of different actors was drawn into the
vortex of the crisis revealed that borrowing affected many different groups.
City officials needed debt to keep operations afloat. The financial
community was split between those who served an underwriting function
and those who were primarily interested in securing sound investments.
Others affected by debt included the city workers, who were inclined to
view debt service costs as detracting from potential wage increases.
Organized labor, on the other hand, viewed city debt as a potential
investment for pension funds, provided that it was competitive with
alternative investments. The state government was particularly interested
in the fiscal crisis because it, ultimately, was responsible for New York
City. Given the volume of New York City debt and the fact that it was
marketed nationwide, potential stakeholders included those investors and
members of the financial community outside New York. Other large cities,
facing similar economic constraints, and perhaps, employing similar
financial practices closely watched events in New York. It is clear, that as
America's largest city, all eyes were upon New York.
In order to recover from the financial crisis in New York, stringent
methods were adopted including a moratorium on debt service payments,
firing city employees, eliminating pay increases, reducing services,
increasing taxes and fares, and the adoption of improved accounting and
financial reporting practices. The City has managed to turn around the
crisis, returning to the long-term debt market in 1981, achieving
Investment grade ratings in 1983. Moreover, New York has embarked upon a
-79-
massive capital program, planning to expend over $40 billion over the next
decade.
Conclusions: The History of Municipal Borrowing
In tracing the history of municipal borrowing in the United States, a
number of general observations can be drawn. Municipalities issued debt for
large capital expenditures. They began to borrow heavily during the period
of "internal improvements" in the middle of the 19th century. Limitations
on state government borrowing forced many local governments to become
involved in the financing of canals, railroads, and other forms of
infrastructure. Local debt grew quickly until the Depression of the 1870s
when many states began enacting restrictions on conventional forms of
local borrowing. At the end of the 19th century, there was an increase in
special districts and special assessment debt. During the Depression of the
1890s, there were many defaults on this type of debt. Urbanization and
growth increased needs for urban infrastructure. Cities began borrowing
larger amounts to fund a wide range of services. Borrowing continued to
increase until the Great Depression, when numerous cities went into
default. During World War 11, municipal capital expenditures were cut back
and for the first time, levels of outstanding municipal debt actually
declined. In the postwar era, there has been sustained growth in municipal
borrowing. High levels of optimism and enlarged demands for service
combined with relatively higher levels of prosperity to push up levels of
borrowing. Throughout history, municipal borrowing has grown in size and
complexity. New governmental entities with debt issuing authority have
emerged at the local level. Federal aid and other forms of outside
assistance continue to influence borrowing practices. The New York City
fiscal crisis serves to illustrate the extent to which municipal borrowing
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can affect many different stakeholders beyond issuers and investors. The
municipal bond market appears to have recovered from any setbacks
resulting from New York's crisis. The growth in annual issuances and levels
of outstanding debt suggest that the municipal bond market is strong.
Since its origins in the early 1800s, through various wars, calamities, and
economic depressions, municipal borrowing has evolved into a prominent and
significant feature of public finance.
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Chapter 4
Issues n Infrastructure Research
The deterioration of urban infrastructure has been widely
documented, both in the popular press,1 and in numerous government
publications.2 For the most part, the evidence pointed to has been the
decline in public investment on capital projects. In real terms, state and
local capital spending grew during the 1950s and 1960s. During the
seventies, and especially during the early-eighties, capital spending in real
terms, declined quite substantially. In constant 1972 dollars, state and
local capital spending has dropped from $35.9 billion in 1968 to about $23.6
billion in 1981.3 In constant per capita terms, state and local government
investment in infrastructure has fallen from $179 per person in 1968 to
$105 per person in 1981.4 Capital expenditures, moreover, make up a
diminishing share of total state and local government outlays. In the
1960s, approximately 27 percent of state and local budgets went to
'Time Magazine (1981) The Crumbling of America. April 27, 1981;
Newsweek Magazine (1982) "The Decaying of America." August 2, 1982.
2CONSAD Research Corporation, (1980) A Study of Public Works Investment
in the United Sates. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.; Lewis,
D. (1983) Public Works Infrastructure: Policy Considerations for the 1980s.
Congressional Budget Office. Washington, D.C.; Choate, P. and S. Walter
( 1981 ) America in Ruins: Beyond the Public Works Pork Barrel. Council of
State Planning Agencies. Washington.; Joint Economic Committee ( 1983) Our
Nation's Infrastructure. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington.
3Government Finance Research Center ( 1983) Financing Infrastructure for
Economic Development. Municipal Finance Officers Association.
Washington, p. 11.
4 Petersen, J. (1983) "Financial Roundup: In the Belly of Recession"
Resources in Review. March. p. 5.
infrastructure; by 1980 this proportion has dropped to 15 percent. 5
decline in capital spending has come at time when many public works were
in need of major repair and rehabilitation. In many cities, infrastructure
systems have exceeded their expected service life and need replacement.
While state and local government spending on infrastructure have
decreased, capital needs have continued to expand:6
requirements for highways,- water and sewer lines, and other
public facilities have increased, not decreased, as the baby
boom has grown into adulthood and the number of households
and automobiles has increased. Economic growth has required
more public services and facilities including increases in
water supply and sewage treatment capacity to meet new
environmental standards.
The "infrastructure crisis" can be defined as the widening gap between the
capital needs and resources pledged to meet those needs.
Evaluation of Research on the Infrastructure Crisis
Several recent studies have focused on the problems of infrastructure
in America's cities. 7 These studies are quite varied in their methods of
sPetersen, J. and W. C. Hough (1983) Creative Capital Financing for State and
Local Governments. Municipal Finance Officers Association. Chicago. p. 11.
6 Porter, D. and R. Peiser (1984) Financing Infrastructure to Support
Community Growth. Urban Land Institute. Washington, D.C. p. 5.
7Choate, P. and S. Walter ( 1981 ) America in Ruins: Beyond the Public Works
Pork Barrel. Council of State Planning Agencies. Washington, D.C.; CONSAD
Research Corporation ( 1980) A Study of Public Works Investment in the
United States. U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.; Joint
Economic Committee (1983) Our Nation's Infrastructure. US. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C.; Subcommittee on Economic Goals and
Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Committee (1984) Hard
Choices: A Report on the Increasing Gap Between America's Infrastructure
Needs and Our Ability to Pay for Them. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C.;Peterson, G. (1981) Public Capital Investment and National
Industrial Policy. Urban Affairs Papers. Vol. 3. No. 2. Spring. pp.35-42.;
Howitt, A. et. al. (1983) Services From Public Capital: The Outlook for
Boston's Physical Infrastructure. Boston Workshop Series. Boston.
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analysis, findings and implications for policy. Many of these studies focus
on levels of capital investment as an indication of capital need. As stated
in one study, 8
a declining level of investment does not indicate existence of a
problem per se, there is mounting evidence that the result has,
in fact, been the deterioration of existing capital plant...
Tracking investment patterns over time often represents a necessary short-
cut in the evaluation of infrastructure conditions. The physical aspects of
deterioration may be difficult to assess. Public facilities may be buried
deeply underground or so widely distributed that accurate measurement of
conditions is difficult and expensive. The basic problem inherent to
analyses of this type is that the economic life of a structure is not the
same as its service life. While some structures have outlived their
economic life, other forms of infrastructure breakdown short of their
expected useful life.
Perhaps the most widely distributed report on the "infrastructure
crisis" was Pat Choate's study for the Council of State Planning Agencies
which concluded that overall:9
America's public facilities are wearing out faster than they are
being replaced. The deteriorated condition of the basic public
facilities that underpin the economy presents a major
structural barrier to the renewal of our national economy. In
hundreds of communities, deteriorated public facilities
threaten the continuation of basic community services such as
fire protection, public transportation, water supplies, secure
prisons, and flood protection...
8Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy, Joint
Economic Committee (1984) op. cit. p. 1 1
9 Choate, P. and S. Walter ( 1981 ). op. cit. p. 1.
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Choate's study, which was based upon secondary data sources, serves
to illustrate many of the problems associated with research on public
infrastructure. First, data on infrastructure is not collected in a
systematic nor coordinated manner. When we speak of infrastructure, we
are referring to a vast collection of capital facilities financed and operated
by a tremendous number of different government agencies and special units.
In Choate's study, the data collection problems were especially pronounced
because he attempted to assess the condition of infrastructure, nationwide.
His conclusions were based upon a the experience of a hand-full of
communities and several aggregate level studies on capital spending,
federal aid and municipal debt. Given the fact that there are over 70,000
units of government across the United States, the available data simply did
not support the conclusions he reached.
A second flaw in the Choate study stemmed partially from the effort
to view infrastructure from a national perspective, but also from ignoring
the extent to which investment in infrastructure is related to a variety of
variables, such as the fiscal health of government, regional growth, and the
demand for public improvements. It is apparent from his analysis that
some government have invested in public works, while others have not.
Public works investment does not occur in a vacuum. His study did not
treat public works investment in much of a theoretical context. There was
little, if any explanation as to why spending has declined, or the extent to
which different areas have different patterns of investment. It would, for
example, be interesting to know whether his conclusions apply to all
communities regardless of income, geographic location, age, size, or
density.
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Other problems in Choate's analysis include: 1) the over-reliance
upon existing federal standards (e.g. Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Transportation, etc.) as a proxy for capital need; 2) the
failure to account for the extent to which the private sector finances and
constructs public infrastructure (e.g., subdivisions, shopping centers, etc.
which provide their own sewer lines, streets, and other infrastructure; and
3) an over-emphasis on inefficiency and graft as an explanation for
inadequate levels of public capital investment. In short, the available
data simply did not support the conclusions reached in his assessment. Yet
the Choate study did play an important role in generating attention to an
otherwise neglected topic of research.
CONSAD Research Corporation conducted a massive study of public
works investment for the Secretary of Commerce in the late 1970s. 10 This
was the most comprehensive study conducted in recent years. The three
volume report focused both on aggregate trends as well trends present in
individual cities. In addition, CONSAD focused specifically on five types of
infrastructure: water systems, sewer systems, streets and highways,
bridges, and mass transit. As part of that study, nine cities'' were closely
examined. This study found that while, in general, water systems were in
good or fair condition, the condition of roads, streets, and bridges varied
tremendously, from poor to excellent. Moreover, the condition of sewer
systems and mass transit systems appeared to have improved, due to the
availability of federal funds for these purposes. The CONSAD report
concluded that the primary factor affecting urban maintenance is the
loCONSAD Research Corporation (1980) op. cit. pp. 11 1-11.338.
1Baltimore, Dallas, Des Moines, Hartford, Newark, New Orleans, Pittsburgh,
St. Louis, and Seattle.
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revenue generating capacity of central city governments. The problem of
maintenance, according to the CONSAD study, is primarily a revenue
generation problem.
There were several shortcomings with the CONSAD study. Similar to
Choate's study, the nation-wide coverage proved to be an enormous
undertaking. Although CONSAD did manage to track aggregate level trends
in capital investment and through its nine case studies, CONSAD was able to
make some pertinent observations at the level of individual cities, the study
failed in its efforts to connect aggregate level trends with city level
trends. It is apparent that more synthesis of the data collected is needed.
The CONSAD study also suffered to the extent that it lacked a specific
theoretical framework with which to evaluate changes in capital spending.
While the researchers collected a wealth of information, they failed to
relate it to any established theories about how governments make decisions,
or why certain governments exhibit distinct patterns of capital investment.
The report's greatest contribution may have been in terms of compiling
available data.
Perhaps the most important contributions of CONSAD's research were
buried within the municipal case studies. Although generalizing from the
experience of only nine cities is difficult, the case studies did reveal some
interesting differences among cities in terms of the organization
and delivery of infrastructure services. In some cities, municipal agencies
play a critical role, while in others, special or statutory districts providing
service to multiple jurisdictions hold the responsibility for infrastructure.
Patterns of financing infrastructure also vary widely. While all cities use
long-term debt to finance construction, some cities also use debt to
finance maintenance. There does, however, appear to be a general bias
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against using debt for repair and preventative maintenance of
infrastructure. Cities also vary widely in their efforts to raise funding for
infrastructure from the private sector. The CONSAD case studies suggest,
moreover, that activities such as road paving are more likely to receive
funding from private sources than other types of maintenance (such as
wastewater treatment). While the CONSAD case studies contained some
interesting information, they did not address many questions particularly
well suited to the case study method. The case studies failed to identify
who is responsible for capital spending decisions and the process by which
those decisions are reached. Also missing was any discussion of the lag
between the time when decisions are made and when actions such borrowing
or outlay occur. It would have been interesting to determine how municipal
officials prioritize capital improvement projects and what they consider to
be the most important factors associated with capital need.
George Peterson and his colleagues at the Urban Institute 12 completed
an assessment of the capital facilities in selected urban areas. In contrast
to the work of Choate, and others, their findings are surprisingly
optimistic: 13
On balance, the results of this survey are encouraging. There is
no sign of sudden deterioration in service levels, no indication
that the physical infrastructure put in place in the nineteenth
century is about to wear out. Indeed, some of the most often
expressed fears are clearly extremist...
Peterson suggests, that in general, the condition of the capital stock is
most closely related to the last decade's history of maintenance and capital
12 Peterson, G., N. Humphrey, M. J. Miller, and P. Wilson (1981) The Future of
America's Urban Capital Plant. Urban Institute. Washinton, D.C.
13 Peterson, G. ( 1981 ) op. cit. p. 36
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repair. Age, moreover, is only modestly related to the condition of the
capital stock. Another important point which Peterson makes is that not all
forms of infrastructure have deteriorated. Investment in wastewater
treatment, for example, has been spurred by federal grant incentives or
federal program mandates.' 4
The Peterson study, although it suffers from the same general data
availability problems of the other efforts, did focus more on the spending
and financing practices of individual cities than previous studies. The
Peterson study, however, did not explicitly treat the processes by which
decisions are made. Moreover, while Peterson's work helps to identify
some of the factors associated with capital spending, it falls short of
developing a robust theoretical model, with results that can be applied to
cities all across the country. His case studies, however, present a strong
justification for focusing on individual cities across time.
In a report issued in 1982, the General Accounting Office 15 asserted
that "some cities maintain and rehabilitate their infrastructure, while
others do not." The GAO selected four city governments and several county
governments and administered a questionnaire to various local officials.
This study described Cleveland as a "classic case of poor urban
management," with a strong tendency to "favor current expenditures over
maintenance and capital investment." Over the period, capital spending
grew only 37 percent, while total expenditures grew 162 percent. The
authors point out that Detroit's infrastructure is also deteriorating for the
14tbid. p. 37.
15General Accouting Office (1982) Effective Planning and Budgeting
Practices Can Help Arrest the Nation's Deteriorating Public Infrastructure.
GAO. Washington, D.C. pp. 15-20
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same reasons as Cleveland's: age, poor maintenance, and a lack of
rehabilitation. The GAO report, on the other hand, describes Baltimore16 as
a declining city that has "done a much better job of maintaining, replacing,
and rehabilitating its facilities and equipment." Baltimore's capital
expenditures, expressed as a ratio to total expenditures increased from 14
percent ($58.7 million) in 1968 to 23 percent ($258.7 million) in 1977.17
In general, the GAO study suffers from the same problems afflicting
studies1 8 which utilize surveys of municipal officials. The findings are
only as good as the records and, often, the memories of those interviewed.
The GAO study did little in the way of developing usable criteria for what
constitutes infrastructure decay, or reasonable standards for capital
spending. It was, moreover, not at all clear what criteria the researchers
used to evaluate quality of urban management or the effectiveness of a
particular city's infrastructure policy. Merely surveying local officials as
to their opinions on the capital budgeting process is no substitute for actual
research on either spending trends or infrastructure conditions.
In reviewing the research on the infrastructure crisis which has
emerged in recent years, there appears to several distinct varieties. The
first tends to be clearly alarmist, presenting as fact, the worse case
16Cincinnati is described by the Urban Institute as an older industrialized
much like Cleveland, Baltimore, and Detroit, which has managed to improve
the condition of its infrastructure, largely by giving maintenance and
capital replacement needs a high priority; see Urban Institute ( 1979)
America's Capital Stock. Vol. 3: The Future of Cincinnati's Capital Plant.
The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.
17 lbid. p. 18.
18Much of the work conducted by Harry Hatry and others at the Urban
Institute on capital investment (see for example, Evans, J. and A. Millar
(1982) Report on Survey of Central Capital Invesment Priority-Setting
Procedures in :25 Municipalities. The Urban Institute. Washington, D.C.)
falls into this category of research.
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scenarios associated with widespread infrastructure deterioration. The
alarmist perspective depends heavily upon the use of real dollars, comparing
the growth of the 1950s and 1960s to the decline in public spending in the
1970s and 1980s. This perspective rarely points out that inflation and
recessions have taken a huge chunk out of the productive capacity of local
government. This perspective also assumes that standards for investment
are merely those established in the past. At the other extreme are the
pragmatists which suggest that the problem is isolated to a few urban
governments which have not managed to institute effective planning,
budgeting, and control programs for handling periodic investment and
maintenance of infrastructure. From this point of view, the infrastructure
problem would simply "go away," if cities adopted more sound management
policies. Neither of this perspectives is satisfying. Both of these
perspectives suggest a real need for a stronger theoretical foundation in
infrastructure planning.
It is clear that infrastructure needs vary across regions, states, and
even within individual states. Data on historical capital outlays
suggest that on a per capita basis, the greatest capital spending on
highways, sewage and water is found in the West, South-Central, and South,
while the lowest spending appears to have occurred in the Northeast and
Midwest.19s Also, among Western and Southern states, highway and water
projects are high priorities while among states in the Midwest and
Northeast, sewage treatment projects are high priorities. In spite of these
regional differences, there is tremendous variation within regions, and
19JEC, (1984) Hard Choices: A Report on the Increasing Gap Between
America's Infrastructure Needs and Our Ability to Pay for Them.
U.S.Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. p. 54
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within states themselves. Factors such as population size, geography,
climate, and prospects for future growth all influence the level of
infrastructure need. In general, those states with the greatest populations
have the greatest capital needs. New York State, for example, projects
capital needs in excessservices of $100 billion, while estimates of
California's infrastructure need exceed $90 billion (in 1982 dollars, over
the next 18 years).20
The level of infrastructure need reported by individual cities is quite
varied. Capital spending needs for Kansas City2 1 were estimated at:
streets and highways at $3.4 billion, sewer system at $3 billion,and, public
buildings at "hundreds of millions of dollars." The costs of rebuilding
Louisville's storm and sewage line was estimated at nearly $500 million. 22
Seattle, a relatively new city, reported over $200 million in infrastructure
needs in roads, bridges, traffic signals, fire stations, office buildings, and
libraries, and "enormous needs" in water, sewer, light, and solid waste.2 3
Much of Seattle's capital need stemmed from a "severe backlog of repair and
replacement needs." New York City reported massive capital needs, on the
order of $35 billion to be spent over the next decade, including $14 billion
on mass transit, $5.4 billion on streets and bridges, $2.4 billion on sewers
and water mains, $3.1 billion on water pollution control, and over $6 billion
on services such as sanitation, correction, parks, and hospitals. 2 4
2 01bid. p. 55.
21JEC (1983) Our Nation's Infrastructure. U.S.Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. pp. 84-86.
22 1bid. p. 317.
23 1bid. p. 335.
24 1bid. p. 507.
-92-
In order to produce an overall assessment of unmet capital needs,
researchers should consider several different factors. First, although the
physical condition of public works depends age and use, the maintenance
record is most important in terms of assessing the condition of
infrastructure systems. Second, capital needs can be guaged in terms of
either physical evidence or capital spending patterns. A determination of
capital need based on physical inspection is costly and difficult to
undertake. On the other hand, an assessment of capital need based on
spending patterns may not reveal the true physical state of infrastructure
systems. Third,. the condition of infrastructure systems, both across
different municipalities and across different service areas within a
municipality varies greatly. Infrastructure includes public works built
long ago with only city resources, as well as capital projects financed quite
recently with federal or state government assistance. In any large city,
there is bound to be a number of different infrastructure systems, in
various states of repair. While there is evidence suggesting that
infrastructure has deteriorated, such deterioration is neither uniform, nor
easily determined.
The New Federalism and Infrastructure Research
Recent developments in federal policy suggest a renewal of the need
for basic research on the effects of federal policies on local government
initiatives. Federal government support for infrastructure occurs in two
basic forms: 1) direct construction of public works; 2) intergovernmental
grants. Direct investments generally involve the construction of large
scale projects, such as dams, waterways, hydroelectric plants, and other
facilities which, because of their scale have regional impact.
Intergovernmental assistance includes various grants-in-aid to state and
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local governments. Such grants can either be categorical, meaning that they
are targetted funds for specific programs (e.g., highway funds, water and
wastewater disposal, urban development, or community development block
grants.) General revenue sharing funds include those grants which
governments may spend on either operating budgets or capital projects. In
the past, approximately one-third of general revenue sharing funds have
been spent on capital projects. 25
Over the past two and a half decades, federal spending in terms of
direct capital outlays as well as intergovernmental assistance have
increased steadily until the late 1970s and early 1980s when both forms of
capital investment have dropped off. Federal outlays for non-defense
public works investment increased from $1.1 billion in 1957 to $8.5 billion
in in the 1982.26 Federal outlays, measured in constant dollars, peaked in
1966 and in 1978, but have since declined sharply. 27 Federal grants, show a
similar pattern of growth in the 60s and early 70s, followed by decline in
the late 70s and early 80s. In 1957, federal capital grants-in-aid amounted
to less than 10 percent of the total volume of state local capital outlays.
By 1977, this figure jumped to nearly 40 percent, replacing debt as the
largest source of financing for public works.28 (In constant 1972 dollars,
federal capital grants increased from $12.2 billion in 1957 to $19 billion in
1977. ) More recently, however, there have been significant declines in
federal grants both as a percentage of federal budget outlays (from 17
percent in 197'8 to 1 1.5 percent in 1 982) and as a percentage of state and
2 5CONSAD Corporation, ( 1 983). op. cit. p. 3.
26U.S. Office of Mangement and Budget. (1983) Federal Outlays for Major
Physical Capital Investment. p. 4.
2 7 1bid. p. 5.
281 bid.
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local expenditures (from 26 percent in 1978 to 20 percent in 1982).
Moreover, in terms of direct assistance for infrastructure, federal grants
for public works have dropped from $22.4 billion in 1980 to $20.2 in 1982.
In real terms, the reduction is much sharper, amounting to a drop (in 1972
dollars) from $20.8 billion to $12.1 billion.
The term "New Federalism" has been used to describe the present
administration's efforts to reduce the role of the federal government by
turning over responsibilities to state and local governments and the private
sector in all areas except defense. Some of the federal initiatives which
embody the spirit of the New Federalism include the reduction of funding for
airports, mass transit operations, and wastewater treatment systems,
which, previously received heavy federal government support.
It can be argued that the progress of the New Federalism is hindered
by several different factors. First, states and localities have, over the
years, become dependent upon federal financing. In 1983, the federal
government made direct non-defense capital investments of $8.7 billion and
pumped another $20.3 billion in grants to state and local governments. This
represents a massive amount of support which could not, easily be reversed.
Second, in addition to the role of financier, the federal government also sets
standards by which infrastructure needs are defined. Most of these
standards are set through the various grant programs which stipulate, for
example, clean water requirements, sewage treatment standards, limits on
discharges of pollutants, and other requirements. Due to its role in the
setting of standards, the federal government could not easily back away
from many of its commitments to infrastructure, in spite of the philosophy
of the New Federalism.
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In a recent book, two Urban Institute researchers 29 state that "not
since 1932 has there been such a redirection of public purposes." They
argue that under President Reagan, there have been sweeping changes in
federal government policies and spending priorities. For example, grants to
state and local governments have declined from 11.7 percent of the federal
budget in 1978 to 6.2 percent in 1985 (amounting to an annual loss of $52.7
billion-in 1985).30 This means that state and local governments have that
much less to spend, or that much more to raise for capital projects and
general government operations. Fun'ds which have been diverted away from
domestic programs have been shifted towards military expenditures.
Defense expenditures have risen from 22.8 percent of federal spending in
1978 to 25.5 percent in 198531. The administration projects that by 1990,
defense spending will rise to 36 percent of total federal outlays. Other
changes in federal priorities include: 32
* cuts in federal housing assistance by over 60 percent
since 1982;
* reductions in CDBG (Community Development Block Grant)
funds and UDAG (Urban Development Action Grant) funds;
* a 21 percent reduction in public transit funds (since 1980);
* 1986 federal revenue sharing funds amount to 25 percent
of their 1972 levels, in inflation adjusted dollars;
* federal education programs declined from 2.4 percent of
total outlays in 1979 to 1.8 percent in 1 986;
* cuts in Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps,
and child nutrition programs;
2 9 Palmer, J. and I. Sawhill (1984) The Reagan Record: An Assessment of
America's Changing Domestic Priorities. Ballinger Publishing Company.
Cambridge.
30U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1985) Historical Tables for the
President's Fiscal Year 1986 Budget. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C.
31 Ibid.
3 2Morial, E. and M. Barry ( 1986) op. cit. pp. 6-7.
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*cuts in federal crime-fighting assistance to state and local
governments.
These changes in federal priorities mean two things. First, municipalities
will lose federal assistance. Lost revenues will need to be made up if
initiatives begun under federal programs are to be continued. Second, more
than ever before, municipalities will be left to fend for themselves. While
the "New Federalism" implies greater discretionary authority at the state
and local levels of government, it also suggests that in terms of
infrastructure, cities will have to develop and implement, their own plans.
The sum total of both the stated objectives and the observed declines
in the level of federal spending (both direct capital outlays and grants-in-
aid) suggest that in the long run, state and local governments will have to
become financially more self-sufficient. In the absence of federal support,
state and local governments will, increasingly, need to issue long-term debt
or use other creative methods for financing capital outlays.
The research questions posed by the arrival of the New Federalism are
complicated by the fact that there is some degree of uncertainty as to
whether federal grants substitute for locally raised funding or stimulate
the overall level of spending. The debate over the "stimulative" versus
"substitutive" effects of federal grants continues to take new form. The
early, "classic" studies involved statistical modelling of both cross-
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In general, the bulk of research focuses
on current spending, rather than capital spending. One notable exception,
contained in a study conducted by George Peterson 34 found that per capita
capital spending was a function of income, density, rate of population
growth, and proportion of current expenditures financed by federal and state
grants. Peterson's analysis focused on county government in the early
1970s, covering the period, 1970-74.
A number of other studies which have explicitly treated the effects
of federal aid on capital spending have found stimulative effects, 35 but in
general, these studies focused exclusively upon one service area (e.g.
transportation or education). The resulting coefficients are of limited
value. The fact that for a given year in the mid-seventies, a dollar of
interstate highway aid led to $1.64 in total expenditure is interesting only
to the degree that the method used can be replicated in other circumstances.
33 see for example of the early studies, Gramlich, E. and H. Galper (1973)
State and Local Fiscal Behavior and Federal Grant Policy. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity. No. 1. Washington, D.C.; Wilde, J. (1 971) The
Analytics of Design and Response," National Tax Journal. Vol 24.;,
Borcherding, T. and R. Deacon, (1 972) "The Demand for Services of Non-
Federal Governments." American Economic Review. December.; Ohls, J.C. and
T. J. Wales (1972) Supply and Demand for State and Local Services. Review
of Economics and Statistics. November.; Nathan, R. et. al. (1977) Revenue
Sharing: The Second Round. The Brookings Institute. Washington, D.C.; and,
ACIR ( 1977) Federal Grants: Their Effects on State-Local Expenditures,
Employment Levels and Wage Rates. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Affairs. Washington, D.C.
34Peterson, G. ( 1977) An Examination of State and Local Government
Capital Demand, Alternative Means of Financing Public Capital Outlays and
the Impact on 'Tax Exempt Security Markets. The Urban Institute
Washington, D.C.
35see for example, Sherman, L. ( 1975) the Impacts of the Federal Highway
Aid Program on State and Local Highway Expenditures. Department of
Transportation. Washington.
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sectional and time series data.33
In summary, researchers who study infrastructure in the 1980s will
not have to re-invent the wheel when it comes to assessing the impact of
the New Federalism. There is an established body of literature on the
effects of federal grants on spending patterns, and although the works
which treat capital spending are relatively few in number, the techniques of
analysis (cross-sectional and time series regression analysis) are well
established methods.
Limitations on State and Local Government Finances
During the late 1970s, tax and expenditure limitations appeared in
state after state. By 1977, some 41 states had partial limitations on
property tax rates and/or restrictions on local spending.36 By 1978, at
least seven states (California, Tennessee, Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, South
Dakota, and, Texas) adopted constitutional amendments limiting local
government taxing powers, and three more adopted more stringent statutory
limits (Colorado, New Jersey, and North Dakota).37 By March of 1980, there
were another 17 states which had adopted new measures limitina the
taxing or spending authority of local governments.
There have been a variety of explanations offered for the so-called
"tax revolt." Break38 suggested that the vote for Proposition 13 reflected
support for a tax shift, rather than tax cut. Boskin 39 argued that because
of inflation and rising taxes, real disposable income per worker declined in
36Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1977) State
Limitations on Local Taxes and Expenditures. Washington, D.C.
37 Pitcher, R. ( 1980) State Revenue and Spending Limits Since Proposition
1 3. Federation of Tax Administrators, Research Report. No. 85. March. p.
36.
3 8 Break, G. (1979) Interpreting Proposition 1 3: A Comment" National Tax
Journal. 32. June. pp. 43-46.
39 Boskin, M. ( 1979) Some Neglected Factors Behind Recent Tax and Spending
Limitation Movements. National Taaax Journal. 32. June. pp. 37-42.
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the late 70s, increasing animosity towards government. Wilensky,40 pointed
that the tax revolt was directed towards highly visible taxes, making the
property tax in many states, particularly vulnerable. Kuttner41 argued that
in additi'on to unfair tax burdens, and economic hardship, backlash against
government helped explain popular support for initiatives like Proposition
13. Citrin suggested that the Vietnam War, corruption in the highest
offices (Watergate), and economic decline brought about "unprecedented
cynicism towards politics and politicians." 42
There is some recent evidence to suggest that the movement to limit
state and local government has recently lost some of the steam it had
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Initiatives to further restrict
taxing and spending have been turned by voters in California, Minnesota, and
in other states.
While the public's desire to limit the size and scope of local
government may not be as intense as in the late 70s, there is little, if any
evidence to suggest that the public supports the expansion of government, at
any level. In spite of the stated objectives of the New Federalism, states
and localities remain constrained by tax and spending limitations.
The emergence of these limitations creates special challenges for
researchers examining urban infrastructure. The fact that the public may
have an unusually strong anti-government disposition may serve to
exaggerate their unwillingness to fund infrastructure projects. During the
Proposition 13 era, many voters, caught up in the "mood of the times" may
4OWilensky, H. (1976) The New Corporatism, Centralization and the Welfare
Sate. Sage Publications. Beverly Hills.
4 1Kuttner, R( 1980) The Revolut of the Haves. Simon and Schuster. New York.
42 Citrin, J. (1978) "The Alienated Voter" in Taxing and Spending. Vol. 1, No. 1.
p.7.
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have routinely rejected bond issues and other referenda to increase local
spending. Two points are to be made here. First, the preferences revealed
during these periods of animosity towards all government activities may
not reflect true attitudes towards infrastructure services. Second, the
sudden loss of tax revenues due to initiative petitions can tremendously
disrupt patterns of savings and investment. Cities under fiscal
constraints may well end up cutting capital budgets, postponing planned
improvements, and spending funds otherwise marked for debt service. 4 3
Changes in the Municipal Bond Market
In recent years, the municipal bond market has changed dramatically.
For the most part, these changes have meant that for cities, borrowing has
become more complex, difficult, and expensive. The major changes in the
market include the following:
* increase in non-guaranteed debt;
* increase in limited tax bonds;
* increased special district and special purpose borrowing;
* increase in negotiated sales;
* congressional restrictions on debt issuances;
* shift towards individual investors, rather than
commercial banks or insurance companies;
* elimination of bearer bonds;
* greater volatility in bond prices;
* proliferation of new debt instruments;
* continued uncertainty as to tax exempt status of municipals
* changes in the federal income tax law which have served to
alter demand for municipal bonds.
During te 70s, non-guaranteed debt financing has so increased in
popularity that currently more 70 percent of the total volume of new issues
43 see for example the case studies in Susskind, L. ( 1983) Proposition 2- 1/2:
Its Impact on Massachusetts. Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain. Cambridge.
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are revenue bonds.44 This is in contrast to 1970, when general obligations
accounted for more than 70 percent of all new issues. Non-guaranteed debt
usually carries higher interest costs than general obligation debt. Revenue
bonds are considered more risky than general obligations because they lack
the "full faith and credit" backing, which is a guarantee that the
municipality will pledge its full authority to levy taxes and raise revenues
in order to meet interest and principal payments. As a general rule of
thumb, a revenue bond will have interest costs about 50 basis points above a
comparably rated general obligation bond.45 The shift towards revenue bond
financing therefore implies an increase in debt service costs.
The popularity of revenue bonds can be explained in three ways. First,
numerous states have passed limitations on local government taxing
authority, thereby weakening the creditworthiness of general obligation.
Second, revenue bonds, since they are self-liquidating, are often exempt
from many of the limitations on general obligation bonds. The use of
revenue bonds, therefore, can be seen as a means of evading debt limits.
Third, in general, revenue bonds not require voter approval, which often is a
requirement of general obligation bonding.
In addition to spurring an increase in revenue bond financing, the
appearance of tax limitations in many states has also meant an increase in
the volume of limited tax bonds. Limited tax bonds, unlike general
obligations do not have full faith and credit backing, and therefore are
perceived as more risky.
4 4 GA0 (1983) op. cit. p. 15, and Forbes, R. et. al. ( 1981 ) "Recent Trends in
Municipal Revenue Bond Financing" in Efficiency in the Municipal Bond
Market. G. Kaufman, ed., JAI Press. New York.
45Kochan, J. ( 1983) "Analyzing Cycles in Municipal Yields: An Institutional
Approach" in Fabozzi, F. et. al. The Municipal Bond Handbook, Volume . op.
cit. , p. 332.
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Many states have authorized the use of another type of tax-exempt
financing alternative--tax increment financing. This type of financing has
gained in popularity in states such as California which have limitations on
local government taxing authorities. Under this type of financing, a city
declares a section of its jurisdiction as a redevelopment district. A
redevelopment" authority proceeds to develop the land. As part of the
development process, the assessed valuation of real property is fexed
atsome base value prior to redevelopment. The authority then attempts to
draw private investment into the district by promising to provide the
ncessary infrastructure. To finance this infrastrucutre, the authority
issues bonds payable soley from the incremental tax revenues generated
from the increase in assessed value resulting from the private investment.
In the wake of restrictions on local taxes, improvement districts
have also increased in popularity. These have been popular mechanisms for
financing public improvements since the turn of the century. With an
improvement district, the emphasis lies on determining which group of
property owners stands to benefit most from a particulary public
ammenity--typically, street lighting, sidewalks, street paving, or other
such public improvements. Recently, the list of improvements has been
expanded to include ammenties such as free parking, street furniture,
decorative lighting, malls, pest control, and transportation services for the
elderly. The advantage to a special assessment district is that enables a
city to provide services to a particular area, raise revenues from those
residents most benefiting from the services through a special assessment
fee, and avoid raising the overall tax rate. Special assessment bonds can be
sold in order to raise the capital necessary to finance construction and
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maintenance. Typically, revenues generated from the assessments are used
exclusively to retire the improvement bonds.
One of the most significant trends in the municipal bond market has
been the use of tax exempt debt for non-traditional purposes. In 1970, the
largest borrowers were traditional types of local government--
municipalities, counties, townships, and school districts. These
traditional forms of government accounted for some 46 percent of the
volume of total bond sales.4 6 By 1982, special districts and statutory
authorities came to dominate the market, accounting for 57 percent of all
borrowing. The fact that these non-traditional local government units have
edged out the other forms of government is also reflected by their growth in
number, increasing from 23,885 in 1972 to 28,433 in 1982.4 7
Over the past decade and a half, there has been a great increase in the
use of debt to finance non-traditional projects. About 53 percent of bond
sales in 1982 went to finance single family mortgages, private economic
development, pollution control, student loans, and private hospital
projects. 48 In 1970, these non-traditional purposes amounted to less than 5
percent of the total sale of the total volume of new bond sales. The
increase in special districts, statutory authorities, and non-traditional
purposes for debt also helps to explain the increased prevalence of revenue
bonds. These non-traditional governments usually do not have broadly based
taxing authority and therefore can only issue non-guaranteed debt.
Another important change in the municipal bond market pertains to
the marketing and sale of bonds. Since 1970, the volume of bonds sold by
-104-
46 GAO,( 1983) op. cit. p. 14.
471bid.
48 1bid. p. 13
negotiated sales, as opposed to competitive sales has increased
dramatically. Competitive sales involves underwriters competing to offer
the lowest possible interest costs. With negotiated sales, In 1970, only 17
percent of all bonds sold in that year were negotiated sales; by 1982 the
proportion had increased to more than two-thirds. (See Figure IV-1.) The
primary reason for the increase in negotiated sales is the proliferation of
revenue bond financing. Revenue bonds are-sold through negotiation because
they often entail more complicated financing arrangements than general
obligations. In addition, every state in the country (except Pennsylvania)
requires that general obligations be sold through competitive sales. The
decrease in general obligations relative to non-guaranteed debt is further
cause for an increase in negotiated sales.
Other important developments include increased congressional
restrictions on the use of tax exempt financing. Congress has acted to
eliminate the tax exempt status of single family mortgage bonds (issued
after December 31, 1983), and small issue industrial development bonds
(issued after December 31, 1986). These restrictions follow those imposed
by Congress under the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, which
included public approval requirements, and disqualified certain facilities
(country clubs, massage parlors, tennis clubs, racquet sports facilities, hot
tub facilities, suntan facilities, and race tracks) from being built with
industrial development bond proceeds. These changes suggest that tax
exempt feature of municipal bonds may not be sacrosanct.
Another statutory change enacted in 1982 required that all bonds
issued after June 1983 to be in registered rather than bearer form. In the
past, most certificates were bearer bonds, which did not identify the owner.
Registering of bonds will mean that the issuer must record the name of the
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owner of the bond as well as the names of any others involved in subsequent
transactions. Some investors may prefer the anonymity and ease of
transfer associated with bearer bonds. In the short run, this may cause
registered bonds to be harder to sell than bearer bonds, thereby increasing
yields on registered bonds.
Increasingly, the municipal bond market has undergone changes from
the investor side as well. Three groups: commercial banks, insurance
companies, and high Income households constitute the major types of
investors interested in municipals. (See Figure IV-2.) In 1982, these three
sectors held more than 89 percent of all outstanding municipal bonds.
Although banks have been the dominant investor in municipal bonds
since the mid 1960s, they have, since 1971, decreased their holdings
relative to individuals, insurance companies, and others investors.
Numerous factors are related to the decreased demand for municipals among
banks. Included among them are the Tax Reform Act of 1969,49 the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (which increased competition within the financial
sector, forcing backs to seek high yields than tax exempts could offer.), and
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which changed the tax
treatment of municipal bond holdings, by allowing banks to deduct only 85
percent rather than the full carrying costs of municipal securities issued
after December 31, 1982. Moreover, the fact that banks have increasingly
become involved in leasing operations which allow the use of investment
tax credits (considered more profitable to banks than investing in municipal
bonds) is further evidence of the decline in commercial bank demand for
49see for further explanation, Kimball, R. (1977) Commerical Bank Demands
and Municipal Bond Yields. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Research Paper
No. 63. pp. 110-111.
-108-
municipals. Another factor which discouraged bank participation in the
municipal bond market was the general rise in interests over the past two
decades. (See Figure IV-3.) This left banks holding low yield bonds at a
time when they had to offer high yields to their customers, making them,
understandably, less willing to invest large sums in long-term municipals.
To a large degree, the decline in bank participation is offset by
increased purchase of municipals by high income households. n 1972, net
household purchases of municipals amounted to 16 percent of all new bond
sales; by 1982, household purchases comprised 87 percent of all new bond
sales.5 0 As pointed out in an earlier section, individuals are drawn to the
bond market by high yields. An additional factor explaining the high
participation of individuals is the growth of mutual bond funds, which can
also be classified under the household sector of tax-exempt investors.
At the same time, recent changes in federal tax policy have served to
weaken the overall demand for municipal bonds. The attractiveness of
municipals is based largely upon their tax exempt status. Recent tax
changes have reduced marginal tax rates and created a variety of alternative
tax shelters (e.g., IRAs and Keogh self-retirement plans). Beginning in
1982, Congress reduced the maximum marginal individual income tax rate
from 70 percent to 50 percent. Over the past several years, Congress has
also reduced other income tax rates. Generally, whenever the marginal
income tax rates are reduced, the demand for tax-exempt bonds declines.
The recently enacted tax simplification plan, approved by both houses
of Congress in late September, 1986.51 The full effects of this
5 OGAO, (1983) op. cit. p. 22.
5 1see for further details, New York Times, September 29, 1986. "Senate
Approves Tax Plan" p. 1.; Business Week, September 1, 1986. "Tax Reform At
Last." p. 54.
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legislation, likely to take effect January 1, 1987, are not fully known. The
main changes in the tax code include the reduction of the top tax rat's from
50 percent to 28 percent; elimination of state-local tax deductibility, as
well as the deductibility of individual retirement accounts, medical
expenses, investment tax credits, and business meals. Moreover, the
collapses 14 income tax rates into two--households earning up to $29,750
will be taxed at 15 percent, while those earning over $29,750 will be taxed
at 28 percent. Under present law, long-term capital gains are taxed at 20
percent. When the new law takes effect capital gains will be taxed at 28
percent. While state and local bonds will remain tax-exempt, the new law
will put limits on the amount of debt that public agencies can issue on
behalf of private concerns (industrial development, hospitals, universities,
etc.). Bonds issued purely for public purposes--roads, sewers, etc.--will be
unaffected.
The full impact of the law on the municipal bond market is difficult
to gauge. On the one hand, a reduction in the top income tax rates suggests
that the value of tax-exempt securities will decrease. On the other hand,
because of the elimination of many tax-shelters, many households and
business will look to municipals as a way of reducing tax liabilities. The
fact that capital gains will be taxed, under the new system, at the same
rate as salaries and wages, may serve to weaken the demand for certain
types of municipals (those below par, zero coupons, etc.).
The tax simplification plan will lead to changes in investment
patterns. Most analysts believe that wealthy individuals will pay higher
taxes under the new system, 5 2 suggesting that there will still be a market
for tax-exempt securities. Moreover, the fact that investment income will
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be taxed at the same rate as salaries and wages suggests that parents who
have set up trusts for their children, may want to switch over to
municipals. Under the new law, the maximum amount which can placed in a
tax-deferred account (401K Savings Plan), will be reduced from $30,000 to
$7,000. This change also increases the attractiveness of municipal bonds.
Finally, because the new law limits the deductibility of interest payments
to only first and second homes, those who invested in real estate may wish
to switch to municipal bonds.
When all the pieces are put together, it becomes apparent that the
municipal bond market has undergone substantial change. Revenue bond
financing has risen tremendously during the past decade and has caused an
increase in the demand for negotiated underwriters. This suggests that
overall interest costs on municipals have increased. Because of increased
borrowing for non-traditional purposes and the increase in borrowing by
special districts and other statutory authorities, much of the market is
dominated by local issuers other than city governments. According to the
Municipal Finance Study Group, an increase of $1 billion in tax exempt bonds
results in interest rates that are 3 to 5 basis points higher for the overall
market. 53 Based on an estimate of some $40 billion in non-traditional
bonds issued in 1982, it would appear that interest costs were some 120 to
200 basis points higher, because the volume of non-traditional debt. At
the same time, the continued presence of restrictions on local government
taxing authority have eroded the backing of general obligation bonds. This
has helped to foster the growth of special districts and other mechanisms
53Forbes, R. (1979) An Analysis of Tax Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bonds."
Municipal Finance Study Group. State University of New York. Albany.
Appendix III.
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for financing public improvements. New debt instruments--hybrid and
limited tax bonds, along "moral obligations," have flooded the market.
Municipal bond insurance companies have continued to expand their base of
operations, perhaps growing in popularity because of the increased
uncertainties in the market. Moreover,54
there are more than a dozen new fiduciary or fiscal
instruments which have turned the staid, sedate, bond world
into an exciting, innovative aspect of public administration.
The effects of the recently enacted tax overhall plan remain to be seen.
City governments with traditional projects face stiff competiton from
special district and statutory authorities. Their presence in the market has
served largely to drive up interest costs, and has cut into the pool of
investors who might otherwise help to finance traditional infrastructure
projects, offered by general purpose governments, like cities. Additionally,
changes in the federal tax code may serve to weaken the demand for tax
exempts. The end result is that municipal yields will increase, and
marketing of bonds, directed towards individuals, rather than institutions
will become increasingly complicated.
All of this implies that increasingly, control is moving further away
from issuers and more and more into specialized roles within the municipal
bond market. The decline in competitive sales reinforces this general
point. Increasingly, through negotiated underwriting, key decisions as to
the structuring of bonds, interest costs, and even the nature of the security
54Hamilton, R. (1983) "The World Turned Upside Down: The Contemporary
Revolution in State and Local Government Capital Financing" Public
Administration Review. January/February. pp. 22-31.
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backing the bonds, involve more and more, members of the financial
community.
Infrastructure and Municipal Debt: Research Needs
Unmet capital needs, the New Federalism, limits on state and local
taxing authority, and major changes in the municipal bond market suggest
that there are many potential topics for research in this area.
It is clear that more research needs to be conducted on the
determinants of municipal capital expenditures. How do municipalities
vary in terms of their levels of capital investment? What kinds of
attributes (size, density, growth, etc.) are associated with capital
investment. While numerous studies have been conducted on expenditure
determinants, most of the past research5 5 has focused on current or total
spending rather than specifically on capital spending.
Needed too, is more analysis on patterns of financing capital outlays.
How do cities vary in terms of their use of debt, federal aid and other
sources of financing for infrastructure. What- attributes are associated
with debt financing of capital outlays? Are certain cities more prone to
use debt than other techniques of financing? Clearly, there is a need for
more cross-sectional analysis of municipal government spending and
borrowing practices.
55 see for example, Brazer, H. (1959) City Expenditures in the United States.
National Bureau of Economic Research. New York; Bergstrom, T. C. (1973)
Private Demands for Public Goods. American Economic Review. 63. 3. June.
pp. 280-97.; Ladd, H. (1979) Municipal Expenditures and the Rate of
Population Change. in The Fiscal Stress of American Cities. ed. R.
Burchell, and D. Listokin. Center for Urban Policy Research. New Brunswick.;
and Beaton, P. (1983) The Demand for Municipal Goods. in Municipal
Expenditures, Revenues and Services. Center for Urban Policy Research.
New Brunswick.
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At the same time, many of the unanswered questions might best be
addressed through the development of new approaches and methods for
analyzing borrowing practices. Typically, the research conducted on
municipal debt has been approached from a market perspective, one in which
the researcher examines the flow of funds from investor to borrower. The
concerns are typically those shared by investors looking for either a high
return on their capital, security for their investment, and maximum
liquidity. The literature on risk and return, portfolio creation, and
municipal bond investment performance is vast.
While a substantial amount of research on municipal borrowing is
geared towards the investment community, very little of it is directed to
the public sector. There is a need to better understand borrowing practices,
to identify appropriate decision-making frameworks, and to develop a more
sound theory as to how, when, and why municipalities use long-term debt.
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Chapter 5
Theories for Explaining Change in Municipal Debt
Politics and Economics
Charles Lindblom, in his book, "Politics and Markets" suggests that
"the greatest distinction between one government and another is the degree
to which market replaces government or government replaces market."1
This dichotomy between government and market is particularly useful to the
study of municipal borrowing. To begin with, borrowing is a form of public
sector intervention. A city floats a bond issue, ostensibly, to finance
needed capital improvements. Yet, market conditions and market rules play
a heavy hand in determining when and how a city will borrow. Previous
chapters have illustrated the extent to which government and market
intermingle during the course of municipal borrowing.
Borrowing is an example of a politico-economic mechanism. It is a
means for altering the present state of affairs and moving a community
towards some desired and hopefully improved state. Debt enables a
community to finance construction of some needed public facility such as a
sewer system, water system, or some other form of infrastructure. It
allows a community to make an in-ground investment that will provide
service for future generations. As such, debt enables a community to shape
its future. In the process of borrowing, a bond, note, or some other
promise to pay is created. This claim to future income in the form of
promised interest and principal payments is the basis of exchange between
government issuers and investors. Holders of this claim to interest and
principal payments may subsequently trade or sell their bonds prior to
1Lindblom, C. (1977) Politics and Markets. Basic Books. New York. p. ix.
maturation. Municipal bonds are, therefore, a medium of exchange between
economic actors. Investors view municipal bonds as opportunities to
increase income, thereby changing their financial status. Municipal debt
therefore can be examined from the perspective of government issuers or
from the perspective of investors. Both perspectives involve decision-
making, that is, deciding upon alternative courses of action, that hopefully,
will lead to a changed, or improved state.
What, therefore, does the issuer hope to gain in the process of
borrowing? First, a government which borrows may raise the necessary
capital to finance needed public mprovements. Borrowing enables a
government entity to balance expenditure demands with available resources.
Second, borrowing is a type of adjustment process by which future
generations are forced into sharing the costs of public facilities planned for
and built today. Borrowing may be the only way to equitably finance large
public projects which provide service for many years. Third, borrowing is
a mechanism which allows a community to exert greater control over its
own future. Unlike intergovernmental assistance which may be earmarked
for certain types of capital projects (e.g., water pollution control,
handicapped access to public buildings, etc.) borrowed funds can be deployed
for whatever reasonable purpose a community deems as necessary. There
are fewer "strings attached" when a community issues a bond, because the
community can determine its own capital needs, allocate an appropriate
share of current assets which can be pledged towards the improvement, and
raise the remaining necessary funds through the sale of debt. Fourth, the
public sector may utilize debt to leverage development. The notion here is
that borrowed funds can be used to fuel economic growth. The issuer can
leverage development directly, as through an industrial revenue bond,
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whereby bond funds are conveyed directly to a private corporation. The
Issuer can also assist development more indirectly, through a strategically
located public improvement or infrastructure investment. The point here is
not so much to argue the merits of industrial development financing, but
rather to argue that leveraging development is, quite often, a reasons for
borrowing. Borrowing, therefore, can be seen as a mechanism for
increasing economic activity and employment, as well as a means for
financing needed capital expenditures.
Examining the other side of the equation, what does the investor hope
to gain in the process of buying a municipal bond? In contrast to the
government issuer, the goals and objectives of an investor are rather
simplistic: earn the greatest return possible on the invested capital.
While the goals and objectives of an investor are straight-forward, the road
to successful investment is paved with numerous pitfalls, shortcuts, and
sharp turns. Basically, an investor takes surplus assets or other liquid
funds and purchases municipal bonds. The investor may hope to earn money
is one of two basic ways. First, by holding on to a bond, the investor is
entitled to claim a stream of interest which, hopefully, exceeds the rate of
interest on alternative investments at any given time. Second, the investor
has the option of selling this claim to interest for a price which will,
hopefully, realize a profit. Built into this scheme are factors such as the
federal income tax code, which exempts interest payments on certain types
of municipal bonds. The tax savings may increase due to exemptions of
interest income from state and city income taxes as well. The investor
also must accept a certain amount of risk of default, that is, the failure of
the issuer to meet all debt service payments in a timely manner. The
pricing mechanism serves to distinguish between bonds with different
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payment structures as well as different risks of default. There are a range
of different opportunities for investment in municipal bonds in both the
primary market and the secondary market. The point here is that setting
aside the distinctions between long and short term investment strategies,
and the various risks associated with changing federal income tax statutes,
and the risks of default, the goals and objectives of investors are relatively
simple.
Municipal borrowing serves to confirm a fundamental distinction
between the public and private sector: in the course of decision-making,
government faces a multiple objective function, while decision-making in
the marketplace tends towards the more single-minded concerns of
maximizing return on investment and profit. The topic of municipal
borrowing draws together these two worlds of "politics and markets" in
several other ways as well. This will become apparent in the next section
which examines alternative approaches to explaining changes in levels of
municipal borrowing.
Alternative Approaches to Explaining Municipal Borrowing
In this section, the major theoretical frameworks appropriate to the
analysis of borrowing are briefly reviewed and evaluated. The struggle to
understand government actions is, perhaps, as old as government itself.
Adam Smith, 2 for example, envisioned government as possessing a minimal
role, serving to lessen regulation and strengthen competition in the private
economy. He was very much aware of the tension between government
action and private enterprise. This is a recurring theme, brought to life
again in the Reagan administration. Many of the early economists viewed
government either superficially or as some necessary evil (e.g., Alfred
2 Smith, A. (1937) The Wealth of Nations. Random House. New York.
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Marshall). In fact, it can be asserted that the field of public finance
emerged more out of the concern for the effect of taxes on economic
activity rather than as an independent and legitimate field of study. Public
finance theory, up until the turn of the century, focused intently upon the
tax and revenue side of government rather than on expenditures, budgeting,
and the provision of public services. Mills, Ricardo, McCulloch, Senior, and
others associated with formation of public finance theory held a rather
limited view of government, giving short shrift to its full role as producer
and provider of goods and services. Even more rare was any detailed
discussion and analysis of sub-national governments (i.e., states and
municipalities) and their potential actions (taxation, expenditure, and
borrowing).
In spite of the fact that as a topic within the field of public finance,
municipal finance theory was somewhat retarded, Interest in municipal
problems continued to grow. A municipal finance officers association
formed in the early 1900s and numerous publications offering practical
advice to those involved in the management and operations of municipalities
emerged. Chatters' Local Government Debt Administration, published
in 1939, is an example the pragmatic approach taken in works of this period.
These volumes served as handbooks or manuals for handling a number of
bond related concerns such as,3
the best time to sell bonds, preparation of the circular; proper
forms, records, and accounting entries; relationships with the
paying agent; and protection of the municipality against
forgeries, and against liability on limited obligation special
assessment bonds.
3 Chatters, C. and A. M. Hillhouse (1939) Local Government Debt
Administration. Prentice Hall. New York. p. 1.
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These works 4 were thin on theory and thick on matters of practical concern.
The literature, for example, presumed that city officials had already
developed an appropriate debt policy and needed only the mechanics
necessary to launch and carry out a debt program.
An important breakthrough in terms of public finance theory occurred
sometime after World War II, when theorists such as Samuelson5
reformulated and popularized the notions of public sector equilibrium
introduced some years early by Lindahl, 6 Wicksell, and others. The notion
of an equilibrium meant that taxes were more likely to be evaluated in
conjunction with expenditures. There was now a rational framework for
evaluation and government actions became more likely topics of study. The
end result was the formation of a body of theory which treated government
much as one would treat a household or firm in economic analysis.
Under conventional economic analysis, government is assumed to
posses a utility function derived from several identifiable objectives. This
function is maximized subject to constraints. In order to optimize the
particular function, government must undertake some sort of intervention,
such as taxation, expenditure, or redistribution of income. This type of
analysis hinges upon a number of key assumptions. The first is that
government acts as a single entity. The various departments and
hierarchies within government are collapsed, both vertically, and
4Added to this list would be titles such as, McQuillin, E. (1937) The Law of
Municipal Corporaations, Callagan. Chicago.; Hoan, D. (1936) City
Government. Harcourt, Brace. New York.; Richtor, E. (1927)The Prepartion
of a Long-Term Financial Program. Public Service Administration. Chicago.
sSamuelson, P. (1954) The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of
Economics and Statistics. 36. November. pp. 387-89.
6Lindahl, E. (i967) "Just Taxation--A Positive Solution" in R. Musgrave and A.
Peacock, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. St. Martin's Press. New
York.
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horizontally, into a unitary entity. This much like the concept of a "firm."
The second assumption is that this unitary entity acts rationally, that is,
its actions are consistent with well-defined, self-interested objectives.
The profit-maximizing firm, becomes the "welfare-optimizing" government
entity.
Another approach taken focuses more upon the behavior of residents.
Tiebout 7 envisioned a world in which residential choice was based upon a
market-basket of goods and services offered by a government for a
particular tax price. Interpreted in this way, the behavior of residents
was similar to the behavior of rational consumers.
Another theorist to contribute to the field of municipal finance was
Niskanen.8 He assumed that government output is produced by self-
interested bureaucrats. Rational self-interest for a government bureaucrat
involves maximizing budgets. Since bureaucrats can not legally keep
profits, they seek other things, such as high salaries, power, and prestige--
all things associated with large budgets.
Other important theoretical developments in the past 50 years
involve the process by which individual level decision-making is aggregated
into a collective outcome. Central to this is the median voter model as
7Tiebout, C. (1956) "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures" Journal of
Political Economy. 64. October. pp. 416-24.
8 Niskanen, W. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government.
Alderine-Atherton. Chicago.
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described by Bowen9, Black, lo and Downs, l l whereby an election serves as a
process for revealing the median voter's preference. A variety of different
concerns with the election process have emerged over the years. Issues of
fairness, 12 agenda control, 13 and barriers to entry into politics t 4 are some
of the more common concerns raised with electoral politics in the United
States. The point worth emphasis here is that voting, in spite of the
problems associated with it, is the most straightforward means of
translating individual preferences into collective outcomes.
Determinants of Local Government Spending
The literature on determinants of local government expenditures is
extensive, perhaps too vast to adequately summarize here. The technique
most commonly employed in these studies is a single equation, cross-
sectional, multiple regression. Variations in expenditures are explained in
terms of variations in social or economic variables.
9Bowen, H. (1943) "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of
Economic Resources" Quarterly Journal of Economics. 58., November. pp.
27-48.
lOBlack, D. (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge
University Press. Cambridge.
iDowns, A. (1957) An Economic kThory of Democracy. Harper and Row. new
York.
12Arrow, K. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University
Press. 2nd Ed. New Haven. and, Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock (1974) The
Calculus of Consent. The Unversity of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor.
13see for example, Black, D. (1958) op. cit.; Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal
(1978) "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agnedas, and the Status
Quo" Public Choice 33. No. 4. pp.27-43.; and Plott, C. and M. Levine (1978) "A
Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decision" American Economic
Review 68. No. 1. March. pp. 146-60.
14Tullock, G. (1965) "Entry Barriers in Politics" American Economic Review.
55. No. 2.
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One of the earliest studies was conducted by Solomon Fabricant15 who
explained variations in 1941 expenditures by state and local governments
with three variables: per capita income, population density, and
urbanization. He found that all three were important for both total
operating expenditures and expenditures on specific services. Fisherl6
repeated what was essentially the same analysis with 1957 data. Low per
capita income was found to be an important determinant. Sacks and Harris 1 7
found that state and federal aid were important explanatory variables.
Because the increased presence of federal aid, it was argued that the
income, density, and urbanization variables were of lessening significance.
Hawleyl8 examined the variation in per capita expenditures in 75
central cities. He determined that population and housing density n the
central city and population size, percentage of population incorporated, and
density in the metropolitan area were positively related to expenditures.
His research pointed to the notion that socio-economic variables in the
region, outside the central city, can be very important determinants of
expenditures.
Brazer's 1 9 work, who employed a similar methodology some years
later, served to illustrate many of the complexities associated with cross-
15 Fabricant, S. (1952) The Trend of Government Activity in the United States
Since 1900. National Bureau of Economic Research. New York.
16Fisher, G. ( 1964) Interstate Variation in State and Local Expenditures.
National Tax Journal. XVII. March. pp. 57-74.
17 Sacks, S. and R. Harris (1 964)The Determinants of State and Local and
Inter-Governmental Flow of Funds. National Tax Journal. XVII. pp. 75-85.
18Hawle, A. (1957) Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government
Expenditures in Central Cities. in P. K. Hatt and A. J. Reiss. Cities and
Society. Free Press. Glencoe.
19Brazer, H. (1959) City Expenditures in the United States. New York.
National Bureau of Economic Research. Occasional Paper. 66.
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sectional analysis of municipal spending patterns. Brazer analyzed a
number of different samples of cities, including a large sample of 462
cities, three smaller samples of cities in California, Massachusetts, and
Ohio, and a small sample which included data on the forty largest cities.
Regressions were performed on specific expenditure functions (e.g., police,
fire, etc.) as well on total general operating expenditures. Although
intergovernmental revenue was significant and positively influenced
expenditures for all functions; density was significant for most functions
(except recreation), and positively related to expenditures. Population size,
growth, and composition of the labor force were, in general, not significant,
and only important for a few functional areas of expenditure.
This research was particularly useful in that it demonstrated a good
deal of variation in local spending patterns exists across different states.
Variables which were important in one state, were not necessarily
particularly important in others. The relationship between state
government and city government may well have had much to bear upon the
level and nature of municipal expenditures.
In order to to eliminate the variations that could result from national
or statewide studies, Sacks and Hellmuth 20 studied data on villages and
cities in the Cleveland area. The variables such as density, income and
urbanization did not explain much of the variation, probably because of the
large differences between villages and cities in terms of the services they
provided. In their analysis, assessed property valuation proved to be
significant and positively related to expenditure levels.
2 0Sacks, S. and W. Hellmuth(1961 )Financing Government in a Metropolitan
Area. Free Press of Glencoe. New York.
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Bollens 2 1 analyzed 1955 expenditure data on local governments in the
St. Louis metropolitan area. His research pointed to the importance of
assessed property valuation and an "index of service quality." Similar to
Sacks and Hellmuth he found that variables such as density and size,
generally, were not important. Bollen did find, however, that housing
density was negatively related to refuse collection expenditures, suggesting
the importance of economies of scale for some municipal operations.
Other interesting expenditure determinant studies which have
conducted over the years include Dye's study2 2 which determined that
variables such as party competition, partisanship, and apportionment, are
much less powerful than the usual economic factors in explaining
expenditures variations within states. Lineberry and Fowler23 national
sample of two hundred cities found that cities run by managers spend and
tax less than those run by mayors. There is no explanation why, and
certainly no empirical evidence to suggest that manager cities are more
efficient or that mayor cities are more prone to having larger populations
who demand high levels of service. Kain24 found that the cost of the inter-
neighborhood system depended primarily on the shape and size of the region
being serviced. Netzer,25 on the hand, found that urbanization and high
2 1Bollens, J. (1964) Exploring the Metropolitan Community. University of
California Press. Berkeley.
22Dye, T. (1966) Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the
American States. Rand McNally and Co. Chicago.
23Lineberry, R. and E. Fowler, (1967) Reformism and Public Policies in
American Cities. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 61. Sept.
24Kain, J. (1967) Urban Form and the Costs of Urban Services. Probram on
Regional Economics; Harvard University.
25Netzer, D. (1974) Financing Surburban Development in P. Beaton, Municipal
Needs, Services and Financing. Center for Urban Policy Research. New
Brunswick.
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demands for public services among suburban newcomers (relative to original
residents) were important factors in explaining the expenditure variations.
Helen Ladd26 confirmed that expenditures were highest for the most
rapidly declining communities. She showed, moreover, that expenditures
will decrease as the rate of population decline slows, reaching a minimum
at a positive rate of population growth; and will rise again in rapidly
growing cities. Her work focused on a sample of 103 Massachusetts
communities.
In summary, there are several different ways of imposing an
economic perspective on government. Government can be viewed in a
manner similar to how one would view a private firm. In this manner,
government uses various resources to produce certain goods and services
needed to achieve certain objectives. In order to ensure, for example,
economic growth, government taxes residents, borrows against that power
to tax, and then uses the bond proceeds to produce some form of
infrastructure. Economic principles also guide the process by which
government determines that a particular facility is needed. A primary
mechanism for resolving collective choice problems is voting. A bond issue
referendum is an example, however flawed, of how government goes about
revealing the preferences of citizens. Another approach is to assume that
people, "vote with their feet," that is, by choosing to live in a particular
community which offers a certain level of public service for a given tax
price, residents are, in effect, revealing their preferences for service.
Economic theory helps to understand: 1) why municipalities borrow; 2) how
26Ladd, H. ( 1978) "Municipal Expenditures and the Rate of Population Change"
in Burchell, R. and D. Listoken, Cities Under Stress. Center for Urban Policy
Research. New Brunswick.
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municipalities determine an appropriate level of borrowing; and 3) what is
an optimal level of capital expenditure and debt.
In reality, providing answers to such questions is a tall order for
economic theory alone. Economic models serve better as examples of how
decisions should be made, rather than how decisions are made in reality.
There are few, if any, pure and simple economic answers and "politics"
manages to enter into virtually all types of decision-making. The
inevitability of interaction between "politics" and "markets" stems from the
following reasons. First as pointed out earlier, government faces a
multiple objective function, meaning that goals and objectives are rarely, if
ever, clear-cut and universally beneficial. Public sector decision-making
does not occur in a vacuum, and increasingly what has been termed, "checks
and balances," or, alternatively "interest group pressures," have been on the
increase. In the second place, government can be characterized as a
bureaucracy. As such, it is quite vulnerable to a variety of organizational
pressures which may fly in the face of a pure market approach. By this, we
mean that organizational behavior and theory may as strong an influence in
government as economic theory. All large organizations are vulnerable to
these influences. Government because of its multiple objective functions is
particularly susceptible.
Financial Decision-making in Local Government
The terms "bureaucracy" and "bureaucrat" often bear negative
connotations. Yet virtually all large organizations are subject to
"bureaucratic" influences. Such influences may be either positive or
dysfunctional. The point here is not to argue whether or not bureaucracy is
good or bad, but rather to establish the fact that there are a variety of
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organizational pressures which, like economic pressures guide and influence
behavior and decision-making, including those relevant to borrowing.
The range of theoretical insight into organizational influences is
quite broad. Max Weber was one of the first to see bureaucracy as the most
efficient means of organizing economic life. Others (Merton, March and
Simon, Gouldner, Selznick, etc.) were less optimistic about the beneficial
aspects of bureaucratic organization.
An important article which suggested that organizational influences
were as powerful as economic motivations was written by Herbert Simon27
In the 1950s. He pointed out that "firms aim at a satisfactory, rather than
highest level of profits." If firms function in this manner, it is quite
conceivable that government agencies also behave this way, seeking
"satisfice" rather than maximize. 28 Cyert and March's study 29 of a large
department store served to reinforce this perspective. Rational behavior
was extended to include the maximization of not just economic resources,
but also things like power, prestige, satisfaction, and other non-monetary
items.
Perhaps the most relevant of all the studies were those conducted
upon decision-making processes within local government itself. Hunter's
study of community power, 30 Dahl's study of leadership in New Haven,3 1
27Simon, H. (1952) A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 69. pp. 98-118.
28Simon, H. (1947) Administrative Behavior (1947) Macmillan. New York.
29Cyert, R. and J. March(1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
3 0Hunter, F. (1953) Community Power Strucutre: A Study of Decision Makers.
University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill.
3 1Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs? Yale University Press. New Haven.
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Sayre and Kaufman's study of New York City, 3 2 and Banfield's study on
political influence 33 stand out as the classic studies which have spawned
nearly three decades of research on decision making in public organizations.
Initially, the research focused on themes such as the existence of a "power
elite," and the dynamics of local government decision-making. Much of the
debate structured on the process itself, including the identification of
stakeholders, 34 the behavior of those identified as decision-makers, 35 the
"rules of the game,"36 the use of strategy, 37 and discretionary authority of
decision-makers. 38 More recently, concerns have been expressed over the
32 Sayre, W. and H. Kaufman (1960) Governing New York City. Russell Sage
Foundation. New York.
33Banfield, E. ( 1961 ) PoliticalI nfluence: A New Theory of Urban Politics.
The Free Press. New York.
34 Sayre, W. and H. Kaufman (1960) op. cit., identified the following
"contestants" in city government: party leaders, public officials,
bureaucrats, non-governmental interest groups, state and federal officials,
and the electorate.
35Thometz, C. (1963) The Decision-Makers: The Power Structure of Dallas.
SMU Press. Dallas.
36Martin, R. et. al., ( 1961 ) Decisions in Syracuse, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington. This study elaborated upon many of the themes raised by
Sayre and Kaufman. Another study which described the system of local
decision-making was, Meltner, A. (1971) The Politics of City Revenue.
Univeristy of California Press. Berkeley.
3 7 Long, N. (1958) "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games" American
Journal of Sociology. 64. November. pp.251-61.
38Lowi, T. (1964) At the Pleasure of the Mayor. Free Press of Glencoe. New
York. Levy, F., S. Meltsner, and A. Wildavsky. (1974) Urban Outcomes:
Schools, Streets, and Libraries. University of California Press. Berkeley.
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extent to which federal policies and programs influence local government
decision-making. 3 9
An alternative, therefore, to the conventional economic framework
for analyzing borrowing decisions, involves constructing some type of
organizational model. Perhaps the most compelling models involve the
concepts of "bounded rationality," and the "limited problem-solving"
capabilities of decision-makers. Articulated by, Lindblom,40 Dahl, Simon,
Wildavsky,4 1 and others, this point of view suggests that while decision-
making is admittedly rational, it is not necessarily economically rational.
As Lindblom describes, 42
Since people cannot intellectually master all their social
problems...they depend on various devices to simplify problem
solving. Among them are trial and error and rules of thumb, as
well as routinized and habitual responses to categories of
problems. One commonplace strategy for a policy maker is to
proceed incremently and sequentially, with close interplay
between ends and means. In such a strategy, a policy maker is
less concerned with "correctly" solving his problem than with
making an advance. He is also less concerned with a
predetermined set of goals than with remedying experienced
dissatisfaction with past policy while goals and politics are
both reconsidered...
39 Martin, R. ( 1963) The Cities and the Federal System. Atherton Press. New-
York; Lowi, T. (1979) The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the
United States. W.W. Norton. New York.; Nathan, R. et. al. (1975) Monitoring
Revenue Sharing. Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C., and Reagan, M.
(1972) The New Federalism. Oxford University Press. New York.
40Lindblom, C. (1959) The Science of Muddling through. Public
Administration Review. 19. pp. 79-88.
4 1Wildavsky, A. (1961) Political Implications of Budgetary Reform. Public
Administration Review. 21. pp. 183-190; and, Wildavsky, A. (1964) The
Politics of the Budgetary Process. Little, Brown. Boston.
4 2 Lindblom, C. (1977) op. cit. p. 314.
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Many borrowing decisions are likely to be made in this manner. The
decision to borrow involves consideration of numerous factors. In addition
to determining levels of capital need, decision-makers must ensure that
there are adequate resources available to support additional debt service
payments, both immediately and in the future. Borrowing can take
numerous forms in terms of length of maturity, nature of security backing
the obligation, refunding provisions, and so on. Many of these decisions
may be made as "routinized and habitual" responses. One sees in the
literature, many such "rules of thumb" as to the amount of debt a city should
issue each year, the necessary coverage of debt service payments, and so on.
While a local official may have final decision-making authority, he, more
than likely will seek the advice and inputs of advisors both inside and
outside government. The decision to incur debt, as pointed out earlier, will
result in a collection of both winners and losers. As stakes increase, the
pressure to decide one way over another will undoubtedly increase. The
selection of one negotiated underwriter over several others, for example,
may mean that the chosen firm is ensured a steady inflow of underwriting
responsibilities. Finally, it is hard to image a city where borrowing
decisions are made completely independent of the personalities of the key
elected and appointed leaders. Although borrowing, particularly that which
is used to finance capital expenditures is often planned on a long-term
horizon, the power of executives to reorder priorities and create their own
long range plans not only occurs, but is often expected.
In summary in terms of social, political, and economic theory, there
are really two dominant frameworks for analyzing debt. Whether you call it
"politics and markets" or economic versus organizational frameworks,
virtually all methods of analyzing borrowing must begin with either of
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these two perspectives. We can, in the process of analysis, blend these two
frameworks, but the point worth emphasis is that there are really two
distinct intellectual streams for analyzing not just borrowing decisions,
but virtually all government interventions.
Unique Aspects of Municipal Borrowing
Before addressing the issues pertinent to municipal borrowing, two
points need to be established. First, borrowing by a municipal corporation
is fundamentally different from borrowing by a private business. Second,
municipal debt is quite different in terms of the purpose, scope, and impact
of federal debt.
Municipal bonds are quite different from corporate bonds. Although
both entities may borrow to finance capital expenditures, the similarities
between cities and private companies are really quite limited. According to
an often cited article by Merton Miller, 43 the major concern of firms is the
extent to which capital structure influences market value. He. takes the
position that "even in a world in which interest payments are fully
deductible in computing corporate income taxes, the value of the firm, in
equilibrium will still be independent of its capital structure." A municipal
corporation, on the other hand, is less concerned with "market value," and,
more concerned with meeting public demands for service. Municipal
corporations, moreover, are exempt from corporate income taxation, and the
deductibility of debt service payments, while a matter of concern to private
firms, is largely irrelevant to city borrowers.
Municipal borrowing is quite different from corporate borrowing for
several other reasons. Municipal borrowing is subject to a set of
4 3Miller, M. (1977) Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance. May. Vol XXXII.
No. 2. pp. 261-275
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constitutional or statutory restrictions expressed in the form of limits or
ceilings on the amount of debt that may be issued or in stipulations
regarding the authorization of debt (e.g., mandatory referendum for bond
issues). Corporations, while less encumbered by legal restrictions on
borrowing are more concerned with the effects of debt on the overall value
of the firm. The private corporation's actions must be accountable to
stockholders, while the actions of a municipal corporation are judged by a
broader audience of residents and citizens.
Borrowing by state and local government entities is fundamentally
different from federal government borrowing. The federal government has
the ability to expand the money supply, a convenience not available to state
and local entities, which are forbidden by the constitution to print money.
The Federal Reserve System is responsible for maintaining monetary and
credit conditions which help to promote economic growth, full employment,
stable prices, and the balance of payments between the U.S. and foreign
countries. There is no equivalent to the Federal Reserve at the state and
local levels of government.
State and local government borrowing is closer to borrowing by
private corporations than federal government borrowing. The federal
government uses its debt and monetary policies to stabilize prices and the
national economy; state and local governments and private corporations, on
the other hand, generally borrow to finance specific capital projects.
There are, moreover, many different state and local government borrowers,
but only one federal government. As such federal government bonds and
notes are generally considered the most secure of all investments,
surpassing any obligation of any state and local government or private
corporation.
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Municipal borrowing is a type of government action. The proceeds of
: ~.'
debt financing are used to construct capital facilities. Debt service is a
type of expenditure, a cost to government like salaries and wages,
equipment and supplies, or pension fund contributions. Perhaps one of the
reasons that the study of municipal borrowing is difficult is that it does not
fit neatly into a revenue-expenditure categorization. In the short term, debt
is likely to be viewed as a type of revenue. Bond proceeds enable a city to
purchase goods or services which it might not otherwise be able to afford.
Over time, however, debt service becomes a fixed expenditure payment, that
is, an obligation which the municipality must meet.
The question as to what constitutes an appropriate level of long term
borrowing involves two separate considerations: 1) what the city actually
needs to borrow; and 2) what the city can afford to borrow. Although the
two are related, need is quite different from borrowing capacity. Need can
be expressed as the difference between total capital expenditure
commitments and total non-debt resources which can be expended on capital
projects. Non-debt resources include current receipts, federal and state
grants, and other monies such as income from the sale of property or trust
income which can be used on capital projects. The question as to what a
city can afford to borrow involves assessing the potential for additional
debt service payments and determining how much additional debt a
government can accumulate. Such an assessment should be based upon
factors such as the government's potential for generating revenue and the
amount of long term debt outstanding.
In the next chapter, I will examine spending and borrowing practices
for the largest cities in the United States. Chapter 6 will describe
patterns of spending and borrowing, and relate these patterns to attributes
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of individual cities, such as size, density, growth, age, and expenditure
responsibility.
Several behavioral models for explaining debt will be more fully
developed in Chapter 7. These models will focus on the behavior of
municipal finance officers responsible for implementing debt policy. They
are assumed to be a rational, reasonable group of decision-makers. These
decision-makers have access to information which they use to evaluate the
consequences of their actions. Although they have different personalities,
preferences, and objectives, they are similar in their capacity to forsee the
outcome of their actions. This approach is a particularly useful way to
describe the process of borrowing. Borrowing is practice carried out by
individuals who make decisions for a city. A city, per se, is incapable of
reasoning, planning, and acting. As such, it makes sense to focus on the
behavior of those responsible for borrowing. A behavioral model enables us
to consider a full range of motives and reasons for implementing a
particular debt program. Moreover, it enables us to specify the extent to
which personality traits as well as "the limits to rationality" may influence
a city's debt policy.
In Chapter 8, the arguments and models developed in the next two
chapters will be tested. This chapter contains an analysis of capital
spending, borrowing, and federal aid over and 18 year period, 1965-82. The
purpose of this chapter is to further strengthen the notion that a behavioral
approach to borrowing holds great promise.
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Chapter 6
Outlays and Debt: A Cross-sectional Analysis
We begin this chapter with a premise: capital spending and debt are
purely rational activities. They are examples of a planned government
intervention--a means of producing some desired change. As such, capital
spending and borrowing occur in response to a set of conditions that exist
within a particular community. This chapter will describe those conditions
which create the need for capital investment, which in turn create the need
for borrowing. As earlier chapters have shown, borrowing, particularly
through the issuance of long term municipal bonds, involves many different
interest groups and stakeholders. Municipalities must bring their issues to
market, that is, they must find willing investors. Part of the explanation
for municipal borrowing, therefore, involves the ability to successfully
market long term debt. Combining together borrowing needs and ability
provides a seemingly rational model of borrowing practices. Simply put,
those cities with the greatest need to borrow as well as the greatest
capacity to incur debt should, over time, exhibit the highest levels of
borrow i ng.
Method of Inquiry and Data Sources
In order to answer some of these questions, we will examine a sample
of the 37 largest cities in the country in terms of their borrowing needs and
capacity to support bonded debt. The cities included in this sample
represent a diverse lot. (See Figure VI-1). All have a 1980 population of
more than 300,000 inhabitants. The smallest is Omaha, with a population
of 313,939, while the largest is New York City, having more than 7 million
inhabitants. The data have been extracted from numerous sources, but most
-Figure VI-1.
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of the information comes from the U.S. Bureau of Census, City Government
Finances. 1
There are several reasons why these 37 cities were selected for
study. Because of their size and location, they serve as important centers
for economic and social activity. Municipalities are complex entities
which provide a wide range of public services for a heterogeneous
population. Historically, large cities have been plagued by a variety of
socio-economic problems. Problems such as poverty, crime, inadequate
housing, pollution, and congestion have persisted in spite of numerous public
interventions, planning efforts, and social programs. Municipalities are, by
definition, general purpose governments, which are different from special
districts, statutory authorities, and other single purpose government
entities. In addition to their heavy service responsibilities they have an
increasingly sophisticated array of revenue generating mechanisms.
Nevertheless, cities continue face a variety of financial difficulties, some
directly related to borrowing. Understanding debt policy can potentially
contribute to a betterment of conditions in large urban areas.
There are, admittedly, numerous problems related to methods and
data. These 37 cities are vastly different in terms of their organization,
their relations with state governments, and overlapping jurisdictions.
Some cities are responsible for financing and provision of services that are
provided for by non-municipal governments in other areas. Some areas face
"border city" problems while others because of their remote location are
free of the additional service costs imposed by outside commuters.
Another serious problem relates to the fact that each city is chartered
1U.S. Bureau of the Census (1965-1983) City Government Finances. U.S.
Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.
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according to the particular laws of the state in which it is located. This
means that there are over 30 different municipal charters, further
complicating direct comparisons between municipalities.
The cities are grouped according to various attributes in Table Vi-1.
All of the population attributes (size, growth, and density) were derived
using 1980 census data. The measures of growth and decline refer to
population changes occurring between 1970 and 1980. There are both old
and young cities included in the sample. An indicator of a city's age is the
age of its housing stock. With the exception of San Francisco, the cities
with the largest proportion of housing built before 1940 are located in the
East and industrial north. Cities with a large proportion of more recently
built housing tend to be located in the west and southern parts of the
country. The highest rates of homeownership appear to be in those cities
located in the middle regions of the country. Almost all of the largest
cities in the United States have large non-white populations. The only
cities to have less than 20 percent non-white population are Minneapolis,
Omaha, Phoenix, and Portland. In terms of the type of government, 25 of
the 37 cities have the mayor-council form of government, 11 have the city
manager form, and one city, San Antonio is governed by the commission form
of government.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Census, there are some 19,000
municipalities, having a total population of over 141 million people.
Altogether, the 37 cities selected for study contain some 34 million
people, amounting to about 24 percent of all those who live in
municipalities. The 37 sample cities generated some $41.4 billion in
general revenues, and spent over $37 billion in annual general expenditures.
In other words, these 37 municipalities raised nearly 45 percent of all total
-14 0-
Table VI-1
Sample Cities Orouped According to Various Attributes
Population Greater
Than Million
Chicago
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
Density Greater Than
20 Persons Per Acre
Chicago
New York
Newark
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Population Orowth
Greater than 20%
Honolulu
Houston
Memphis
Phoenix
San Antonio
San Diego
population Decline
Greater than 15%
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
St. Louis
Washington
More Than 50% Housing
Built Before 1940
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cleveland
Minneapolis
Philadelphia
San Francisco
St. Louis
More than 20% Housing
Built After 1969
Columbus
Dallas
Denver
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Memphis
Oklahoma City
Phoenix
San Antonio
San Diego
More than 50%
Homeownershio
Detroit
Fort Worth
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Memphis
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Portland
San Antonio
Toledo
More than 50%
Non-White Population
Atlanta
Baltimore
Chicago
Detroit
Honolulu
New Orleans
Newark
Oakland
Washington
More than 30%
Manufacturing Jobs
Chicago
Cleveland
Detroit
Fort Worth
Houston
Long Beach
Milwaukee
Newark
Toledo
More than 30%
Service Jobs
Atlanta
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Minneapolis
New Orleans
San Diego
San Francisco
Seattle
St. Louis
Washington
City Manacer
Government
Cincinnati
Dallas
Fort Worth
Kansas City
Long Beach
Oakland
Oklahoma City
Phoenix
San Francisco
Seattle
Toledo
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revenues generated by all 19,000 municipalities in the United States. Of
the $85 billion spent annually by all municipal governments, these 37 cities
accounted for more than 43 percent. Similarly, this group of cities
accounted for more than 40 percent of all capital outlays and over 45
percent of total municipal spending on salaries and wages. In summary,
these 37 cities account for a significant proportion of the total financial
activity of all municipalities in the country. It is important, therefore, to
understand the fiscal behavior of these cities because they account for such
a large share of total financial activity. In addition, understanding the
actions of these cities may help further an understanding of other, smaller
municipal units.
Patterns of Spending and Borrowing: The Largest Cities
As pointed out in earlier sections, capital outlays tend to be large,
irregular expenditures. The planning, design, and construction of an
infrastructure project can occur over a period of years, perhaps decades. As
such, it makes sense to utilize a multiple year perspective when examining
outlays and debt. Researchers who opt for a single year analysis risk
creating a "hit or miss" situation when it comes to analyzing capital outlays
and debt. In this chapter, annual spending and borrowing patterns of the 37
largest cities, averaged over an 18 year time period (1965-82), will be
examined.
In order to provide some basis of comparison between cities, the
values for capital spending and debt are expressed in per capita terms. in
other words, an 18 year average is divided by 1980 population. There are
some drawbacks to this approach. Because population may have changed
over the 18 year period, using 1980 population may not be a good way to
determine per capita spending trends. There are also other possible ways
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of standardizing the capital spending and debt values, such as using
assessed valuation or percentage of personal income. After consideration
of the various available alternatives, it was determined that the potential
problems created by use of 1980 population could be overcome by
considering a range of other variables (size, growth, density, age, etc.) in
this analysis.
Table VI-2 contains average values (averaged over 18 years) for
capital outlays, long-term debt outstanding, and long-term debt issued. It
also contains the total amount of debt issued in a single year, 1982.
Several points emerge from examining this table. As indicated by the mean
and large standard deviation values for outlays and debt, there is an
extremely wide distribution of values. In other words, there appears to be
tremendous differences in this sample of 37 municipalities. Per capita
capital outlays range between a low of $40 (San Antonio) to a high over
$383. Long-term debt outstanding ranges between $1400 (Washington, D C.)
and $143 (San Diego). Debt issuances are also widely divergent: San Diego
issued on average $8 per person, while New York City borrowed
approximately $1 80 per resident.
The cities with above average levels of long term debt outstanding
are: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Columbus, Los Angeles, Memphis,
Minneapolis, New York, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, San Antonio, Seattle
and Washington. The cities with an above average level of debt issuance
(over the 18 year period) include all those mentioned plus Buffalo, and
Dallas. One city, Seattle, has an above average level of outstanding debt, but
a below average record of debt issuance. There is generally a strong
relationship between high levels of debt outstanding and high levels of debt
issuance.
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Capital Outlays,
City
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
FortWorth
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
KansasCity
LongBeach
LosAngeles
Memphis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
NewOrleans
NewYork
Newark
Oakland
OkiaCity
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Portland
SanAntonio
SanDiego
SanFran
Seattle
St.Louis
Toledo
Washington
mean
St. Dev
Table VI-2
Long-term Debt Outstanding, and
CAPOUT LTDO
174.38 1323.62
198.41 674.30
117.15 667.14
129.26 547.44
49.22 322.68
149.04 525.38
66.60 546.75
58.93 586.02
61.21 472.96
87.18 641.86
92.26 538.46
69.11 427.25
69.29 280.22
56.02 463.84
65.04 336.71
99.00 618.69
102.47 243.96
48.67 654.27
72.03 765.62
66.97 390.31
383.46 598.00
69.85 505.62
113.81 1340.89
40.90 381.82
93.94 413.10
86.15 788.21
85.21 300.75
97.62 752.67
71.93 401.77
59.16 274.11
40.61 603.75
44.50 143.96
131.97 682.40
80.94 787.22
57.45 358.64
61,18 170.60
216,92 1400.45
96.43 565.71
64.08 292.92
Long-term Debt
LTDI
156.78
68.52
89.05
82.04
27.67
37.03
51.63
55.36
74.81
58.18
46.18
47.74
23.97
70.40
25.85
43.10
39.05
71.08
70.07
49.79
133.12
46.51
180.64
40.89
44.79
62.57
38.20
80.82
60.17
59.80
110.22
8.28
92.87
63.72
31.87
22.86
155.06
65.42
38.95
CAPOUT--ANNUAL CAPITAL OUTLAYS AVERAGED OVER PERIOD 1965-82
LTDO--ANNUAL LONG-TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING AVERAGED OVER PERIOD 1965-1982
LTDI--ANNUAL LONG TERM DEBT ISSUED, AVERAGED OVER PERIOD 1965-82
LTDI82--ANNUAL LONG TERM DEBT ISSUED IN 1982.
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Issued
LTDt82
39.29
228.96
0.00
0.00
9.77
49.87
0.00
191.00
248.57
40.49
103.16
129.87
62.58
105.14
6.40
47.54
72.18
24.46
82.69
73.36
425.77
12.54
194.57
0.00
81.98
39.00
48.56
145.44
128.87
136.35
291.87
5.09
59.70
122.01
139.51
27.32
227.27
97.33
95.82
Table VI-2 serves to illustrate another interesting point, which
supports the view that researchers adopting a single year perspective run
the risk of "hit or miss." The point is that although Boston and Buffalo had
above average levels of annual debt issuances over the 18 year period, as
indicated by the last column of the table, these two cities issued no debt
whatsoever in 1982. Similarly, St. Louis, which had a relatively low level
of average annual borrowing over the 18 year period issued over $139 per
capita, for the single year of 1982.
In inspecting Table VI-2, it is somewhat surprising to find that there
are some cities with low capital outlays and high debt (San Antonio), as
well as some cities with high capital outlays and low debt (Long Beach).
While the relationship between outlays and debt appears to be positive, at
first glance it does not appear to be especially strong.
The fact that the relationship between outlays and debt is not
particularly strong is confirmed by the calculation of the rank-order
correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho). Shown in Table VI-3, the
coefficient s only .43. This suggest that less that half of the variation in
debt is predicted by capital outlays. Since long-term debt is used to
finance municipal capital outlays, then, we expect a strong, positive
relationship between debt and capital outlays. This may be an over-
simplification. Some cities may make use of non-debt resources (federal
aid, current revenues, etc.) in financing capital outlays. In other cities, the
relationship between debt and outlays may not be so straight-forward. If,
for example, debt is used to finance re-fundings of outstanding debt, then
there may not be a strong correlation between debt and capital outlays.
The Impact of Municipal Characteristics on Outlays and Debt
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Table VI-3
RANK ORDER CORRELATION BETWEEN CAPITAL OUTLAY AND DEBT
CITY CAPOUT LTDI D D SOU
Atlanta 4 2 2 4
Baltimore 3 3 0 0
Boston a 7 1 1
Buffalo 7 8 -1 1
Chicago 33 33 0 0
Cincinnati 5 31 -26 676
Cleveland 25 21 4 16
Columbus 30 20 10 100
Dallas 27 10 17 289
Denver 15 19 -4 16
Detroit 14 25 -11 121
FortWorth 23 23 0 0
Honolulu 22 35 -13 169
Houston 32 12 20 400
Indianapolis 26 34 -- 64
KansasCity 11 27 -16 256
LongBeach 10 29 -19 361
LosAngeles 34 11 23 529
Memphis 19 13 6 36
Milwaukee 24 22 2 4
Minneapolis 1 4 -3 9
NewOrleans 21 24 -3 9
NewYork 9 1 8 64
Newark 36 28 8 64
Oakland 13 26 -13 169
OklaCity 16 16. 0 0
Omaha 17 30 -13 169
Philadelphia 12 9 3 9
Phoenix 20 17 3 9
Portland 29 18 11 121
SanAntonio 37 5 32 1024
SanDiego 35 37 -2 4
SanFran 6 6 0 0
Seattle 18 15 3 9
St.Louis 31 32 -1 1
Toledo 28 36 -8 64
Washington 2 3 -1 1
4769
0.4346847
CAPOUT: CAPITAL OUTLAY 6 
LTDI: LONG TERM DEBT ISSUED 2
D: DIFFERENCE IN RANKING N(N -1)
D SQU: DIFFERENCE IN RANKING SQUARED = 1 - .5653
= .4347
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In stating the initial argument it may be useful to distinguish
between capital needs and expenditures. Expenditures represent the amount
that a city spends, regardless of its capital needs. Capital needs can be
defined as the need to invest in infrastructure and capital projects. When a
city relies heavily upon debt financing, there will be a strong connection
between capital expenditures and borrowing. Borrowing may or may not be
tied to capital needs. Hopefully, it is. Capital needs amount to what the
city should be spending its money on (raised through borrowing or other
means). Capital expenditures represent what the city spends in reality,
which is independent of actual need.
As the previous chapter pointed, while there has been a tremendous
amount of empirical research on expenditure determinants, very little is
known about what determines capital spending. There is, as suggested
earlier, ample evidence to suspect a number of different (and contradictory)
frameworks in which capital spending is affected by municipal
characteristics. As cities increase in size and density. there is reason to
believe that there will be a corresponding increase in the need for capital
investment. Large, densely populated areas require the heaviest
investments in infrastructure. On the other hand, there is also evidence to
suggest that there are possible economies of scale associated with the
provision of infrastructure services. This suggests the possibility of a
negative relationship between size and density and capital spending. As
areas grow, and as new development occurs, old infrastructure systems
must be expanded or rehabilitated, or new systems must be put in place. As
infrastructure systems age, they require replacement or rehabilitation.
Those cities with the oldest systems, potentially, have pressing capital
needs. At the same time, the well established presence of a U-shaped
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expenditure curb, suggests that there may not be a simple relationship
between growth and capital spending. In fact, declining areas and growing
areas may both share the highest rates of expenditure.
In this analysis, size is operationalized, using 1980 central city
population. Density is expressed as persons per acre in 1980. Growth is
measured as a percentage change in resident population between 1970 and
1980. Age is estimated on the basis of the proportion of the housing stock
in 1980 built before 1940.
Another factor frequently pointed to as a determinant of spending is
the level of financial responsibility held by the municipal government.
Those municipalities which share fewer responsibilities with other units of
government will, according to this view, have the highest levels of spending.
The expenditure responsibility variable used in this analysis is municipal
government expenditures divided by total metropolitan area expenditures. it
gives a measure of the financial responsibility of the central city
government.
A number of statistical tests were run to determine the nature and
magnitude of the relationships between outlays/debt and municipal
characteristics (size, density, growth, age, and expenditure responsibility).
The results of the ANOVA test are presented in Table VI-4.
Few of the attributes turned out to be significant determinants of
either capital outlays or long-term debt outstanding, or long-term debt
issued. Population size appears to be strongly and positively rel.ated to
capital outlays and long-term debt issuances. The other variables exhibited
much weaker effects on outlays and debt.
In summary, of the five variables (size, density, growth, age, and
expenditure responsibility), only size had a bearing upon outlays and debt.
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Table VI-4
Summary Table, ANOVA Test Results,
Capital Outlays, Long-term Debt Issued and Long-term Debt
Outstanding Against Various Municipal Attributes
SS, Between
Capital Outlays
Sampling D.F. F-ratio
Attribute: GrouDs Error
Size 5,849 142,219 2/34 7.02*
Density 6,510 141,849 " .78
Growth 34,144 144,921 ".40
Age 21,760 126,328 " 2.92
Exp. Resp. 10,582 137.506 " 1.30
Long-term Debt Outstanding
SS, Between Sampling D.F. F-ratio
Attribute: Groups Error
Stize 103,267 3,077,908 2/34 .57
Density 342,643 2,745,592 " 2.12
Growth 403,331 2,684,903 " 2.55
Age 5,050 3,080,185 " ' .04
Exp. Resp. 176,652 2,911,583 " 1.03
Long-term Debt Issued
SS, Between Sampling D.F. F-ratio
Attribute: GrouDs Error
Size 1,627 52,695 2/34 8.70*
Density 4,353 49,979 " 1.48
Growth 6,354 47,968 " 2.25
Age 849 53,483 " .26
Exp. Resp. 799 53,533 " ' .25
*significant at .01 level
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Table VI-5
Population Size and Capital Outlays
Summary ANOVA Table
* significant at .01 level
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean
Variation Squares, SS Freedom, df Square F-Ratio
Between groups 58,694 3 - 1 = 2 29,347 7.02
Sampling Error, E 142,219 37 - 3 = 34 4,182.9
Total,T 3565 37 - 1 = 36
Table VI-6
Population Size and Long Term Debt Issued
Summary ANOVA Table
* significant at .01 level
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean
Variation Squares, SS Freedom, df Square F-Ratio
Betveen groups 1,627 3 - 1 = 2 13,490 8.70
Sampling Error, E 52,695 37 - 3 = 34 1,549
Total, T 2,423 37 - 1 = 36
_________________________________II
Moreover, population size was significantly related to per capita debt
issued, but was not significantly related to per capita debt outstanding.
Tables VI-5 and VI-6 contain the ANOVA tables for population size and
outlays and population size and debt.
In order to probe the relationship between attributes and
outlays/debt even deeper, several regression equations were formulated.
Three basic equations were utilized. The first attempted explain capital
spending as a function of size, density, growth, age, and expenditure
responsibility. The second equation attempted to explain per capita debt
outstanding on the basis of the five attribute variables. The third equation
attempted to explain the variation in average annual long-term debt
issuances as a function of the five attribute variables.
Mathematically, the form of the regression equations used can be
expressed as linear, additive models, whereby:
Y = al + 31SIZE + B2 DENSITY + 33 GROWTH + 34 AGE + 35EXPRESP + E
with a equal to the intercept, 3n equal to the regression coefficients, SIZE,
DENSITY, GROWTH, AGE, and EXPRESP equal to the attribute variables
described earlier.
In addition to the general linear models, the variables were also
transformed (using logarithms) in order to produce three logarithmic
models (outlays, debt outstanding, and debt issued). The results of the two
approaches are summarized in Table VI-7.
The summary table containing the regression results demonstrates
that five municipal attributes can explain up to 25 percent of the variation
in capital outlays, 42 percent of the variation in long-term debt
outstanding, and 28 percent of the variation in long-term debt issued. The
use of the logarithmic transformations produced mixed results. On the one
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Table VI-7
Summary of Multiple Regression Results
Capital Outlays
Linear Model Logarithmic Model
Size
Density
Growth
Age
Exp. Resp.
B
-.002
-.038
-106.
.462
.352
R2 .17
F-ratio 1.27
R2 .25
F-ratio 2.08
Debt Outstanding
Linear Model Logarithmic Model
Size
Density
Growth
Age
Exp. Resp.
B
.152
-7.2
-1191.
-6.97
4.88
R2 .423
F-ratio 4.45
R2 .36
F-ratio 3.43
Debt Issued
Linear Model Logarithmic Model
Size
Density
Growth
Age
Exp. Resp.
B
.009
1.72
-110.
-. 91
.055
R2
F-ratio
SE
.008
1.86
57.8
.665
.348
.285
2.47
R2 .21
F-ratio 1.68
SE
.014
3.27
102.
1.17
.631
t
-.13
.01
-1.04
.39
.56
B
-.06
.073
1.30
-.068
.175
SE
.14
.149
.819
.232
.210
t
-.44
.49
1.59
-.29
.83
SE
.057
12.5
382.
4.5
2.35
t
2.66
-.57
-3.03
-1.55
2.08
B
.378
-1.25
2.52
-3.10
.415
SE
.129
.142
.777
.220
.199
t
2.92
-.88
2.97
-1.41
2.08
t
1.25
.923
-1 .90
-1.36
.158
B
.224
.117
2.295
-.462
.140
SE
.174
.190
1.04
2.95
.267
t
1.29
.93
2.21
-1.57
.52
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hand, the log transformations improved the capital outlays equation, raising
the R2 value from .17 to .25. On the other hand, the log transformations
produced lower R2 values for the debt outstanding and debt issued equations.
The best equation for estimating capital outlays is the log model.
According to this model, outlays are negatively related to both size and age,
but positively related to density, growth, and expenditure responsibility.
Such a finding confirms the notion that there may be economies of scale in
terms of the provision of infrastructure in the largest cities. Also, the
negative relationship between outlay and age suggests that as cities become
older they spend comparatively less on infrastructure than younger cities.
The positive relationship between density and outlays makes some degree of
sense (ignoring for the moment, the possibilities of scale economies)--as
density rises, so too should the level of infrastructure investment. The
positive relationship between expenditure responsibility and level of
capital spending was expected. Because of the low R2 values and t-test
results, it makes the most sense to use these findings to gauge the
direction (positive or negative) and magnitude of relationships, rather than
as predictors of outlays based on attributes.
Table V-7 also displays the results of the regression equation for
debt outstanding. Here, the best model is the linear model, which produced
an R2 of over .42. With an F-ratio value of 4.45, this equation produces a
highly significant regression. In this model, density, growth, and age are
negatively related to debt outstanding, while size and expenditure
responsibility are positively related to debt outstanding. According to
these results, we can state with confidence that the largest cities with the
highest level of expenditure responsibilities have accumulated the most
outstanding debt. It was surprising to find a negative relationship between
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age and debt outstanding. One would expect that older cities should have
accumulated the greatest volume of outstanding debt. It was also
surprising to find a negative relationship between growth and debt
outstanding. However, the strong positive relationship between expenditure
responsibility and level of outstanding debt was anticipated.
When examining the debt issued equations, the linear model produces
the best results (R2 of .285). In this model, only growth and age are
negatively related to the amount of per capita debt issued. The other
attributes (size, density, and expenditure responsibility) are positively
related to average annual debt issuances. In other words, large, densely
populated cities with high levels of expenditure responsibilities have the
greatest propensities to borrow. On the other hand, both growing cities
and old cities are less likely to issue debt.
Several concluding points emerge from this analysis. While the R2
values are certainly respectable for cross-sectional analyses of this sort,
there is reason to be skeptical about the appropriateness of this method.
First, there is reason to believe that outlays/debt and municipal attributes
do not necessarily follow a linear pattern. The iogarithmic
transformations did not, on the whole, produce significantly higher levels of
explained variation. The dependent variables, might indeed be distribute
in a U-shaped curve for some variables. Second, the equations might not be
focusing on the appropriate municipal attributes. Other attributes might
lead to a more powerful explanation of spending and borrowing. In answer
to this concern, several other variables, such as metropolitan population
size and metropolitan area population change were also run in both the
linear and log-linear models. None of these variations produced more
significant R2 or t-test results.
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In spite of the deficiencies :associated with the linear regressions,
this analysis has produced some noteworthy findings. It is clear that
relationship between capital spending and municipal attributes does not fit
into a simple framework. At best, only one-fourth of the total variation
in spending patterns among the 37 cities was explained. While there does
appear to be a consistent negative relationship between size and spending,
the relationships between all the other variables (except expenditure
responsibility) and outlays appears to be too unstable to predict. In all of
the equations, the expenditure responsibility variable demonstrated the
greatest degree of robustness: it was positively related to outlays, debt
outstanding, and issuance. Another point worth drawing attention to is that
while overall the outstanding debt equation (linear model) produced the
highest level of explained variation, this equation did produce some peculiar
results, such as a strong negative relationship between both growth and
outstanding debt and age and outstanding debt. What is implicit in this
finding is that high growth cities share patterns of debt use which are
similar to older cities.
The fact that the expenditure responsibility variable stands out as
the only consistently positive variable across the outlay and debt equations
suggests that both spending and borrowing practices may more be a function
of other variables. In the next section, other variables, such as type of
government, financial capabilities of government, and geographic location
will be explored.
Factors Related to Debt Use Among City Governments
Table VI-8 contains the following relevant financial data for
the 37 largest cities: current expenditures, capital expenditures, general
revenues, total federal revenue, property taxes, and long-term debt issued.
-156-
The figures represent per caoita amounts averaged over the 18 year
period. The mean, standard deviation, and range for these variables are:
Variable: Mean Standard Deviation. Range
current expenditures $355 $268 $1 15-1415
capital expenditures 96 63 41-383
general revenues 507 358 154-1820
federal revenues 86 113 24-738
property taxes 118 103 14-541
debt issued 65 38 8-181
These statistics reveal the tremendous variation in levels of spending,
revenue generation, and borrowing among the 37 largest cities. In terms of
current spending, Washington D.C. outspent San Antonio by a factor of more
than 12. Minneapolis' average capital budget was more than nine times
greater than San Antonio's. In terms of federal revenues, San Francisco
received almost six times the per capita allotment than Houston received.
In addition, per capita property tax collections ranged between $13.88 in
Columbus to $540.79 in Boston.
Given the wide variations in financial activity among these
governments, it should come as no surprise to find that municipal
attributes, in and of themselves, are poor descriptors of capital investment
and borrowing patterns. In reality, there are two separate considerations
when it comes to capital spending and borrowing. The first is need, and the
second is financial ability. Need, as suggest earlier is an elusive concept,
complicated by both physical standards as well as economic terms
(willingness to pay). Financial ability, on the other hand, can be more
readily quantified. For example, it is possible to determine the total level
of financial resources available, the total expenditure requirements, and the
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Table VI-8
CUREXP
226.94
668.97
775.94
609.63
252.54
487.21
281 .69
188.46
142.42
366.52
383.33
133.82
175.37
125.47
198.40
262.85
283.40
193.43
441.94
218.23
246.88
261.95
968.59
680.73
258.86
138.78
170.33
540.16
153.13
237.44
114.91
131.40
528.49
244.06
398.99
214.99
1414.98
354.63
CAPEXP
174.38
198.41
117.15
129.26
49.22
149.04
66.60
58.93
61.21
87.18
92.26
69.11
69.29
56.02
65.04
99.00
102.47
48.67
72.03
66.97
383.46
69.85
113.81
40.90
93.94
86.15
85.21
97.62
71.93
59.16
40.61
44.50
131.97
80.94
57.45
61.18
216.92
96.43
GREV
434.69
1012.85
1049.05
775.95
355.65
705.22
408.03
242.59
235.37
573.28
584.04
216.73
275.18
202.56
307.96
413.50
406.98
305.98
441.90
346.21
383.46
378.30
1469.57
812.16
412.97
262.77
273.58
531.56
231.73
319.36
154.22
217.83
1010.50
394.13
526.14
270,18
1819.58
507.07
TFREV
54.69
122.34
114,18
119.52
75.53
111.58
76.99
39.28
25.14
70.59
133.36
38.02
58.94
24.34
57.81
72.88
43.58
39.35
76.20
34.93
57.70
83.54
79.25
41.95
85.02
60.72
55.29
76.72
43.49
62.19
41.38
34.14
136.35
52.92
81.89
64.11
738.12
86.05
PTX
98.22
227.13
540.79
214.78
92.47
66.41
80.76
13.88
99.35
93.07
124.46
69.34
126.73
73.46
112.59
48.76
58.21
70.59
76.59
112.57
126.72
54.03
345.77
272.19
85,17
42.67
79.05
82.05
31.04
102.51
37.70
37.37
252.13
60.64
75.50
19.80
251.17
117.72
year average of current expenditures.
year average of capital expenditures.
year average of general revenues.
year average of total federal revenues.
PTX - 18 year average of property tax revenues.
LTDI - 18 year average of long-term debt issued.
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City
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
FortWorth
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
KansasCity
LongBeach
LosAngeles
Memphis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
NewOrleans
NewYork
Newark
Oakland
OklaCity
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Portland
SanAntonio
SanDiego
SanFran
Seattle
St.Louis
Toledo
Washington
AVERAGE
LTDI
156.78
68.52
89.05
82.04
27.67
37.03
51.63
55.36
74.81
58.18
46.18
47.74
23.97
70.40
25.85
43.10
39.05
71,08
70.07
49.79
133.12
46.51
180.64
40.89
44.79
62.57
38.20
80.82
60.17
59.80
11022
8.28
92.87
63.72
31.87
22.86
155.06
65.42
CUREXP -
CAPEXP -
GENREV -
TFREV -
18
18
18
18
total amount that can be borrowed. For municipal governments, the
following identity can be expressed:
CO = [CR - CE] + [LT - RD]
where,
CO = capital outlays
CR = current revenues
CE = current expenditures
LT = long-term debt issued
RD = debt redemption total.
Table VI-9 contains estimated capital spending for the 37 largest
municipalities, based on the above identity. The first term, CR - CE,
represents average annual budgetary surplus. This amount might also be
called the revenue-expenditure "gap." The larger the gap, the greater the
amount available for capital projects. The second term, LT - RD,
represents average long-term debt issued minus average debt redemption
total. This difference is the amount which can be pledged towards capital
outlays. This term might also be called the available debt term. Adding
the two terms together, budgetary surplus and debt pledged toward capital
projects, yields an estimate of the amount which municipalities should have
invested on infrastructure.
The technique produced in most instances wild estimates of capital
spending. Virtually no city spent more than the estimated amount, except
for Philadelphia, Minneapolis and Memphis. According to this estimation
procedure, virtually all cities spent, on average, far less than they should
have. Cities such as New York, San Francisco, Boston, Baltimore,
Washington, Atlanta, have accumulated huge deficits in capital spending.
Cities with more modest deficits include Toledo, Columbus, Honolulu,
Omaha, and Fort Worth.
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Table VI-9
Estimated Capital Outlays
City CR-CE LT-RD EXPECTED ACTUAL DIFFERENCE
Atlanta 207.75 123.98 331.73 174.38 -157.34
Baltimore 343.89 21.19 365.08 198.41 -166.66
Boston 273.10 20.72 293.83 117.15 -176.67
Buffalo 166.32 5.55 171.87 129.26 -42.61
Chicago 103.11 3.58 106.70 49.22 -57.47
Cincinnati 218.01 33.79 251.30 149.04 - 102.7
Cleveland 126.34 -2.75 123.59 66.60 -56.99
Columbus 54.13 15.59 69.72 58.93 -10.80
Dallas 92.95 38.72 131.67 61.21 -70.46
Denver 206.77 34.65 241.42 8,7.1 -54.-23
Detroit 200.71 8 .32 209.03 92.26 -116.77
Fortorth 82.91 22.09 105.00 69. 1 -1 5.;39
Honolulu 99.81 -3.24 96.57 69.29 -,.28
Houston 77.09 46.59 123.69 56.02 
indianapolis 109.56 9.35 118.91 65.04 -5 .:87
KansasCitq 150.64 12.25 162.89 99.00 -63.89
LongBeach 123.58 25.29 148.88 102.47 -4e.41
Los Angeies 12.55 45.74 158.29 48.67 -109.62
Memphis -0.03 20.29 20.26 72.03 51 .77
Milwff aukee 127.97 10.52 138.50 66.97 -71 .-2
Minneapolis 136.58 91 .48 228.06 38 3.46 155.40
NewOrleans 11 6.35 23.78 140.13 69.85 -70.29
NewYork 500.98 -5.24 495.74 1 1 3. -381 .93
Newark 131.42 4.15 13 5.57 40.90 -94.67
Oakland 154.11 18.59 172. 9 93-.94 -78 .76
OklaCit, 123.98 16.3 1 40.37 86.15. -54.22
Omaha 103.24 14.57 117.81 85.21 -32.60
Philadelphia -8.60 34.13 25.53 97.62 72.09
Phoenix 78.60 47.6.4 126.24 71.93 -54.31
Portland 81.93 43.83 1 25.75 59.16 -66.59
San Antonio 39.31 87.97 127.29 40.61 -86.68
SanDiego 86.43 2.96 89.39 44.50 -44.89
SanFran 482.01 37.84 519.85 131.97 -387.8 
Seattle 150.08 26.03 176.11 80.94 -95.16
St .Louis 127.14 10.75 1 37.90 57.45 -80.45
Toledo 55.19 7.14 2.33 6i1.18 -1.15
washinqton 404.60 109.84 514.44 21 6.92 -297.52
CR - CE = Average current revenues - current expenditures.
LT - RD = Average long-term debt - debt redemption total.
Expected = (CR - CE) + (LT - RD).
Actual = Average capital spending.
Difference = Actual - Expected.
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The problem with this technique is that in reality, average annual
values were not meant to be applied against each other. In other words,
while the reasoning is acceptable, the operationalization of the variables is
flawed. Another way to have conducted this procedure would have been to
take each year individually and determine the surplus and available debt
terms. Then, an estimate for each year could be produced. The only
problem with such an approach is that it ignores the fact that capital
spending and borrowing decisions often occur over a multiple year time
frame. Given the nature of of infrastructure decisions, it was decided in
this section to examine 18 year averages rather than individual years. In
future chapters, individual years for each city will be inspected more
closely.
Given the above identity, there are two possible reasons why cities,
for the most part, have not invested enough in infrastructure. First, the
budgetary surpluses may have gone to purposes other than capital
investment. Surpluses, for example, could have been rolled over into tax
reductions or to fund current operating expenses in future years. The
determination of budgetary priorities involves a political process, a process
in which the outcomes may not always be planned. The second possibility
is that cities, for one reason or another, may fail to issue adequate amounts
of long-term debt. In other words, because the level of borrowing has not
kept pace with new debt requirements, a capital shortage has accumulated
over time. This second possibility, that cities have failed to issue
adequate levels of debt, while subject to some of the same political
pressures governing the use of operating budget surpluses, is, from the
perspective of this analysis, the central problem in infrastructure planning.
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Given this perspective, and based on the identity presented earlier
(Table VI-9), the difference between actual and expected levels of capital
outlay can be seen as an estimate of the shortfall in long-term debt. In
other words, those cities which appear to be spending far less than they
should be are doing so because of inadequate levels of debt.
The question as to why cities have not borrowed enough is difficult to
answer.- The analysis of debt on the basis of municipal attributes failed to
produce much in the way of strong, significant relationships. Perhaps
other factors more directly related to the issuance of debt.
Alternative Explanations
There are several alternative hypotheses that one could formulate in
explaining patterns of debt use in American cities. Each of these
alternative hypothesis are proposed not with the intention of conducting a
full-blown analysis, but more to suggest the wide range of potential
explanations that are applicable to municipal debt.
Since most debt is backed by the full-faith credit of a city, debt
issuances might be related to the taxing strength of the municipality. in
other words, there might be a strong relationship between property taxation
and debt issuances. Another hypothesis involves federal aid. While some
believe that federal aid may substitute for debt, others hold that federal aid
may stimulate borrowing, by increasing the stock of resources which can be
pledged towards debt retirement. In either case, there should be a strong
relationship between debt and federal aid. Next, one might hypothesize
those cities which have large surpluses are in the best position to borrow,
while those which have the most severe budgetary shortages are in the
worse position to issue debt. In this case would expect there to be strong
relationship between revenue-expenditure gap and debt. Another hypothesis
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which has been tested by other researchers, is the possibility that type of
government (mayor versus manager) has some impact upon borrowing
practices. While such studies typically offer no explanation, the accepted
wisdom is that "mayor" cities spend more than "manager cities." As such,
it follows that "mayor" cities should also borrow more. Finally, one might
test the hypothesis that sunbelt cities differ from frostbelt cities in terms
of their borrowing practices. There has been much research on how certain
regions of the country have been experiencing rapid growth and development,
while others appear headed for prolonged stagnation and economic decline.
It would be interesting to test these hypotheses, using the data set,
however limited, that is described in this chapter.
In order to test the strength of the relationship between debt and
property taxes, a Chi Square table has been prepared (Table VI-10). This
table shows a clearly that there is a strong, significant relationship
between average level of property taxes and average level of long-term debt
issued among the 37 largest cities in the country. Of the 17 cities with
property taxes below $80 per capita, 12 have have levels of debt issuance
below $60 per capita. Of the three cities with debt issuances above $ 120,
two collect more than $160 in property taxes.
The Chi Square table for Debt and Federal Revenue (Table Vi- 11 ), on
the other hand, does not produce a significantWhitney Chi square value. This
suggests that at least in terms of this cross-sectional analysis, there is
not a particularly strong relationship between federal revenues and debt.
In examining Table VI-12, it is clear that a significant
relationship does exist between revenue-expenditure gap and debt issued.
The table suggests that as budgetary surpluses increase, so too does the
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Table VI-10
Chi Square Test for Property Taxes and
Long-term Debt Issued
2X- 11.09
(significant at .025 level)
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Long-term Property Taxes
Debt Issued
<80 60-160 >160
12 10 1 62.2%
10.5 8.06 4.36
5 2 4 29.7%
60- 120 5.0 3.8 2.07
>120 0 1 2 8.1%
1.36 1.03 0.55 8
45.9% 35.1% 18.9%
Table VI-11
Chi Square Test for Federal Revenue and
Long-term Debt Issued
Long- ter m Federal Revenue
Debt Issued
< 60 60- 120 >120
12 9 1 59.4%
10.6 8.9 2.3
4 5 2 29.7%
60-120 5.3 4.4 1.1
>120 2 1 1 10.8%
1.9 1.6 .44
48.6 40.5 10.8
X 2 2.974
(not significant at .10 level).
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Table VI-12
Chi Square Test for Revenue-Expenditure Gap and
Long-term Debt Issued
Long-term Revenue- Expenditure Gap
Debt Issued
<100 100-200 >200
5 12 4 56.7%
<60 6.23 9.63 5.12
6 4 2 32.4%
60- 120 3.56 5.81 2.91
0 1 3 10.8%
1.19 1.83 0.97
29.7% 45.9% 24.3%
X 2 9.398
(significant at .10 level)
-166-
propensity for borrowing. Of the 11 cities with surpluses less than $100,
not one has issued debt over $120 per capita.
The remaining Chi Square test (Table VI-13) examines the strength of
the relationship between type of city government and long-term debt
issuances. The results suggest that there is no significant difference
between cities run by mayors and those run by managers in terms of their
average borrowing levels.
In order to determine if a significant difference between sunbelt and
frostbelt cities exists, the W-Statistic (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whiney) was used.
Used to compare ranked, ordered observation, the statistic was used first on
long-term debt outstanding (Table VI-14), and then on long-term debt issued
(Table VI-15). The calculation of the statistics are as follows:
E(w)= (1/2)m(m + n + 1) = 85.5
var(w) = ( 1/12)mn(m + n + 1)= 128.25
long-term debt outstanding:
Pr (w < 106)
106 - 85.6
Pr( ~ -- --
'1 128.25
Pr(z < 1.80)
significant at .05 level
long-term debt issued:
Pr (w < 97)
97 - 85.6
Pr (~ -jtC? )
r(z' 128.25
Pr(z < 1.00)
not significant at .10 level.
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Table VI-13
Chi Square Test for Type of City Government and
Long-term Debt Issued
Long-term Type of City Government
Debt Issued
Mayor-Council City- Manager
14 6 55.5%
<60 13.86 6.08
7 5 33.3%
60-120 7.67 3.67
4 0 11.1%
2.77 1.22
69.4% 30.6%
2 X = 1.7622
(not significant at .25)
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Table VI-14
W Statistic, Long-term Debt Outstanding,
Comparison of Frostbelt and Sunbelt Cities
Combined Ordered
Observations
Frostbelt
323
382
547
548
586
598
667
674
1341
m=9
Sunbelt
144
244
280
402
427
464
473
604
654
n=9
Combined Ranks
Frostbelt
4
5
10
11
12
13
15
17
Sunbelt
1
2
3
6
7
8
9
14
16
18
w= 106
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Table VI-15
W Statistic, Long-term Debt Issued
Comparison of Frostbelt and Sunbelt Cities
Combined Ordered
Observations
Frostbelt
28
41
52
55
82
89
133
181
m=9
Sunbelt
8
24
39
48
60
70
71
75
110
n=9
Combined Ranks
Frostbelt
3
5
7
8
14
15
17
18
Sunbel t
1
2
4
6
9
11
12
13
16
w=97
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These results suggest that while there is a significant difference
between frostbelt and sunbelt cities in terms of outstanding debt, the
differences between the two groups in terms of debt issuances is minor.
The finding that in frostbelt areas, levels of outstanding debt are
significantly higher, while levels of debt issuances are similar suggest that
frostbelt cities either started the 18 year period with heavier debt burdens
than did the sunbelt cities, or, they have been slower to retire their
outstanding debts. Either way, the frostbelt cities are in a comparatively
disadvantageous situation. While the sunbelt cities can more readily take
on new debt, the frostbelt cities are strapped into paying off old
outstanding debts. Given the arguments concerning the economic advantages
associated with the sunbelt regions, high levels of outstanding debt are both
problematic as well as symptomatic of greater ills.
Conclusions: A Need for a New Approach to Study Capital Outlays
and Municipal Debt
While this chapter has served to describe the variegated pattern of
outlays and debt in the largest cities, it has also shown the need for a new
perspective on capital spending and debt. There were some notable
findings, and although the regression equations fell short of expectation,
the analysis has served in most, if not all cases, to illustrate the direction
and magnitude of the relationships between various variables and capital
outlays and debt. Certainly there is ample evidence throughout this chapter
to suggest that even among a relative small group of cities, there is wide
variation in financial capacity, spending patterns, and borrowing practices.
It is clear from this analysis that there are a number of very
different forces which affect capital outlays and debt. On the one hand,
there are various physical characteristics (size, density, age, growth, etc.)
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which exert some influence over capital spending and debt. These variables
accounted for more than 42 percent of the variation in long-term debt
outstanding, and over 25 percent of the variation in capital outlay and debt
issued. In addition to these attributes, there are also a range of other
variables which can exert an influence over outlays and debt. The analysis
found that while expenditure responsibility, property taxes, and revenue-
expenditure gap are significantly related to levels of debt, federal aid and
type of government (mayor v. city manager) are not. Finally, the analysis
produced some preliminary evidence that there is a difference between
sunbelt and frostbelt cities, not in terms of debt issuances, but in levels of
outstanding debt.
In this chapter a mathematical identity was constructed, in which it
was postulated that capital spending should equal total operating surpluses
added to available debt (debt issuances minus debt redemption). Based on
this formulation; the expected level of average capital spending for all 37
cities was derived. This expected levels far exceeded actual levels of
investment. While this identity was offered more as a theoretical construct
rather than as an accurate estimation of true need, one could go so far as to
use the deficits in spending (actual - expected) as measures of borrowing
shortfal 1.
In summary, the results of this analysis are not entirely satisfying.
While it is quite apparent that municipal borrowing is, indeed, a complex
activity, this chapter demonstrates that a new approach to understanding
and describing debt is in order. In the next chapters, a behavioral
approach for examining decision-making over time will be developed.
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Chapter 7
A Behavioral Model of Municipal Borrowing
The Need for a Behavioral Model
The previous chapter, which focused on a cross-sectional view of
municipal borrowing, served to llustrate the need for a behavioral model.
The framework developed In Chapter 6. attempted to relate municipal
characteristics to long-term borrowing practices. It was suggested that
certain cities with similar attributes should, over time, demonstrate
similar patterns of borrowing. Although several statistically significant
relationships were described, the analysis in Chapter 6 fell short of
producing a complete explanation of municipal borrowing. The previous
chapter concluded with a suggestion that a more penetrating examination of
the decision-making process might help to explain borrowing in America's
largest cities.
In this chapter, the focus s on the development of models to
characterize the behavior of decision-makers responsible for capital
spending and borrowing decisions. Several important assumptions,
necessary for the adoption of this approach must be made. First, we
assume that municipal borrowing is the outcome of a decision-making
process. A decision making process can be defined as thinking that results
in the choice of alternative courses of action. Second, we assume that all
decision-making authority is collapsed both vertically and horizontally into
a single, powerful entity. Third, we assume that the decision-maker is
responsive, Intelligent, and committed to finding the best possible solution.
This chapter is different from the previous one because here we begin with
the constraints and opportunities faced by the decision maker, rather than
focusing on the various socio-economic conditions present within the
community.
Once all of the key constraints, factors, decisions, and outcomes
have been identified, a number of different models for decision-making can
be specified. Another way of describing this approach is to think In terms
of the key Inputs and outputs to a decision-making process. The outcomes
depend not only upon the combination of Inputs, but also the sequence by
which they are entered Into the decision-making framework. The value to
this approach Is Its flexibility; behavioral models can account for a wider
range of outcomes, as well as nfluencing factors, than the cross-sectional
methods employed in the previous chapters.
Another advantage to this method Is Its Intimate connection with
micro-level decision-making processes. When conducting an aggregate level
analysis of the sort presented In Chapter 6, the tendency Is to engage in a
never-ending search for statistically significant relationships. With the
ease of computer generated contingency tables or regression equations, the
temptation to demonstrate that a relationship exists, no matter how
spurious, is often overpowering. With a behavioral model, on the other
hand, the range of influencing factors Is bounded. There is a much closer
connection between rationality (human thought) and action.
Key Inputs to Borrowing Decision
As with any decision-making process there s a finite set of Inputs
associated with the decision to borrow. These inputs to borrowing decision
can be organized Into data concerning: 1) capital needs; 2) financial
capabilities; and 3) market conditions. (See Figure VII-l). In theory,
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Figure VII-1
Inputs to Decision- making Process
IS
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decision-makers draw upon these three kinds of nputs In deciding when and
how much to borrow.
The first Input to the decision-making process Is the level of unmet
capital need within the community. A high level of unmet need increases
the likelihood that a community will have to borrow. In cities with low
capital needs, there is, obviously, less of a need for borrowing. This is not
to suggest that low capital need cities are completely removed from debt
related issues. The reality is that such cities 1) will eventually face high
capital needs; 2) have faced capital needs In the past; and 3) need to
establish an appropriate debt policy with guidelines for borrowing.
The determination of capital need is a difficult task. In some cities,
capital needs will be determined largely on the basis of physical standards,
while in others the key determinant of need s economic criteria (i.e., the
willingness to pay, for additional services). As pointed out earlier, capital
expenditures may or may not serve as a good indicator of capital need. The
pattern of actual spending can exceed or fall short of need. For this reason,
capital expenditure data needs to be Interpreted cautiously.
From the earlier chapters, it is apparent that the relationship
between capital outlays and various municipal attributes is difficult to
specify. Table VII-1 contains a comparison of five cities with high capital
expenditures with five cities having low capital expenditures. Although
high expenditure cities have slightly higher levels of personal income, lower
percentages of non-white residents than low expenditure cities, the extent
of similarity between cities with high capital expenditures and those with
low expenditures Is striking.
Another set of Inputs to the decision-making process is the financial
strength of the municipality. Obviously some cities are In a better position
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Table VII-1,
A Comparison of High and. Low Capital Expenditure Cities
CapitalA
Exp
Minneapolis
Washington
Baltimore
Atlanta
Average
San Antonio
Newark
San Diego
Los Angeles
Chicago
Average
37 City Averaae
$383
217
198
174
149
224
41
41
45
49
50
45
.196
PersonalsB
Income
$7940
8963
5877
6550
6875
7241
$5672
4525
8027
8422
6936
6717
7582
1940c
Housing
57%
39
50
21
46
43
14
47
13
23
52
55
HomeD PercentE
Own Non-white
47%
32
44
38
35
39
56
19
46
38
36
39
40
12%
73
50
23
48
35
21
67
23
38
50
40
59 47
Aper capita capital expenditures, averaged over 1965-82
B 1979 personal income
Cproportion of Housing in 1980, built before 1940.
DProportion of metropolitan area expenditures made by municipality
EPropotion of population nonwhite in 1980.
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to issue bonds than other cities. Cities with unlimited taxing authority
and broadly based taxing authority are in a better position to Issue debt than
cities which are highly dependent upon a single tax source. Cities with low
levels of outstanding debt are also In a superior position to take on new
debt than those places strapped with heavy debt burdens and large debt
service payments.
The assessment of financial capacity involves consideration of non-
debt sources of revenue which can be pledged towards capital
improvements. There are two basic non-debt sources of financing for
capital improvements: own source revenues and intergovernmental
assistance. Own source revenues Include property taxes, sales taxes,
Income taxes, other tax revenues and Income from fees and charges.
Intergovernmental aid includes all funds received from state and local
governments. Table VI 1-2 shows various financial characteristics of the
37 largest cities for selected years. Over the period 1966 to 1982, there
has been substantial growth in all types of financial activity. Federal aid
grew by almost 20 times, state aid by over five times, and, property taxes
by more than two times. The growth of general revenues from an average of
$235 million to over $1.1 billion, paralleled an expansion in current
spending (which grew from $159 million to to $736 million) and capital
spending ($41 million to $137 million). While outstanding debt more than
doubled, and long term debt issued jumped from an average of $43 million in
1965 to over $102 million in 1982, it is Important to note that between
1976 and 1982, there was an apparent drop off in borrowing, as the average
amount borrowed by the 37 largest cities was $165 million In 1976.
The cities with highest level of per capita general revenue collection
include Washington ($1820), New York ($1470), Boston ($1049), Baltimore
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Table VII-2.
General Financial Characteristics
Sample Cities, Selected Years,
Mean Values
1982 1976 1972 1966
General Revenues 1.1 b 756 m 493 m 235 m
State Aid 277 m 229 m 47 m 52 m
Federal Revenue 157 m 103 m 41 m 8 m
Property Taxes 209 m 165 m 129 m 87 m
Current Expenditures 736 m 520 m 356 m 159 m
Capital Outlays 137 m 90 m 80 m 41 m
Long Term Debt Issued 102 m 165 m 84 m 43 m
Outstanding Debt 891m 785 m 566 m 415 m
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($1013), and San Francisco ($1010). These cities all have high levels of
capital outlays and debt. Cities with a low level of general revenue
collections, in the range of $154 to $232, including San Antonio, Houston,
Fort Worth, San Diego, and Phoenix, have lower than average levels of
capital spending and debt.
The cities with the highest per capita property tax collections
include Boston ($541), New York ($346), Newark ($272), San Francisco
($252) and Washington, D.C. ($251). Wth the exception of Newark, these
cities all have high capital outlays and high levels of long term debt. They
also demonstrate a greater propensity to use general obligations over non
guaranteed debt. The cities with low rates of property tax collection (less
than $38 per capita) include Columbus, Toledo, Phoenix, San Diego, and San
Antonio. These cities have low levels of capital spending, and below
average levels of long term debt, particularly general obligation debt.
The 37 sample cities varied widely in terms of federal aid.
Washington D.C. which received, on average, $738 per capita topped the list,
while Houston, at the bottom, received only $24 per capita. The
relationship between debt and federal aid is complicated. On the one hand,
federal aid represents a source of financing with which to back municipal
debt. The availability of federal aid may free up discretionary funds
thereby increasing revenues which can be used for debt service. In this
way, high federal aid is oaltively related to borrowing. On the other hand,
federal aid could be used as a substitute for borrowing. That is, federal aid
and debt could be neagativelv related.
The fact that no simple relationship exists between general revenues,
property taxes, federal aid, and borrowing is summarized in Table VII -3. In
this table, cities were first grouped according to various fiscal attributes.
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Table VII-3
Cities Grouped According to Various Fiscal Attributes'
Average Level of Debt Issuance
Classiftcaton
General Revenues:
> $1000
$500 - $1,000
$300- $400
< $300
Property Taxes:
$345 -
$214 -
S 98 -
$ 60 -
<$60
Average Long Term Debt Issued2
$116.92
$ 53.85
$ 64.41
$ 52.23
$540
$272
$126
$ 93
Federal Revenue:
i$135
S1t1 -$113
$70 - $85
$52 - $64
$34 - $43
< $34
$134.80
$ 87.88
$ 71.28
S 52.44
$ 48.91
$ 155.10
$ 69.15
$ 56.80
$ 65.55
$ 54.77
$ 72.60
'Attrlbutes all expressed as in mean per capita values over the period 1965
to 1982.
2Per capita values averaged over 18 year period ( 1965-1982).
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Then group averages for long term debt were calculated. Generally
speaking, high levels or general revenues, property taxes, and federal
revenues were associated with high levels of long term debt. Of the three
fiscal variables, only property taxes emerged as consistently and positively
related to borrowing. Federal revenues appear to both stimulate as well
as substitute for long term borrowing. Those municipalities receiving
highest levels of federal revenue (>$135) had the highest levels of
borrowing. At the same time, those municipalities receiving the least
amount of federal assistance (<$34) demonstrated the second highest level
of long term debt issuance. These results are consistent with the results
from the Chi-square analysis conducted In the previous chapter.
There are other factors which may help or hinder a city's financial
capabilities. Debt limits or referenda requirements can make it more
difficult for issuers to float bonds as needed. The presence of tax
limitations or spending caps can also interfere with borrowing decisions.
Fiscal restraints increase the competition for public dollars among
competing interests as well as weaken the "full faith and credit" backing
which make municipals attractive investments.
Another important factor which decision-makers consider is the
condition of the municlal bond market at the time they expect to float a
new Issue. Obviously the strategy is to Issue debt when interest rates are
low, and, to the extent possible, postpone borrowing when rates are high.
Strategic placement of debt during period of low interest rates could result
in considerable savings. For example, consider the costs of a $20 million
bond, Issued at 5 percent for 30 years. The total debt service, over the life
of the repayment period would be approximately $38.6 million. If the same
bond were issued at 6 percent, the total debt service would exceed $43.1
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million, or about $8.5 million above the bond issued at 5 percent. Given the
fact that original issue was for $20 million, the difference due to a one
percentage difference in the Interest rate is quite substantial.
Figure VII 1-2 contains a plot of average annual yields (interest costs)
and the total amount amount of long term debt issued by the 37 largest
cities. This figure shows that as Interest rates peaked first n 1969 and
1970, debt issuances remained relatively low. When rates declined In 1971,
borrowing picked up. Similarly n 1975, when Interest rates reached a five
year high, then borrowing reached a five year low. The pattern borrowing
when rates were low and postponing debt when rates were high appeared to
be upset during the 1976 to 1978 period. As Interest rates climbed to all
time record highs from 1979 to 1982, borrowing by the largest cities
leveled off.
In summary, if capital needs are determined to be low, then the need
to borrow s also low. If, on the other hand, capital needs are deemed to be
high, then, the decision maker faces a choice: to use debt financing or some
alternative to borrowing. Assuming that the decision-maker elects to
finance the capital Improvements with debt, the next choice Involves the
use of general obligation or revenue bond financing. This choice may be
constrained by legal restrictions on the type of debt Instruments that a
city Is authorized to use. There are, n either course, costs associated with
the decision to borrow. Many states require a referendum n order to
authorize general obligation bonding. At the same time, the use of revenue
bond financing involves generally higher Interest costs charged by the
underwriter--usually 50 basis points above what s charged on general
obligations. On the other hand, revenue bonds generally can be authorized
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Table VII-3.
Rankings of Cities Based on Capital Outlays and Debt
Top Ten Cities
CAPOUT
Minneapolis
Washington
Baltimore
Atlanta
Cincinnati
San Francisco
Buffalo
Boston
New York
Long Beach
LTDO
Washington
New York
Atlanta
Oklahoma City
Seattle
Memphis
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Baltimore
Boston
LTDI
New York
Atlanta
Washington
Minneapolis
San Antonio
San Francisco
Boston
Buffalo
Philadelphia
Dallas
GODEBT
New York
Washington
Minneapolis
Boston
San Fancisco
Buffalo
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Memphis
Baltimore
NGDEBT
Atlanta
San Antonio
Minneapolis
Oakland
Houston
Seattle
Long Beach
Dallas
Oklahoma City
Philadelphia
Bottom Ten Cities
LTDI
San Diego
Toledo
Honolulu
Indianapolis
Chicago
St. Louis
Cincinnati
Omaha
Long Beach
Newark
GODEBT
Oakland
Long Beach
San Diego
St. Louis
Toledo
San Antonio
Chicago
Kansas City
New Orleans
Honolulu
NGDEBT
Newark
Los Angeles
Indianapolis
Honolulu
San Diego
Cincinnati
Washington
Omaha
Boston
Columbus
CAPOUT - annual capital outlays averaged over period 1965-82
LTDO - long term debt outstanding, averaged over period 1965-82.
LTDI - long term debt issued, averaged over period 1965-82
GODEBT - general obligation debt, averaged over period 1965-82
NGDEBT - non guranteed debt, averaged over period 1965-82.
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CAPOUT
Ssn Antonio
Newark
San Diego
Los Angeles
Chicago
Houston
St. Louis
Columbus-
Portland
Toledo
LTDO
San Diego
Toledo
Long Beach
Portland
Honolulu
Omaha
Chicago
Indianapolis
St. Louis
Newark
without the expense and delay associated with a public referendum. Upon
approval to borrow, the total costs of borrowing will depend upon the
prevailing levels of interest at the time the bonds are marketed. Obviously,
the lower the Interest costs, the lower the total costs of borrowing.
Table VII-3 contains rankings of cities based on capital outlays and
various measures of debt. Several different measures of debt are used. The
variables LTDO and LTDI refer to total long term debt Issued. GODEBT and
NGDEBT refer to levels of general obligation debt and non-guaranteed debt.
The table demonstrates the point that cities likely to have high levels of
capital spending are also likely to exhibit high levels of debt use. There are,
moreover, cities such has Boston and New York which make heavy use of
general obligations, while others such as Oakland, Long Beach and San
Antonio, which make heavy use of non-guaranteed debt and very little use of
general obligations. Cities such as Minneapolis and Philadelphia use both
full faith credit as well as non-guaranteed debt quite liberally. The cities
which have low capital expenditures, on the other hand, have low levels of
borrowing in both categories of debt.
Table VII-3 serves to illustrate another important point in terms of
the process by which borrowing decisions are made. After the decision to
borrow has been made, the city must select between the use of general
obligation debt or non-guaranteed financing. Over the period 1965 to 1982
the largest municipalities showed a preference for general obligations over
revenue bonds. On the average, the 37 cities issued $42 per capita in
general obligations as compared to $24 per capita In non-guaranteed debt.
Only one city, Oakland, issued no general obligations whatsoever, cities such
as newark, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, and Honolulu Issued either extremely
small levels of non-guaranteed debt. If the top ten issuers In general
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obligations are compared the top ten in revenue bond borrowers, some
general trends emerge. Older cities have a preference for general
obligations while younger cities appear to be more Inclined to use revenue
bonds. With some exceptions, the highest use of non-guaranteed debt
appears concentrated In the western, sunbelt, and growing areas of the
country. Of the top ten issuers in revenue bonds, only Philadelphia stands
out as an Eastern, older city.
Behavioral Models: A Typology of Municipal Borrowers
Upon examination of the data on the largest cities In the country,
after studying several case histories on municipal government decision-
making, there appear to be several different behavioral models which appear
to be quite relevant to the explanation of municipal debt. These are
presented as models for explaining the behavior of financial officers
responsible for debt policy. Each of these different models emphasis a
different combination of variables and outcomes. The behavioral models
include the following:
* The Good Government Do-Gooders
* The Postponement Syndrome
* The Last Chance Borrowers
* The Referenda Referees
* The Debt Limit Loaders
* The Interest Rate Watchers
* The Wheeler-Dealer Urban Financiers
* The Business As Usual Bureaucrats
The Good Government Do-6ooders, characterized in Figure VII-3,
represents a style of decision-making which, to the extent possible, comes
closest to an idealized version of how municipal borrowing should occur.
The financial officers exhibiting this sort of behavior respond first to the
perceived level of capital need. If capital needs are perceived to be high,
then a choice is made between debt-financing or the use of non-debt
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resources. Perhaps the needed capital improvement can be financed
entirely through federal aid or some combination of other non-debt
resources. If on the other hand, a decision s made to borrow, then the
financial officers must decide between using general obligation debt and
revenue bond financing. The fact that revenue bonds Impose at least a 50
basis point cost increase also needs to be weighed against the costs of a
referendum and other restrictions put on general obligations. Upon deciding
what kind of bond to issue, the decision-maker must then float the issue,
hoping for the lowest possible interest costs.
The Good Government Do-Gooders put capital needs before all other
considerations. As soon as these officials perceive that there are unmet
capital needs, the search for financing begins. In this framework, the only
factors which heavily Influence the borrowing outcomes are: 1) whether
non-debt financing is available, 2) whether general obligation or revenue
bond financing Is chose, and 3) what the level of Interest happens to be at
the time of debt Issuance.
The Postponement Syndrome, depicted In Figure V -4, Is
characterized by an unwillingness to admit the existence of high capital
needs. From this perspective, as long as capital needs are ignored, then
there s no need to borrow. Because of the lumpy and irregular nature of
capital outlays, and the fact that infrastructure deteriorates slowly over
the course of many years, the postponement syndrome s a common style of
decision-making. Officials, elected on promises to hold the line on taxes
and spending, may be hard pressed to find revenues which can be easily
diverted to Increasing salaries and wages and other rising operating costs.
Cancellation of large expensive infrastructure projects stand out as a quick
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and easy solution to revenue shortages. By simply denying the existence of
high capital needs, officials can avoid having to borrow altogether.
Eventually, cities In which officials exhibit the postponement system
face capital needs so large or potentially catastrophic, that the period of
postponement must end. The postponement syndrome must give way to
another style of decision-making, one that is more attuned to the true
levels of capital need.
The Last Chance Borrowers represent those cities which have
identifiable capital needs, but use debt financing only as a means of last
resort. (See Figure VII-5). Financial officers In these cities will conduct an
exhaustive search for non-debt sources of financing before issuing long-
term bonds. In these cities, there is a strong bias against using debt to
finance even the most Important infrastructure projects. Financial
officers would sooner apply revenues from taxes, fees, or reserves directly
to meeting capital costs than enter the bond market. In addition to
scouring the stock of own-source revenues, those who are seasoned last
chance borrowers look for available Intergovernmental revenues prior to
Initiating borrowing plans. Only f the stock of non-debt resources which
can be pledged towards capital projects s judged Inadequate do the last
chance borrowers consider Issuing long-term debt.
A version of the Last Chance Borrowers, might be labelled the Federal
Afd Fnders This characterizes the pattern of decision-making In which
the availability of federal aid, more so than than the level of capital needs,
determines whether or not a particular city will Invest In Infrastructure.
Given adequate levels of federal support, officials will be willing to
take on capital projects that they might not have considered In the absence
of outside support. As pointed out earlier, the question as to whether or
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Figure VII-5
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not federal aid stimulates or substitutes for locally generated revenues has
not been resolved. There s evidence to support both positions. In the
case of a stimulative effect, Increased aid could, conceivably lead to higher
outlays and levels of borrowing. As to the substitutive effects, there
should then be a negative effective relationship between federal aid and
levels of spending and debt.
Two related types of decision-makers: the Referenda Referees and
the Debt Limit Loadersmake decisions on the basis of Information and
outcomes related to the restrictions placed on municipal debt by state
governments. Virtually all states require approval by referendum for the
authorization of general obligations. The Referenda Referee is depicted in
Figure VII-6. Decision-making simply involves following the outcome of
bond issue referenda. Although financial officers can play an active role In
agenda control, the outcome of the decision-making process depends upon
the electorate. Government by referendum may not necessarily be the
optimal way to make debt-related decisions. Voters may not have complete
information nor fully comprehend all of the factors associated with the
proposed bond issue. Consequently if the decision-maker envisions a high
probability of failure, an alternative path, via revenue bond financing may be
undertaken. It is difficult to identify this style of decision-making,
primarily because centralized data on bond Issue referenda are not generally
available.
As to the other type of decision-making, the Debt Lim/t Loader, this
style of decision-making can be Identified more readily. Table VII-5
contains a listing of the restrictions on general obligation and revenue bond
debt for each state having one of the 37 largest cities. These restrictions
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Table VII-5.
Debt Limitations and Interest Rate Ceilings, By State
Limits on
General Obligation
(% of Equalized
Assessed Value)State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Lousiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvanis
Tennessee
Texas
Washington
4
15
3
7
15
5
2
10
15
5
10
20
5
0
3.5
7
10
5
3
15
0
0
Interest Rate Ceilings
General
Obligations
0
7
0
0
7
7
0
6
0
0
8
7
8
0
0
0
8
7.5
8
6
10
10
0
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Revenue
Bonds
0
0
0
9
7
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
O10
10
0O
- --
are expressed in terms of limits on the amount of general obligation debt
that can be issued relative to equalized assessed value, and in some cities,
restrictions on allowable interest rates. In reviewing these restrictions, it
appears that the states with the most stringent ceilings on municipal debt
include: Indiana, Colorade, Oregon, New Jersey, and Arizona. These states
limit borrowing to 4 percent or less of equalized assessed valuation (EAV).
At the other end of the spectrum, states such as California, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Texas either have no
restrictions whatsoever, or have very generous ceilings of 15 to 10 percent
of equalized assessed value.
The "debt limit loaders" operate in states such as Minnesota,
California, Texas, and Maryland. Cities in these states (Minneapolis, San
Francisco, San Antonio, Dallas, Baltimore) have high levels of borrowing.
On the other hand, stringent state restrictions on borrowing appear to have
resulted In low levels of debt in places such as Newark (3.5% EAV limit),
Indianapolis (2% EAV limit), Portland (3% EAV limit), St. Louis (5% EAV
limit), and Chicago (5% EAV limit).
The /nterestRate Watchers (Figure VII-7) follow changes in interest
rates and base their borrowing decisions upon market fluctuations rather
than capital needs. To some degree this approach makes a good deal of
sense. Capital needs generally develop over an extended period of time.
The deterioration of infrastructure takes many years. Strategic placement
of debt during period of low interest rates could result in considerable
savings. Table VII-6 contains a description for each of the 23 states, of
the Interest rate ceilings on general obligations and revenue bonds.
Thirteen of the 23 states have interest rate ceilings on general obligations,
while only 7 of the 23 states have ceilings on revenue bond interest rates.
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States which have such limitations help to encourage "interest rate
watching;" in addition to the cost savings due to borrowing when interest
rates are low, many municipalities simply can not Issue debt when interest
rates are high. These forced Interest rate watchers include: San Francisco,
Long Beach, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Chicago, New Orleans, Detroit,
Minneapolis, St. Louls, Oklahoma City, Portland, Philadelphia, Memphis, San
Antonio, Dalllas, Houston, and Ft. Worth. California, Illinois, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Oregon, have stringent limits on allowable interest on
general obligations but no limits, whatsoever, on revenue bond interest
rates. Not surprisingly, these cities tend to have higher levels of non-
guaranteed debt than other cities.
The Wheeler-Dealer Urban Fnancier s characterized in Figure VII-8.
This approach to borrowing has persisted throughout history. For example,
tax-exempt debts Issued by municipalities were used to subsidize canals,
railroads, and other private enterprise in the 1800s, speculative real estate
projects in the early 1900s, industrial development projects in the 1930s,
and in recent years to subsidize student loans, hospitals, mortgages,
pollution control devices, and economic development. Each of these uses of
tax exempt financing has involved the "wheeler-dealer urban financier."
Basically, borrowed funds are used to leverage economic development and
growth. The proceeds of this growth are then used to pay debt service
requirements. For example, a city might use bond funds to construct a
building, plant, or facility. Upon completion of the project, the city would
then either lease or sell the property to a business or private interest. The
income from the sale or lease would be used to retire the debt.
The final model of decision-making has been termed the Business As
UsualBureaucrat. Under this model, the decision-maker merely follows the
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path established In the past. The key determinant of borrowing decisions,
therefore, s not capital needs nor Interest rates nor referenda outcomes,
but, Instead, the past record of borrowing. This Is a particularly
convenient model of decision-making for borrowing, because of the long
range time horizon associated with capital outlays and debt service
schedules.
The existence of these different modes of decision-making helps to
explain why patterns of borrowing are so difficult to predict. Complicating
the picture is the fact that over time, cities may elect to follow a different
pattern of decision-making. Within every city government there will be
periodic replacement of elected and appointed officials. The evolutionary
nature of local government management makes it even more difficult to
track behavioral patterns over time. New administrations will bring to
government their own distinctive style of management and decision-making.
Over time, government officials will adjust their administrative styles
which can potentially affect the process and outcome of debt related
decisions.
Implications of Models
Behavioral models were Introduced as a means of better
understanding how municipalities make borrowing decisions. The
experience of the 37 largest cities suggests that it is difficult, if not
Impossible to predict long term borrowing purely on the basis of attributes
like population size, density, Income, age of Infrastructure, and so on.
Behavioral models enable us to better understand the reasons why a high
debt city may share characteristics similar to that of a low debt city.
In order to use these models, one might go about by assigning
likelihoods to various events and costs associated with alternative
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outcomes. There are two basic difficulties in using these models n such a
formal manner. First, it s difficult to determine and assign probabilities
to given events occurring within a particular community without having a
great deal of additional nformation. Second, the formulation of costs and
benefits is complicated by the fact that debt s both minimized and
maximized to produce the maximum benefit. While the decision makers
wants to have the lowest possible debt service costs, the amount borrowed
has to be large enough to cover necessary capital improvements. That is,
the borrowing decision is not simply a case of minimizing debt service
costs.
As such, It makes the most sense to use these decision models as
heuristic devices. In formulating an appropriate debt policy, city officials
would be well advised to take into consideration different rationales and
behavioral patterns that exist as alternatives to the normative model. As
such, a number of important questions which decisions makers should ask
emerge out of this analysis. There are three basic kinds of questions to be
asked: 1) questions about the community's capital needs; 2) questions about
the community's financial capabilities; and 3) questions regarding the
municipal bond market.
The relevant questions that a decision-maker should ask about capital
needs include the following:
* How great are capital needs?
* How have capital needs changed over the past decade?
* What is the present level of debt and non-debt financing
for capital needs?
* What is the level of participation by federal, state, and other
local authorities in the financing and delivery of
infrastructure?
* To what extent can the demand for capital expenditures
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be segmented into Into identifiable groups?
As developed in the previous chapters, understanding capital need Involves
an assessment of of both physical demands for infrastructure, as well as
economic, willingness to pay arguments. Factors associated with change
In capital needs include growth In population, Increase In personal income,
new residential, commercial or industrial development, and deterioration of
old plant and facilities. As communities change, so too do needs for capital
investment. One issue facing many large communities is adaptive reuse of
public buildings, (e.g., schools, little cityhalls, police substations, etc.).
These represent assets to the city. The properties can be: 1) conveyed to
private or non-profit organizations for development projects; 2) liquidated
in the local real estate market; 3) adapted for reuse in meeting new capital
needs.
Another important question which city officials need to ask is what
is the present level of commitment, through both debt and non-debt sources,
to financing capital improvements? What proportion of current revenues
routinely goes towards capital improvements, maintenance of
infrastructure, and debt service? Has the commitment to finance capital
Improvements changed over time? Have other priorities, such as funding
pension plans, meeting contractual wage and salary increases, and other
financial demands moved ahead of capital expenditures?
During the past two decades, federal aid to large cities has increased
considerably. Federal aid can both substitute for and stimulate local
spending on infrastructure. The extent to which the availability of federal
aid "frees up" local revenues is Important. Federal aid s another Important
factor to consider in the formation of an overall debt policy. At the same
-202
time, the unpredictable nature of federal assistance may make long range
planning difficult.
Cities vary widely in terms of their responsibilities for service.
Places such Washington, Baltimore, Honolulu, Newark, and Boston are
responsible for more than 90 percent of the services provided. Other
cities, such as San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Atlanta are responsible
for 37 percent or less. Cities with a high level of responsibility for
services need to identify the full set of resources both locally and
externally necessary to ensure that an adequate level of financing is
provided. Cities with a low level of responsibility face problems of
coordination among the various state and local authorities which share in
the provision and financing of infrastructure.
Another important question regarding capital needs is whether or not
the demand for infrastructure can be segmented according to various
population groups within the community. For example, with new housing
developments requiring sewer lines, sidewalks, curbs, street lighting, and
other improvements, there are identifiable beneficiaries of public capital
investment. These beneficiaries include the residents, the developers, and
property owners in the area. There are a number of different ways to
charge the costs of improvement to the beneficiaries. The city can set up a
special district, collect special assessments levied on the property owners
within the designated area and use the revenues to pay back debt service and
other costs associated with improvements. Another approach is to collect
fees or other exactions from developers. These can be either cash
contributions or in-kind services, such as the construction of infrastructure
normally built by the city. The city can also use tax increment financing.
With this approach, the city targets an area for development and determines
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its assessed valuation prior to development. After development occurs, the
city reassesses the value of property In the area, and uses the resulting
increase in tax revenues to cover debt service payments and other costs
associated with Improvements In the area. Beneficiaries of public
improvements should, whenever possible, pay for these improvements.
The second set of questions which a decision-maker needs to address
before borrowing involve the community's financial condition. The
important questions that decision-makers should ask include the following:
* How high are the city's own source revenues in comparison
to its expenditure commitments?
* To what extent can federal aid substitute for local revenues
in terms of financing needed capital improvements?
* How can the city justify using current revenues to finance
capital improvements which will provide public service over
a long range time horizon?
* How have non debt resources changed over time?
* Are there opportunities for creating reserve funds
for eventual use in financing capital mprovements?
· Does the city have sound budgeting and accounting practices
as well as an adequate financial reporting system?
To a very large degree, the financial condition of a particular city depends
upon its economic base. A city experience growth in income, real estate
values, employment, and population will have, as a general rule, a stronger
tax base than a city characterized by low/declining incomes, economic
stagnation, and unemployment. Assuming that the city has a strong tax
base, the question that decision-makers need to ask is: how high are
revenues in comparison to expenditures? Those cities which maintain a
healthy margin between revenues and expenditures are more likely to be in
a position to support new debt. At the same time as having a strong
revenue base, communities need to exert control over expenditures.
Expenditure control involves disaggregating the municipal budget into its
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various components, identifying fixed and adjustable expenses, and ensuring
that all expenditure increases are capped.
A related concern s whether or not the city provides a
disproportionate level of public services to non-residents and others such
as commuters. If the city s shouldering a large share of costs benefiting
those living outside its boundaries, the state government may need to 1)
grant new taxing authority to the locality to help recover some of these
costs; 2) play a more active role In the provision of services within the
municipality.
Other questions pertinent to financial condition Involve the mix of,
revenues which the community can draw upon. Cities dependent upon sales
and income taxes may be in comparatively weak position during periods of
economic stagnation. Cities dependent upon property taxes face the
potential loss of revenue due to property abandonment, disinvestment, and
changes in the ability to pay taxes among homeowners. Tax limitation laws
can also lower revenue yields, and create problems in terms of planning an
appropriate debt policy. The cities having a good mix of taxes to draw
upon, as well as having a strong base with which to tax, will be in the best
position to incur new debt.
Debt involves the payment of interest and principal according to a
fixed schedule. The key question that decision-makers must ask is: can the
city afford debt service payments both now and in the future? Perhaps the
best way to answer this question is to generate a set of scenarios based
upon revenues yields, intergovernmental aid, expenditure commitments, and
other factors associated with the fiscal health of the city. The ability to
generate such scenarios depends upon the availability of accounting and
budgeting information. Adoption of standard accounting and financial
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reporting practices, therefore, s critical to the formulation of sound debt
policy.
It s important to note that debt policy s directly related to the
financial condition of a city. Debt service payments are financial
commitments which must be honored. As such, cities with high debt
service payments generally have limited capacity to Incur new debt and face
potentially higher tax burdens. An optimal level of borrowing is high
enough to address necessary capital needs, but low enough so that the city
remains in good fiscal health. Signs of poor fiscal health include the
inability to meet expenditures, the unwillingness of creditors to lend to the
city on a short or long term basis, and an Inability to meet public demands
for service. A strong debt policy, therefore, is an Important part of
strengthening a city's financial condition.
The final set of considerations that decision-makers should address
before issuing long term debt involves conditions in the municipal bond
market. The municipal bond market is the mechanism which channels funds
between governments and investors. The types of questions that a decision-
maker must ask include:
* Will the city receive the lowest possible interest costs
on the debt that it Issues?
* What can the city do to lower interest costs?
* Should the issuer postpone borrowing until interest rates
drop?
* What can the city do to improve the marketability of its
bonds?
* Should the city borrow because interest rates are low?
The questions that a decision-maker should ask about market conditions
primarily center on interest rates. The borrower should seek to minimize
interest costs, both by issuing bonds at times when Interest rates are low
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and by taking steps to ensure that nterest costs are as low as possible.
There are several things a city can do lower its interest costs. First, It can
work to achieve the highest bond ratings possible. The higher the rating,
the lower the Interest rate. Second, the city should sell their bonds by
competitive bid. If bonds are sold through negotiation, the city should agree
to the lowest possible interest costs. Third, the city should provide full
financial disclosure. An abundance of information will help create a
positive image of the city among investors, financial publishers, and others
In the Investment community.
The Issuer should also time their bond sales to occur during periods
of low interest rates. Whenever possible, cities should borrow when rates
are low and postpone borrowing when rates are high. Cities should
prioritize their capital needs. Invariably, some projects will have to be
initiated during periods of high interest rates. In order to minimize
Interest costs, the project can be broken Into several different phases, and
the construction timed to when Interest rates fall. Some projects lend
themselves to phasing more than others. Obviously, the business of
predicting interest rate swings Is quite difficult. The advice of experts
and those who track Interest rates should be Incorporated Into decision-
making. Another option is to refinance debt issued during periods of high
interest rates when interest rates decline. Here too, the timing of
borrowing Is critical. Refinancing bonds should be issued when Interest
rates are low.
There have, in recent years, been various attempts to improve the
marketability of municipal bonds. One approach Is to lower the face value
of the bonds to attract a broader spectrum of investors. The typical
municipal bond, with a face value of $5,000 may be out of the reach of many
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people. Small denomination bonds, $500, $100, $50, $25, etc., on the other
hand, can be marketed more easily to residents, and Incorporated Into
savings plans. Other possibilities Include zero coupons (allowing all
interest payments to accumulate to be returned upon maturation), variable
rate bonds, deep discount bonds, and other types of non-traditional
municipal bonds. These alterations can help Improve the marketability of
municipals by expanding the range of Investment opportunities.
In summary, the key concern for financial officers is minifizing the
interest costs on the bonds issued. At the same time, they need to ensure
that their bonds will be bought by investors, and the the city develops a
solid record of repayment. Cities need to develop a good credit history to
promote nvestor confidence In their securities. As such, cities which
borrow smaller amounts, at regular Intervals, are bound to have a
comparative advantage over those cities which embark Irregularly upon
extremely large capital projects, heavily financed with debt. At the same
time, to present a world In which cities borrow small amounts, timed to
occur when Interest rates are low, capital needs are manageable, and
Investors are anxious to purchase bonds, may represent a case of wishful
thinking.
This chapter has served to demonstrate the theoretical as well as
practical utility of behavioral models for explaining long term borrowing by
the largest cities In the country. Styles of decision-making can Influence
municipal borrowing. A behavioral approach allows us to Identify factors
that might not otherwise be detected, particularly if one conducts a
traditional cross-sectional analysis. On the practical side, a behavioral
approach also serves to dentify a range of different questions which arise
in the course of the borrowing process. In general, the factors that
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decision-makers need to consider Include: capital needs, financial
capabilities, and bond market conditions. In the next chapter, a city by city
analysis will be undertaken to Identify the patterns in borrowing, over time.
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Chapter 8
The Long-term Borrowing and Spending Patterns of Large
American Cities, 1965-82
Previous chapters have pointed to the difficulties of analyzing data
on capital spending and long-term debt. In addition to the scarcity of
well-developed theoretical foundations, the long-term nature of capital
investment and borrowing decisions create special problems. Cross-
sectional studies can miss the mark entirely because of the irregularities
associated with capital spending and debt issuances. As such, the study of
infrastructure investment, almost by its very nature, requires longitudinal
analyses.
With the longitudinal approach, one might go about examining
aggregate level data on savings and investment. The Flow of Funds Account
provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve does, in fact,
provide one acceptable source for this type of time series study. There are
a number of problems with this approach. Because the data are in aggregate
form, combining together all the various units of local government issuers
(cities, counties, special districts, etc.), the behavior of individual units of
governments is hidden. Many of the behavioral arguments developed in
previous chapters would be lost through the use of aggregate level data.
The behavioral perspective is weakened when the unit of analysis is the
local government "sector" rather than the individual government unit.
Moreover, the results of a "sectoral" approach could be quite biased, since
there would no way to control for the behavior of the very large issuers,
like New York City, which issue many times the volume of debt of smaller
issuers.
At the risk of tackling a more unmanageable study, this chapter
investigates the financial behavior, over time, of the 37 largest cities in
America. This chapter draws upon the framework constructed in the
previous chapters.
Method of Analysis
In this chapter, a modified case study approach will be used. The
case studies in this section depart from traditional case studies because
they are constructed, almost entirely, from secondary source data. In
addition, rather than selecting only a few cities to study in-depth, this
chapter will provide information on the 37 largest cities in the U.S. Much
of the data comes from the annual survey of city government finances
conducted by the Bureau of the Census.1 The analysis focuses on three
principal variables: 1) capital outlays, 2) long term debt, and 3) federal aid.
Each of these variables for all 37 of the largest cities have been plotted for
the period 1965 to 1982. A graph for each municipality showing outlays,
debt, and aid in constant dollars has been included.
Following a short description of each city and its socio-economic
characteristics, there will be a short discussion of overall trends in
outlays, debt, and federal aid. Each case history will report the results of a
regression analyses, in which federal aid and long-term debt will be
regressed on annual capital spending. Two different regression equations
will be specified. The unlagged model will be specified as:
CAPOUT = a + 31FEDAID + 2 DEBT
where,
a= intercept;
1Bureau of the Census (1966-1983) City Government Finances. U.S.
Department of Commerce. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.
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J3 = regression coefficients
CAPOUT = total annual capital outlays
FEDAID = total annual federal aid
DEBT= total annual debt issued
The lagged model, however, will utilize a two year moving average of the
debt variable, in an effort to smooth out some of the regularities
associated with borrowing:
CAPOUT = + 31FEDAID + 32MADEBT
where,
MADEBT = two year moving average of total
annual debt issued.
In addition to reporting R2 values, F-ratios, and t-statistics (on the beta
coefficients) for those cities in which there are statistically significant
results,2 each case history will conclude with a short prognosis of capital
spending needs and financing trends.
Case Histories: Capital Spending in the Largest Cities
Atlanta
Soclo-economic Trends
Although Atlanta experienced almost a 15 percent decline in
population between 1970 and 1980, the metropolitan area grew by 27
percent. Atlanta s a city in which two-thirds of Its population s non-
white. The 1979 per capita income ($6550) was below the 37 city mean by
2The F-ratio, [R2 /p]/[(1-R 2)/(n - p - 1)], is statistically significant, at the
95 percent confidence level, for values in excess of 3.68. The t-value,
3/SEB, is statistically significant, at the 95 percent confidence level, for
values in excess of 1.75.
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about $744. With only 21 Dercent of Its housing stock in 1980, built before
1940, Atlanta's infrastructure is relatively young.
Trends in Outlays, Debt and Federal Aid
From 1965 to 1977, Atlanta experienced only moderate growth in
capital spending, spending less than $80 million annually. Atlanta's capital
spending peaked in 1980-81, when the city spent more than $180 million
annually.
In real dollars, the major debt peaks occurred in 1971 and in 1978
(See Figure VIII-1). The 1978 peak corresponds to a period of relatively low
interest rates. In general, large federal aid allotments occurred at the same
time as large outlays, while debt appeared to lag behind outlays.
Regress/on Results
The lagged model performed much better than the unlagged model. By
using a moving average of the debt variable, an R2 of 45.6 percent (F-ratio =
6.4) was achieved, compared to only 32.6 percent for the unlagged model.
CAPOUT = 21.9 M + .885 FEDAID + .243 MADEBT
(2.55) (2.09)
The t-values, contained in the parentheses, show that both federal aid and
debt are significantly and postively related to capital outlays.
The regression results suggest that Atlanta is more dependent upon
federal aid than debt, when it comes to capital spending. Upon closer
inspection, however, it appears that the first period of heavy capital
investment, 1971 to 1973, was financed largely by debt. At that time,
Atlanta's federal aid allotments were small; below $10 million, annually.
The second period of heavy capital investment, during the late 70s, however,
occurred at a time when federal aid had grown to nearly $20 million (in real
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dollars). The point worth emphasis is that model, as specified, provides a
better explanation of how Atlanta financed capital outlays in the late 70s,
than in earlier years.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
While the level of capital investment has Increased in the late 70s,
the fact that the metropolitan area has grown substantially, suggests that
demands for capital investment will increase, rather than decrease. While
Atlanta's infrastructure is relatively young, the fact that personal income
is low and that the city has a disportionately large share of minorities and
low income residents suggests that in the years ahead, there may be
increasing pressure to provide an increase in operating budgets, by
sacrificing capital projects. The fact that capital outlays plunged, in real
terms, from over $70 million in 1980 to less than $30 million in 1982,
suggests that there may be some need to stabilize capital spending in the
years ahead.
Baltimore
Soclo-economic Trends
While the metropolitan area population grew by five percent, during
the decade of the 1970s, Baltimore lost more than 13 percent of its
population. Baltimore can be characterized as a city with a large non-white
population, a low personal income ($5877 in 1979), an aged housing stock
(more than 50 percent built before 1950), and an average level of home
ownership (44 percent In 1980).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Baltimore experienced two periods of heavy capital spending, one in
1976-78 and another in 1981-82. Long term borrowing, however, remained
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quite low (approximately $30 million, annually), until 1980 when the city
began issuing large amounts of debt. In 1980, Baltimore issued $110
million, in 1981, over $130 million, and in 1982, nearly $180 million in long
term debt. Capital outlays in the 1976-78 period were financed with a
combination of state and federal aid, while the latter period of capital
spending was heavily debt-financed.
Figure VIII-2 displays federal aid, debt, and outlays in real dollars
over the period 1965 to 1982. Several points are apparent. Throughout
much of the 1970s (1972-1979), Baltermore issued in real dollars, $20
million or less in long term debt. In real dollars, the amount of debt was
almost constant. The graph also shows the extent to which periods of high
capital spending were, in general, accompanied by high federal aid
allotments.
Regression Results
Upon inspection of the graph of outlays, aid, and debt, it became clear
that the lagged model would not necessarily perform better than the
unlagged model, because there were so many years where the amount of debt
issued was virtually a constant. In fact, the lagged model produced an R2
of 34.9 percent, only 0.1 percent greater than the unlagged model. As
expected, neither model produced a significant debt coefficient.
CAPOUT = 61M + .581FEDAID + .03MADEBT
(2.68) (.06)
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
Although a recent return to bond market (Baltimore issued more than
$40 million in long-term debt annually from 1980), may help to improve
Baltimore's ability to finance infrastructure in the absence of federal aid,
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the regression results demonstrate a strong dependency on federal aid
which may be difficult to shake. In 1978, when federal funds began to
drop, capital spending dropped by about $90 million In one year. It is clear
that as federal funds continue to shrink, Baltimore must develop other
means of financing its capital needs.
It is interesting to note that Baltimore demonstrates many of the
behavioral patterns of the "wheeler-dealer urban financier" as described in
the previous chapter. Note that the most massive capital outlay occurred in
1976 (See Figure VIII-2), two years before federal aid peaked, and four
years before borrowing increased. Given Baltimore's comeback as an urban
center, it would appear that the increase in capital investment may have
helped to spur economic development.
Boston
Soclo-economic Trends
With a population density of 19 persons per acre, Boston is one of the
most densely populated cities in the country. While the city lost about 12
percent of its population during the 1970s, the region grew slightly,
increasing in size by about 1 percent to over 3.9 million persons. With 63
percent of its housing stock built before 1940, Boston also has one of the
oldest infrastructure systems.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Boston's record of capital spending is marked by a peak in the mid-
70s, follwed by a pronounced decrease in the early 80s. The pattern of
borrowing roughly matches its capital spending record: both outlays and
debt reach peaks in 1973 and 1976. In 1982, Boston issued no long term
debt whatsoever, and capital outlays for that year reached an 18 year low.
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While state aid has increased steadily, it appears to have had little if any
effect on stemming the decline in capital spending since the mid-70s. High
federal aid allotments in 1976 and 1979 correspond with slight increases in
capital spending.
In real dollars, Boston's spending on infrastructure (See Figure VIII-
3) fluctuated between a low of less than $10 million in 1982 to a high of
over $70 million, in 1976. In general, peaks in debt, federal aid, and outlays
occurred within the same years. In the early part of the series, it actually
appeared as though Boston was borrowing after, not before, making large
capital outlays. In later years, Boston withdrew from the bond market.
Shortly thereafter, federal aid began to decrease. A pattern of declining
capital investment soon took shape.
Regression Results
Of the two models, the model with the unlagged debt term performed
much better than the lagged model. The unlagged model produced an R2 of
72 percent (F-ratio 19.29) compared to 50.3 percent for the lagged model.
CAPOUT = 14.2 M + .0002FEDAID + .001 DEBT
(4.0) (4.5)
Both the federal aid and debt terms are highly significant. The fact that the
unlagged model performs better than the lagged model suggests that Boston
is more likely to spend debt proceeds in the same year debt is issued rather
than waiting for a few years.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The fact that Boston's capital spending has dropped in almost every
consecutive year since 1977 signals a pattern of disinvestment which must
be reversed if the city is to avoid widespread collapse of infrastructure.
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Complicating the situation In Boston is: 1) the old age of the infrastructure;
2) the high population density; and 3) the financial pressures associated
with Proposition 2-1/2. The fact that Boston had virtually retreated from
the bond market altogether suggests too that there is a great need to re-
structure the city's entire capital plan.
Buffalo
Soclo-economic Trends
Buffalo's population plummeted by more than 22 percent during the
1970-80 period. The metropolitan area lost more than 8 percent during the
same period. Of the largest cities in the U.S., Buffalo has the oldest
housing stock, with 73 percent of it built before 1940, and only 3 percent
built after 1969. Compared to many large cities, it has a relatively small
non-white population, less than 30 percent in 1980.
Trends In Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Buffalo exhibited two peaks in capital spending over the 18 year
period. One occurred in 1977 and another in 1982. Both years were peak
years in terms of federal aid. In 1981, Buffalo issued close to $160 million
in long term debt, more than two times the amount it had ever issued. This
suggests that borrowing played a much more important role in financing the
capital Improvements in the 1980s.
In real dollars, (See Figure VIII-4) Buffalo spent a fairly constant
amount on capital projects, except for 1976-77, when outlays increased to
just over $45 million. During the early years of the series, there was a
fairly clear match between debt, federal aid, and outlays. In 1972, the city
issued debt which lagged behind outlays by as much as four years.
Regress/on Results
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Because of the fact that the lag between debt and outlays may have
been as much as four years, both models encountered difficulties In
estimating the debt terms. However, the lagged model did produce the
highest R2 value, 57.5 percent (F-ratio = 7.59).
CAPOUT = 17.2 M + .342 FEDAID + .1 52MADEBT
(4.28) (.93)
Upon closer inspection of the graph of Buffalo's capital spending, debt, and
federal aid (Figure VIII-4), it becomes clear that the relationship between
debt and outlays is much more difficult to discern than the relationship
between federal aid and outlays. Buffalo is yet another example of city
where federal funds are spent more quickly than funds raised through the
issuance of long-term debt.
Assessment of Capital Spend/ng Record
The period of protracted economic decline throughout the 70's in both
the central city and in the Buffalo metropolitan region suggests that the
decline in public capital investment may have much to do with the
stagnation of the private economy. In addition to its economic woes,
Buffalo's infrastructure is among the oldest of the 37 largest cities. The
combination of population decline and old infrastructure suggests that
future capital needs are more likely to involve repair and rehabilitation of
existing systems rather than the construction of new facilities.
Chicago
Soco-economic Trends
With a population of more than 3 million persons in 1980, Chicago
was the second largest city in America. Moreover, during the decade of the
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70s, the city grew by about 27 percent. Its population density of 21 persons
per acre was surpassed only by New York City and San Francisco. In 1980,
50 percent of its population was non-white, the per capita income was
$6939 (compared to the 37-city average of $7294), and 36 percent of the
households were homeowners.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
For fifteen years (1965-79) Chicago maintained a relatively flat
capital spending profile, spending, for the most part, approximately $150
million annually. In the 1980-81, capital spending jumped to alomst $350
million. This sudden increase in capital spending paralleled Increases in
intergovernmental aid and debt issuances of over $200 million in 1980.
Chicago's debt profile is interesting. The city floated major bond issues in
1971, 1972, and 1976. The city issued virtually no debt in 1968, 1975, and
1979.
In real terms (See Figure VIII-5) Chicago has been spending, for the
most part, less and less each year on capital outlays. The "postponement
syndrome" as described in earlier chapters appears to be dominant
behavioral pattern in Chicago.
Regress/on Results
The fact that neither the unlagged nor the lagged model produced a
significant R2 (neither exceeded 28 percent) suggests that capital spending
patterns in Chicago have been basically unresponsive to either federal aid
allotments or increased debt.
It may well be the case that Chicago, which has a low level of per
capita debt, has not borrowed enough to ensure a high level of capital
spending. At the same time, Chicago, which has received generous federal
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aid allotments, particularly in the mid to late 70's, may have not spent
these funds on capital outlays.
Assessment of Capltal Spending Record
All of the available evidence points to a pattern of neglect in terms
of infrastructure in Chicago. First, there is the fact that capital outlays
have decreased steadily, in spite of its increasing population size and
growing density. Second, there is evidence that increased federal aid did
not significantly increase levels of capital spending. Third, in per capita
terms, Chicago borrowed much less than other large cities. While the
analysis can not determine whether or not Chicago faces a critical level of
unmet capital need, it is clear, however, that the trend of declining capital
expenditures will eventually have to be reversed.
Cincinnati
Socio-economic Trends
While the Cincinnati metropolitan area grew by 3 percent, the central
city population dropped by more than 15 percent. In 1980, 35 percent of its
population was non-white, and 35 percent of its households owned their own
homes. Cincinnati had a population density of 7.7 person per acre, about 10
persons per acre less than the 37 city average. Cincinnati was one of the
11 cities with a city manager, rather than mayor-council form of
government.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal AId
This city experienced three periods of high capital spending: 1969-
71, 1975-77, and 1980. Cincinnati issued large amounts of debt in 1969,
1972, 1974, 1976, and 1978. The greatest amount of borrowing occurred in
1974, when the city floated approximately $40 million in long-term
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securities. Cincinnati issued no debt in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Both state
and federal aid peaked in 1977.
In real terms, the heaviest levels of capital spending occurred in the
late 60s and early 70s when the city spent more than $50 million annually
on infrastructure. (See Figure VIII-6.) At no other time did it match that
level of commitment to capital projects. From the graph, it appears that
capital spending is more influenced by federal aid than by debt issuances.
Regress/on Results
The regressions did not produce significant R2 values. The lagged
model (R2 = 12.4 percent) performed slightly better than the unlagged model
(R2 = 9.0 percent.) The fact that the models failed to explain much of the
variation in outlays was somewhat disappointing given the similarity of
outlays and federal aid, particularly during the later part of the series. One
factor which may have contributed to the poor performance of the models is
that Cincinnati's heaviest capital expenditures occurred during the late
1960s and early 1970s, at a time when debt and federal aid were quite low.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
Although Cincinnati's population has declined, the growth of the
metropolitan area suggests that demands for capital investment should
continue into the decades ahead. What's most striking about Cincinnati is
the extent to which it appeared to finance a sizeable amount of
infrastructure during the period 1968-71, in the absence of large federal
aid or major debt issuances. Also interesting, is the extent to which debt,
relative to outlays has remained quite small, in real terms, certainly less
than $30 million. It would appear that Cincinnati has an excess capacity to
borrow, particularly since the period 1977 were especially lean in terms of
the volume of debt issued.
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Cleveland
Soclo-economic Trends
Even upon casual inspection, Cleveland appears to be a city in trouble.
The metropolitan region lost about 6 percent of its 1970 population, while
in 1980, the central city showed a decline of more 23 percent. The city's
per capita income ($5770) n 1979 was lower than all but two of the 37
largest cities. With 58 percent of its housing stock built before 1940, and
a population that was 46 percent non-white, Cleveland faced difficulties
in setting its budgetary priorities. Only 6 percent of its adult population
in 1980 were college educated, far below the mean (16 percent) for the 37
largest cities
Trends In Outlays, Debt, and FederalAid
Cleveland experienced one major peak in capital spending over the 18
year period which occurred in 1976-77. For those years, the city spent
between $65 and $70 million on capital projects. Cleveland entered the
bond market sporadically over the 18 year period. Although the city issued
over $50 million in 1969 and 1971, the city issued no debt in 1973, 1974,
1979, 1980, and 1982 and virutally no debt in 1970, 1972, 1975, and 1976.
The lack of borrowing helps to explain the enormous issue ($150 million)
brought to market in 1977. Although state aid continued to increase
steadily, the decline in federal aid since the late 70s helps to explain
Cleveland's dropoff in capital spending.
In real terms, (See Figure VIII-7), there was strong decline in capital
investment from 1977 to 1982. Outlays dropped from nearly $40 million
to below $10 million. This decline persisted in spite of large federal aid
allotments (in excess of $50 million, in real dollars).
Regress/on Results
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In viewing the graph of outlays, federal aid, and debt (Figure VIII-7),
it is apparent that increased outlays tend to be correlated with increased
federal aid allotments, except for perhaps, two years--1971 and 1972.
Debt issuances, on the other hand, appear to match even more directly the
pattern of capital outlays. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the
unlagged model performs better than the lagged model. The unlagged model
produced an R2 of 42.8 (F-ratio = 5.6) while on the lagged model, the R2
dropped to 12.4 percent.
CAPOUT = 25.8M -. 171 FEDAID + .21 1 DEBT
(-1.74) (3.06)
Although the Federal aid term in the regression was not significant, it did
produce a negative sign. Rather than interpret this negative sign as
evidence that increased federal aid decreases capital spending, it makes
more sense to put this federal aid in the context of the financial problems
Cleveland encountered in the 70's. The negative sign suggests that in spite
of large federal aid allotments, capital spending continued to decrease.
Assessment of Capotal Spendg Record
Cleveland's record of capital spending is undoubtedly related to the
financial problems it encountered throughout the later part of the time
series. In a city with both a declining population and economic base, the
loss of outside aid can represent an especially crippling blow. The fact that
Cleveland may not have borrowed much in the late 70s, moreover, reinforces
the perception that this city was, potentially, a serious credit risk. Cities
in financial straits similar to Cleveland present the strongest case for
continued federal assistance.
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Columbus
Soc/o-econom;c Trends
In addition to growing about 5 percent over the decade of the 70s, the
Columbus metropolitan area expanded by 8 percent, to over 1.2 million
persons in 1980. In 1980, Columbus was a city with a relatively high per
capita income ($6783), a high degree of homeownership (45 percent), and a
relatively small non-white population (24 percnet).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Over the past two decades, Columbus experienced two periods of
capital spending. One occurred in the late 60s and the other began in 1978
and peaked in 1981. The period 1971 to 1977 was relatively flat, with
capital outlays in the $20 million to $30 million range. Columbus' capital
outlays appear closely tied to its federal revenue allotments which
increased significantly in 1979, when the city began its most ambitious
capital improvements. Long term borrowing roughly follows the pattern set
by capital outlays. Borrowing peaks occurred in 1967, 1973, and 1981-82.
In real terms (See Figure Vi -8), Columbus spent the most on capital
projects in 1967 when it spent more than $35 million on infrastructure. In
the same year it borrowed more than $20 million. The next heavy outlya
occurred in 1974. This time there was a two year lag between debt and
outlays. Later increases in capital spending appear related to increases in
federal aid.
Regression Results
Because of the fact that the largest outlays occurred in the late
1960s, when federal aid was insignificant, one would not expect to see a
strong relationship between outlays and federal aid. The fact that debt
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lagged behind outlays by two, perhaps more, years also reduced expectations
as to the success of the regressions.
Neither regression produced R2 values in excess of 15 percent. The R2
value on the lagged model, however, was twice as large as the R2 value on
the unlagged model. This suggests that the most promising explanations
for Columbus' capital spending involve the construction of model in which
the debt term is lagged behind the outlay variable.
Assessment of Cap/tal Spending Record
The fact that both the central city and the metropolitan area
experienced growth, as well as the relative prosperity of the city suggests
that demands for capital improvements will expand in the years ahead.
Similar to Cincinnati, Columbus financed its largest capital outlays in the
late 60's, during a time when federal aid was quite low. Although a
noticeable relationship between federal aid and outlays occurred in the
years 1977-80, Columbus appears to be capable of financing its
infrastructure needs on its own. As federal aid dropped in 1980-81,
Columbus incurred the highest volume of debt ever.
Dallas
Soclo-economic Trends
While the metropolitan area grew by 25 percent, the central city
grew by more than 7 percent. Dallas had all the characteristics of a
growing area: low population density (5 persons per acre), low proportion of
housing built before 1940 (10 percent), high proportion of college educated
residents (20 percent), and a higher than average level of per capita income
($8614). Dallas is one of the largest cities to be run under the city-manager
form of government.
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Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federa/Aid
Up until 1970, Dallas spent relatviely little (less than $30 million
annually) on capital projects. By 1971, spending doubled, by 1975 spending
tripled, and by 1981 Dallas was spending more than $130 million annually on
capital improvements. The growth in spending was steady. Federal aid
peaked in 1976 and 1980, while state aid peaked in 1977 and 1981. Dallas'
use of long term debt closely matches its capital outlays. Debt issuances
have grown from $25 million in 1969, to $120 million in 1971, to over $225
million in 1982.
In real terms, (See Figure VIII-9), the largest levels of debt were
issued in the early 1970's and mid-1970's. The debt issuances were
generally followed by increases in capital spending one to two years later.
Although federal aid increased in the mid-70's, the relationship between
federal aid and outlays does not appear to be as strong as the relationship
between debt and outlays.
Regression Results
As expected, the lagged model produced the best results, explaining at
least 53 percent of the variation in annual capital outlays. The unlagged
model, however, produced an R2 of only 17 percent.
CAPOUT = 7.4 M + .182FEDAID + .505MADEBT
(.963) (4.07)
The fact that debt term was more stronger than the federal aid term
suggests that Dallas is a city that is less dependent than other cities on
federal aid for the financing of capital projects.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
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The fact that Dallas is in one of the fastest growing areas in the
country suggests that capital needs are likely to expand rather than
decrease in the coming years. In addition, the relative prosperity of the
area suggests too that the willingness to pay for capital improvements may
be higher in Dallas than in places with lower levels of personal income.
Dallas, moreover is a city with a proven record of financing infrastructure
in the absence of federal support. Dallas is one city which increased
spending in 1980-81, despite large cuts in federal aid. In addition, since
Dallas appears to have maintained a fairly constant level of capital
investment over the past 18 years, nfrastrucutre systems are in better
shape than many of the other cities which have neglected their capital
facilities.
Denver
Soclo-economic Trends
While Denver's population fell by almost 5 percent, the metropolitan
population in 1980 reached 1.6 million, an increase of more than 30 percent.
With a per capita income of $8556, Denver is one of the more wealthy cities
in the country. Forty-seven percent of the population were homeowners and
22 percent were college educated.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, andFederal Aid
Denver's capital spending profile reveals growth in the late 60s and
mid-70s. Spending peaks occurred in 1969 ($40 million), 1976 ($70
million), and 1979 ($80 million). Large debt issuances occurred in 1967
($30 million), 1970 ($40 million), 1976 (over $50 million), and 1978 ($70
million). State aid has grown steadily over the period, while federal peaks
occured in 1974 and 1979.
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In real terms, there has been some growth in capital spending,
particularly during the mid 70s (see Figure VI I- 10). The graph of outlays,
debt and aid shows that first period of heavy capital expenditures (1969)
was largely debt-financed, using proceeds of bonds issued two years earlier
(1967). Later on, outlays appear to be financed with a combination of debt
and federal aid.
Regression Results
Given the apparent lags as depicted in Figure VIII-10, it was not
surprising to find that the lagged model explained more than 64 percent (F-
ratio=13.87) of the total variation in capital outlays, compared to the
unlagged model which had an R2 of 35.6 percent (F-ratio=415). In both
models, federal aid and debt were positive and significant.
CAPOUT = 6.9M + .234FEDAID + .1 63MADEBT
(2.34) (3.99)
Denver is a city in which both federal aid and long-term debt has played a
significant role in infrastructure finance.
Assessment of Capital Spendring Record
The fact that Denver's population dropped by 6 percent during the
decade of the 70's needs to be weighed against the metropolitan growth rate
of 30 percent. The growth of the region, the high per capita income, and the
high rate of homeownership suggest that capital needs are likely to expand
rather than contract.
There is some evidence to suggest that Denver's dependency upon
federal aid may be difficult to overcome in the years ahead. First, the
regression equations shows a strong, positive, and significant relationship
between outlays and aid. Second, when federal aid dropped by more than
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$10 million between 1980 to 1982, capital spending was almost cut in half.
As such the planned shrinkage in federal aid suggests that Denver will need
to use debt, more than ever before, In the financing of infrastructure.
Detroit
Soco-economic Trends
The central city population suffered a 20 percent decrease in the
1970s, while metropolitan area population fell by about 1 percent. A
relatively old city (46 percent of the housing stock built before 1940, 3
percent built after 1969), Detroit was one of only six cities in the U.S. to
have a population greater than one million. Detroit can also be
characterized as a relatively poor city (1979 per capita income was
$6215), with a large non-white population (65 percent).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal AId
Detroit experienced a modest growth in capital spending in the early
70s, and more significant growth in 1980-81, when capital spending peaked
at over $250 million, annually. Although Detroit borrowed more than it
ever had before ($160 million) in 1979, its record of capital spending more
closely parallels its federal aid receipts than its borrowing patterns.
While there is a fairly close match between years of high federal aid and
high capital spending, the city went into a borrowing slump between 1972
and 1978.
When viewing the graph of outlays, debt and aid (see Figure VIII-1 1),
one can sense that Detroit is a city facing severe economic hardships.
Unlike virtually any other city, the relationship between outlays and federal
was established from the early years of the series. Debt issuances have
been infrequent and show an overall pattern of deterioration. In real terms,
-240-
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the largest issuance occurred in 1971. The three largest issuances of debt
appear to lag behind outlays by two to three years.
Regression Results
The lagged model (R2 = 70.7, F-ratio = 18.1 ) was able to explain about
4 percent more of the total variation in outlays than the unlagged model (R2
= 66.8, F-ratio = 15.09). In either model, only the federal aid term was
significantly related to outlays.
CAPOUT = 23.6M + .371FEDAID + .241MADEBT
(4.92) (1.43)
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
Detroit is a city with an obvious dependency on federal aid. When
viewing the demographic trends, especially the population loses and the low
level of personal income, the prospects for Detroit, in the face of severe
federal cuts, appear quite dismal. Unlike other cities which have a proven
capacity to take on new long-term debt as needed, Detroit with its severe
economic problems is not likely to be viewed as a good credit risk. In part
because of its inability to raise the necessary capital for financing
infrastructure, Detroit will continue to lose jobs and people to other areas.
Fort Worth
Socio-economic Trends
Although the central city population lost about 2 percent of the
393,000 inhabitants it had in 1970, the metropolitan area grew by more
than a half million people (25 percent). With only 17 percent of its
housing built before 1940 and a per capita income of $7336. With a
-2 42-
population density of only 3 persons per acre, only two other cities
Oklahoma City and Kansas City were less densely populated.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Of the cities examined, Fort Worth exhibited one of the most sporadic
patterns in capital spending, with peaks occurring in 1968, 1972, 1977, and
1981. In 1970-71 Fort Worth had a capital budget of approximately of $17
million. One year later it shot up to almost $45 million. By 1974, capital
spending was below the 1970-71 level. Although a peak in 1977 was
followed by another dip, the fluctuations appear to be less wide in the
latter part of the series. The city's debt profile exhibits a similar zig-
zagging pattern, with peaks in 1968, 1972, 1978, 1980, and 1982. Federal
aid peaked in 1974 and 1977-79. State aid peaked in 1971 and 1974 and has
remained at low levels ever since.
In real terms (see Figure VIll-12), Fort Worth's pattern of capital
spending appears closely related to its debt issuances, at least up until
the mid-70s. The outlays in 1977 to 1978, however, appear to financed
with federal aid. In most years, there appears to be a year to year match
between receipt of debt proceeds and spending.
Regress/on Results
Of the two models, the unlagged model produced the best results,
having an R2 of 51.9 percent compared to only 19.4 percent with the lagged
model. In spite of the heavy use of federal aid in the mid-70s, only the debt
term was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
CAPOUT = 8.9 M + .243 FEDAID + .468 DEBT
(1.63) (3.98)
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
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In general, it appears that Fort Worth is in good financial condition.
The fact that much of its infrastructure in the past has been financed by
debt is apparent, not only from the regression equation results, but also
from inspection of the graph of outlays, debt and aid. It is interesting to
note that Fort Worth's highest capital expenditures occurred at a time when
federal aid was virtually non-existent (1972). Given the growth of the
region, the relatively young age of the city's infrastructure, Fort Worth is
likely to be a city which will be able to meet its capital needs in the
absence of federal assistance.
Honolulu
Socio-economic Trends
Honolulu is one of the few cities in which the central city and the
metropolitan area are the same. The population grew by more than 20
percent, increasing from 631,000 in 1970 to over 763,000 in 1980. In
1980, only 11 percent of the housing stock was built before 1940, and 33
percent was built after 1969. Although the city has a large non-white
population (70 percent), unlike many American cities, only 2 percent of the
city's population was black, and only 7 percent was hispanic (the majority
were asians). In 1980, the city had a per capita income ($8948) ,and a high
proportion of college graduates (21 percent).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Ad
Annual capital spending in Honolulu grew to $50 million the late 60s,
to $85 million in the mid 70s, and increased in 1982 to nearly $100 million.
Large bond issues occurred in 1967 ($25 million), 1973 ($35 million), 1976
($38 million), 1978 ($52 million), 1982 ($50 million). For three years,
1979, 1980, 1981, Honolulu issued no debt whatsoever. Federal aid peaked
-245-
in 1978 and has declined steadily. To some extent, the loss of federal funds
have been offset by increased state aid in 1980-82.
In real terms, (see Figure VIII-13), the heaviest capital spending
occured in the late 1960's and mid 1970's. Although the growth in capital
spending in the 1970's corresponded to an increase in federal aid, the city
also issued its largest debt (in real terms) in 1972 and 1973. In the late
1970's, debt, federal aid, and outlays all declined simultaneously. As debt
issuances dropped to zero in 1979 to 1981, outlays reached their lowest
levels n the 18 year period.
Regression Results
The high level of capital spending in the late 1960's and early 1970's
is difficult to explain on the basis of borrowing and federal aid. There does
not appear to be any lag between debt and outlays, ruling out the possibility
that the lagged model would produce better results than the unlagged model.
Given the patterns exhibited in the graph of outlays, debt and aid, the
regresion results were not surprising. The R2 value on the lagged models
was 6.1 percent; on the unlagged model it reached 19.4 percent (F-ratio =
1.81).
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
Honolulu is city which has experienced considerable growth, both in
population and in income, over the decade of the 70s. As such, it appears
quite likely that eventually, this city will need to increase its level of
capital investment. While the loss of federal aid will increase the
financial burden of financing infrastructure, Honolulu is in relatively good
financial shape to incur more debt. With a relatively high level of personal
income, low levels of outstanding debt, and increasing growth, Honolulu
appears to be a good credit risk.
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Houston
Soclo-economic Trends
Only one other city, Phoenix, experienced a greater increase in
population during the 1970-80 decade. Houston's population grew by over
29 percent to almost 1.6 million. The metropolitan area grew by 43
percent, outpaced again by only one city, Phoenix. Houston s a young city,
with only 8 percent of its housing built before 1940. Close to 40 percent of
its housing stock was built after 1969. With a per capita income of $8796,
Houston was one of the more prosperous of the cities with more than one
million inhabitants.
Trends n Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Except for two modest peaks (in 1969 and 1976), the greatest growth
in capital spending occurred after 1978, when Houston's capital budget grew
from $75 million to $225 million. The increase in capital spending was
accompanied by increased intergovernmental aid. Houston's debt profile
remained relatively flat between 1965 and 1973 (at about $50 million in
annual issuances), peaked slightly in 1974 and and 1978, and then shot up to
$400 million in 1980.
In real terms (see Figure VIII-14), Houston exhibited a pattern of
gradually increasing outlays, reaching over $80 million by the early 1980s.
Houston also increased borrowing over the period, issuing $90 million in
1974 and $160 million in 1980. Throughout the period, federal aid also
increased steadily.
Regression Results
The unlagged model produced an R2 of 45 percent (F-ratio = 6.6), while
the lagged models produced an R2 of 60.8 percent (F-ratio = 11.6). In the
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unlagged model, the federal aid term was significant while the debt term
was not. In the lagged model, however, the only the debt term was
significant. Since this was one of the only instances where the two models
produced different findings, both are included for discussion.
CAPOUT = 30.8M + .698 FEDAID + .101 DEBT
(2.56) (.81)
CAPOUT = 20.3 M + .321 FEDAID + .391 MADEBT
(1.18) (2.63)
These findings suggest that spending on infrastructure is influenced by both
federal aid and debt. The unlagged shows that federal aid and outlays tend
to occur in the same year. The lagged model shows that debt lags behind
outlays by at least one year.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The fact that both debt and federal aid are significantly related to
outlays suggests that even Houston, a relatively prosperous and growing
area, is likely to encounter some hardship in financing infrastructure as
federal aid is cut. Between 1974 and 1982, federal assistance was quite
stable, showing little of the wide fluctuations as in some of the other
cities. Given the tremendous growth in Houston and the accompanying
expansion of capital needs, the large volume of debt issued in 1980
indicates that Houston already is on its way to expanding its infrastructure.
Indianapolis
Soco-econom/c Trends
Although the metropolitan area grew by about 5 percent, Indianapolis
lost about 6 percent of its population during the period 1970-80. With only
2.88 persons per acre, Indianapolis is one of the most sparsely populated
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cities n the United States. About 54 percent of the households in this city
owned their homes in 1980, which was high when compared to the 37 city
average of 44 percent. The city's per capita income of $7585 was quite
close to the mean for all cities ($7294).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
For the 15 year span of 1965 to 1979, Indianapolis experienced
modest incremental growth in capital spending, increasing from about $10
million to $60 million in annual outlays. Then, in 1980 and 1981, capital
spending jumped up to almost $130 million. In 1979, Indianapolis floated a
$72 million bond issue, the largest offering made during the 18 year period.
In addition to the large amount of borrowed funds, the city's
intergovernmental revenues peaked in 1981.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-15), Indianapolis increased spending in
the early 1970s and in the early 1980s. During these periods, this city
spent between $20 and $40 million (in real dollars) on infrastructure. Over
the period, there was a steady and noticeable increase in federal aid. Debt,
on the other hand, was more much more irregular, with large issuances
occurring much more sporadically over the period.
Regression Results
Although the lagged model did yield a slightly higher R2 value, the
lagging of of the debt term did not produce a significant t-value. In both the
lagged and unlagged models, outlays were positively and significantly
related to federal aid. The lagged model produced an R2 of 61.8 percent (F-
ratio = 12.13).
CAPOUT = 14.7 M + .417 FEDAID + .262 MADEBT
(4.91) (1.40)
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These results suggest that federal aid was the most important factor in
explaining capital outlays in Indianapolis. In inspecting the graph of
outlays, debt and aid, (Figure V111-15), it is apparent that debt played an
important role in financing infrastructure in 1972, when federal aid was
virtually non-existent.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
While the region appears to be stable, in terms of growth and income,
the dependency on federal aid does spell trouble in the years ahead. While
the city issued over $30 million in debt in the late 70s, it still has one of
the lowest levels of per capita borrowing in the country (approximately $26
annually). Whether this low level of borrowing is more a function of the
availability of federal funds, or, because of difficulties enountered in the
bond market, remains yet to be seen.
Kansas City
SocIo-economic Trends
With a density of two persons per acre, Kansas City has one of the
lowest densities among large cities in America. Although the region grew a
modest 4 percent during the 1970s, Kansas City's population dropped by
almost 12 percent. A city with relatively high homeownership, (53
percent), Kansas City is governed by the city-manager form of government.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal A/d
If not for one year, 1977, Kansas City would have exhibited a virtually
flat capital spending profile, fluctuating between $20 million and $30
million annually. In 1977, however, Kansas City's capital outlays shot up to
$140 million. Intergovermental aid increased over the entire period, with a
slight peak in 1977. Kansas City's debt profile, on the other hand, was quite
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unusual. The city floated one massive bond issue in 1968 ($1 10 million) and
smaller issues ($20-$40 million) in 1971 and 1974. The city issued
virtually no debt throughout the mid 70s and early 1980s.
Even in real dollars (see Figure VIII-16), the lag between debt and
outlays is quite pronounced. On the other hand, there does appear to be a
pattern of steadily increasing federal aid which generally accompanied the
growth in capital spending.
Regression Results
The pattern of borrowing for Kansas City does not appear to meet the
general specifications of either the lagged or unlagged models. In
particular, the nine year lag between the largest debt issue and the largest
capital outlay is longer than the observed lags in other cities. In addition,
while federal aid increased gradually over the 18 year period, capital
outlays exhibited much more wide fluctuations.
It was, therefore, not surprising to find R2 values of only 2 to 5
percent. These findings suggest that the pattern of decision-making is
different in Kansas City than in other cities.
Assessnment of Capiotal S,oendig Record
The fact that the region is growing while the central city is
decreasing indicates that Kansas City will need to re-examine its spending
priorities. Although the ability of the city to finance its own
improvements may decline, the pressures to provide infrastructure with
region wide beneits is likely to increase. Since Kansas City has already
demonstrated some capacity for long-range planning (i.e., the nine year gap
between debt and outlays), perhaps this city will be able raise the
neceassary funds through the long-term bond market. A point of some
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concern, however, s the fact that between 1974 and 1982, Kansas City
Issued virtually no debt whatsoever.
Long Beach
Soclo-econom/c Trends
While the city grew by a little more than one-half of a percent, the
Long Beach metropolitan area grew by 15 percent between 1970 and 1980.
This city was run by a city manager, had a relatively young housing stock
(20 percent built after 1969), and had a below average percentage of non-
white residents (25 percent).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Long Beach follows a pattern of capital spending characteristic of
many sunbelt areas: relatively low spending through the 60s and early 70s,
slight increases in the mid-70s, and heavy outlays in the 1980s. Between
1976 and 1981, Long Beach's capital budget grew from $40 million to over
$100 million. Over the same time period, annual borrowing grew from less
than $10 million to over $85 million. While state aid increased over the
entire period, federal aid peaked in 1980.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-17), Long Beach's pattern of spending
is quite different from its actual spending. Once accounting for inflation,
the pattern of capital spending appears to be more constant. There were
two poeriods of heavy spending: one in the early 70's and the other in the
early 80's.
Regress/on Results
The unlagged model performed much better than the lagged model.
The R2 for the unlagged model was 36.7 percent (F-ratio = 4.35), compared
to only 21 percent for the lagged model. This suggest that Long Beach is a
-256-
Figure VIII-17.
I BPI--, z )I cl = ~!- dZ
F-DERAL AID:, DEST, AND OTLANYS
~~~~~~~~~1~  ~ ~  ~ !
IA~~~~~~~- ,.  / /1/ otl.al! ;~ :/ 
¢ i '",, /
' J W / / ,, / \ ./\
·' \l,I h~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~q
., , ,
, / \.I
I'I . t I
65 88 57 8 59 70 71 72 73 74 75 75 77 75 79 B0 81
3 FEERAL 4AI 4- GEST iS2ULED
- CAPITL ', OUTL-"Y
-257-
40
30
25
0
n
z
z
0C
20
15
t1 OI
0
i nN. ~- A , n;
city in which debt and outlays, more often than not, occur in same year.
Federal aid was not significant in neither model.
CAPOUT = 18.5 M + .087 FEDAID + .398 DEBT
(.47) (2.46)
These results suggest that in Long Beach debt is used more regularly than
federal aid to finance capital outlays.
Assessment of Capital Soending Record
The fact Long Beach is part of the Los Angeles metropolitan area
presents both constraints and opportunities. On one hand, regional growth
can increase Long Beach's capital requirements. On the other hand, because
of the existence of other cities (e.g. Los Angeles), there are opportunities
for sharing the costs of infrastructure.
Los Angeles
Soc io-economic Trends
Sharing the same metropolitan area with Long Beach, the city of Los
Angeles grew by more than 5 percent during the 1980s, while the region's
population increased by 15 percent. With a per capita income of $8422, the
city had a higher level of personal income than most of the other large
cities. About 38 percent of its residents were non-white. Thirty-eight
percent of its residents were homeowners.
Trends in Out/ays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Like other west coast cities, Los Angeles' capital spending grew
mostly in the 1980s, increasing from about $175 million in the late 70s to
over $300 million in 1982. In 1980, the city issued approximately $650
million in long term debt, the largest amount ever issued in a single year.
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Previous large issuances (Approximately $350 million) occurred in 1973
and 1977. State aid to Los Angeles peaked in 1979 (due to the Proposition
13 bailout), while federal aid peaked in 1978.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-18), the heaviest capital outlays
occurred in 1973, two years after the city issued about $160 million in
long-term debt. The other major outlay occurred in 1977, one year before a
substantial increase in federal aid, and three years before the largest debt
issue ever undertaken ($260 million).
Given the fact that the largest outlays occurred in 1973, at a time
when federal aid was still quite small, and, given the fact the other large
outlay (1977) occurred before large increases in debt and aid, the two
models are not likely to produce highly significant results.
Regression Results
Neither model produced an R2 of more than 8.7 percent. As
structured, these equations were poor predictors of Los Angeles' capital
spending record. The heavy investment in the early 70's and the tendency
for outlays to occur before either debt or federal aid, may have contributed
to the poor performance of the two models.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The capital requirements of city such as Los Angeles are vast and
difficult to predict with much certainty. There does, however, appear to be
a great deal of fluctuation in how much Los Angeles spends on
infrastructure. In constant dollars, annual spending ranged between $280
million and $60 million! Although such wide fluctuations may not
necessarily be indicative of a shortage per se, the fact that there is no
readily distinquishable pattern of investment is somewhat disconcerting.
One would expect that a city which functions as the center of region
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experience growth in Dopulatlon and growth, would, over time exhibit a
pattern of increasing capital investment.
Memphis
Soc/o-economic Trends
In 1980, there were about 646,000 people in Memphis, an increase of
23 percent over the 1970 population. This city grew even faster than its
metropolitan area, which only increased by 9 percent during the 1970s. Only
14 percent of its housing stock was built before 1940, and over 20 percent
was built after 1969. Forty-eight percent of its residents in 1980 were
non-white.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and FederalAid
Memphis experienced three periods of heavy capital investment: 1971,
1975-76, and 1981-82. During these peak years, capital outlays ranged
between $60 million and $75 million. In spite of the fact that Memphis had
three peaks in capital spending, this city had only one prominent peak in
borrowing in 1977, when it issued over $200 million in long term debt. In
all other years, Memphis borrowed no more than $60 million. Trends in
capital spending corresponded closely with state aid receipts. Federal aid,
however, remained at less than $10 million annually, until 1982, when it
jumped to approximately $45 million.
When inflation is accounted for (see Figure VII I-19), Memphis appears
to have one very prominent issuance of long term debt in 1977 ($120
million). While during the early years of the series, there appears to be a
close match between outlays and debt, in later years, the strongest
relationship appeared to be between debt and federal aid.
Regresson Results
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The R2 values for both models (unlagged and lagged) ranged between 5
to 6 percent. Neither the federal aid term nor the debt term was found to be
statistically significant. The fact that neither model explained much of
the variation over time in capital investment suggest that Memphis may be
one of those cities which first makes a capital outlay and then arranges for
financing (either through the use of debt or through federal financing).
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The fact that Memphis experienced such large and rapid growth during
the 70s, was, in no way reflected in its pattern of capital spending. The
fact that outlays,in real terms, decreased over the period, suggests that
this city is in for a period of heavy capital investment in the years ahead.
While the issuance of debt in 1977 may represent an instance of "interest
rate watching," the proceeds could also be applied to either past outlays, or,
more likely, to planned improvements which have not yet been undertaken.
Milwaukee
Socio-economic Trends
The City of Milwaukee lost over 11 percent of its population during
the 1970s, although the region remained pretty much unchanged (it lost
about 5,000 of its 1.5 million residents). With 42 percent of its housing
built before 1940, Milwaukee had a homeownership rate of about 45
percent, and a non-white population of about 26 percent.
Trends in Outlays, Debt andFederal Aid
Capital spending increased in 1969-70 and again 1979-82. The period
1971-78 was marked by relatively low spending (less than $40 million), but
in 1982, capital outlays (at $75 million) had nearly doubled. Milwuakee's
debt history, however, contained much more fluctation, with peaks that
-263-
occurred in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1978, and 1981. In these years, the city
borrowed between $35 million and $70 million.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-20), Milwaukee's heaviest capital
investment occured in 1969-70, on year after the city issued more than $40
million in long-term debt. Capital spending continued to drop from that
point on. The slight increase in outlays in the late 70's corresponded to a
rise in debt.
Regression Results
Although federal aid grew in the early 70's, this growth happened
after the major period of capital investment. In addition, when federal aid
was on the decline in 1979-82, capital spending in Milwaukee actually
picked up. Given these patterns, the regressions are not likely to produce
the best of results.
The unlagged regression produced an R2 of 55 percent ( F-ratio =
9.02), compared to one of 33 percent produced by the lagged model. In both
models, federal aid and debt had significant, negative coefficients.
CAPOUT = $46.4 M -. 746 FEDAID - .474 DEBT
(-3.89) (-2.76)
These negative terms are quite surprising. Virtually no other city produced
negative coefficients on both the debt and aid terms.
Rather than interpret these negative coefficients as evidence of a
inverse relationship between outlays and aid or outlays and debt, it makes
the most sense to attribute these results to faulty model specification.
This is a clear instance where the lagging of both the debt and aid terms
would serve to improve the overall predictive power of the equations.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
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The regression results, though statistically significant run counter to
both established theory as well as precedents set by other cities in the
sample. Several points do emerge from this analysis. First, Milwaukee's
level of capital investment appears to have leveled off since its growth in
the early 70's. Second, the city has borrowed, albeit, smaller amounts than
in the early part of the time series, throughout the decade of the 70s. From
inspection of the graph of outlays, debt and aid, it would appear that
Milwaukee's capital investment has moved towards a pattern of steady
state, a necessary pattern in view of a declining population.
Minneapolis
Socio-economic Trends
Although the metropolitan area gew by more than 8 percent,
Minneapolis' population fell by about 15 percent during the 1970s. This
city's per capita income, $7940, was higher than the 37 city average. With
57 percent of its housing stock built before 1940, Minneapolis was one of
the older cities. Minneapolis had the lowest proportion of non-white
residents among the 37 cities; only 12 percent of its population was non-
white in 1980.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
The first major period of increased capital spending occurred in
1976-77, when the city expended over $45 million in capital outlays.
Outlays dropped sharply by 1979 to less than $30 million, but rebounded to
in the 80s. The heaviest borrowing occurred in 1978 ($120 million), 1980
($122 million), and 1982 ($150 million). While state aid has increased
steadily, Minneapolis' federal aid peaked in 1979.
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In real dollars (see Figure VIII-21) Minneapolis displayed a pattern of
steadily increasing outlays until the mid-70's. After 1977, however,
outlays, in real terms, decreased markedly. This decrease occurred in spite
of large federal grants and huge debt issuances. From inspection of the
graph of outlays, debt and aid, it is not clear as to whether Minneapolis
issues debt before or after making capital outlays. There does appear to be
-a readily identifiable relationship between outlays and federal aid.
Regresston Results
Both models (unlagged and lagged) produced R2 values in the range of
2.9 to 3.6 percent. These unimpressive results suggest that the model, as
specified, does not work well in Minneapolis.
Two factors apparently weakened the regressions: 1) the massive
amounts of debt issued during the late 1970s, and 2) the decrease in capital
outlays at a time when federal aid increased (1977-79). In viewing Figure
VIII-21, it appears that during the late 1970s, capital spending was
unusally low, given the large amounts the city borrowed and the large
federal grants it received. The expected level of capital spending, based on
previous levels of spending has been drawn on to the graph. At a minimum,
Minneapolis has underspent on infrastructure by $10 to $20 million,
annually.
Assessment of Capita/ Spending Record
Although the region grew, the loss of population in Minneapolis
suggests that an estimate of capital needs based on extrapolation of past
trends may not necessarily be accurate. The age of Minneapolis'
infrastructure, as well as the relatively high level of personal income,
however, may serve to enlarge demands for capital improvements.
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Rather than view the difference between the high level of debt and
low level of capital investment as a deficit, perhaps a better way to
understand this disparity is in terms of a longer range time perspective. In
other words, the large volume of debt in the late 70's may have been issued
to finance large Infrastructure projects which will be undertaken in the
near future. The relationship between debt and outlays would therefore
balance out over time. Such interruptions between planned debt and outlay
sequences are likely occurences because of the somewhat arbitrary nature
of the years chosen for study (1965 to 1982). While the period is large
enough to capture many of the long-term relationships between debt and
outlays, obviously there will be some at the beginning or end of the time
series which may have been, as n the case of Minneapolis, truncated.
Newark
Socio-economlc Trends
Newark lost almost 14 percent of its population in 1970s, while Its
metropolitan area lost only 4 percent during the same period. This city
showed all of the signs of decline: lowest per capita income of the 37
cities ($4525), large non-white population (67 percent), lowest
homeownership of largest cities (19 percent), old housing stock (47 percent
built before 1940, and low proportion of college graduate (6 percent). With
almost 22 persons per acre, Newark was also one of the most densely
populated cities.
Trends n Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Newark's greatest capital spending occurred in 1969, when it
expended nearly $225 million. Capital spending declined ever since,
although Newark did manage to expend over $175 million in 1974, 1975, and
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1982. Newark issued large amounts of debt in 1972 and 1981
(approximatley $30 million), but failed to issue any debt in 1965, 1967,
1975, 1979, and 1980. While state aid has grown steadily, federal aid
peaked for two years in 1977-78.
After accounting for inflationary effects, (see Figure VIII-22), the
extent to which capital spending has declined is all the more apparent. In
spite of substantial federal assistance in the mid-seventies, outlays
continued to drop. The fact that between 1974 and 1980, capital spending
fell in each consecutive years suggests that Newark has postponed making
necessary capital improvements.
Regression Results
The regressions show a strong, postive, statistically significant
relationship between debt and outlays, but a negative (though not
significant) relationship between aid and outlays. The lagged model
produced an R2 of 40.5 percent (F-ratio = 5.11), almost double the
explanatory power of the unlagged model (R2 =21.7 percent).
The negative coeffient on federal aid is probably best interpretted as
evidence of Newark's persistent deferral of capital improvements, 'a
deferral which continued in spite of large and frequent federal grants.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The fact that Newark faces a severe pattern of capital disinvestment
is compounded by a range of socio-economic problems: low personal
income, old age of infrastructure, and a large, non-white population in need
of public services.
It is clear too that Newark's ability to fend for itself has weakened
over time. During the early years of the time series, Newark issued
relatively large amounts of debt one to two years in advance of making
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capital outlays. In later years, borrowing levels dropped quite noticeably.
The continued loss of federal assistance will undoubtedly place greater
stress on Newark's system of revenue collection. As such, it is hard to
envision ust how this city will be able to establish itself as a credible
borrower in the years ahead.
New Orleans
Soc/o-economfc Trends
Although the New Orleans metropolitan area grew by about 14
percent, the central city declined by 5.9 percent. Its population density
was 4.4 persons per acre, below the 37-city average of 17.4 persons per
acre. In 1980, New Orleans had a non-white population of 57 percent.
Approximately 38 percent of its housing stock was built before 1940.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Capital outlays peaked once in 1976 at ($58 milion) and increased to
over $70 million by 1982. The highest levels of borrowing (more than $80
million, annually) occurred in 1980 and 1981, just prior to the highest
levels of capital spending. Intergovernmental aid peaked both in 1976 and
again in the early 1980s.
Capital spending, in real terms (see Figure VII-23) fluctuated
between $0 and $35 million over the 18 year period. Both debt and outlays
fluctuated so widely that it was difficult to determine whether outlays
came before or after debt. What can be said is that while the order is
unclear, the movements of debt, outlays, and federal aid appear to be closely
tied.
Regress/on Results
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As formulated, the regression equations performed poorly. R2 values
ranged between 5.0 and 5.1 percent. Neither equation could muster a single
significant coefficient on neither the federal aid nor debt term.
New Orleans is an example of a city which simply just does not
respond to the framework established to explain outlays and debt. The fact
that the linear model fails so completely is, perhaps, reason to suspect that
decision-making in New Orleans is different from other cities.
Assessment of Capita Spending Record
One of the striking features of New Orleans' graph of outlays, debt
and aid, is the extent to which outlays appear to have reach some kind of
steady state--at approximatley $25 million, annually. One question which
arises is: will growth in the region, in spite of apparent stabilization in the
central city, lead to increased demands for infrastructure in New Orleans?
How long can the pattern of constant spending on capital outlays last, given
the deterioration of existing infrastructure? These are questions which
decision-makers are likely to face in the coming years.
New York City
Socio-economic Trends
With a population of over 7 million in 1980, New York was the largest
of the 37 cities. Its metropolitan area was also the largest (17 million).
During the decade of 1970s, New York City lost about 10 percent of its
population. The metropolitan area lost approximately 4 percent. With 37
persons per acre, New York was the most densely populated city in the
country. Forty-nine percent of the housing was built before 1940, and only
22 percent of its households were homeowners.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
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New York's record of capital outlays and long term borrowing is
closely related to the fiscal crisis it encountered in the mid-70s. Capital
spending grew steadily between 1970 and 1975. Borrowing also increased
steadily until 1974 when it dropped for the first time since 1966. Between
1975 and 1976, borrowing skyrocketed to approximately $4.5 billion, when
the city issued long term securities as part of its financial reorganization.
Capital spending plummeted for the crisis years (1976-78). Long term debt
reached an all-time low in 1980, but federal and state aid continued to
increase. Capital spending and borrowing made a modest recovery in 1981-
82.
Even after adjusting all the values for inflation (see Figure VII-24,)
New York's picture is clouded by the fiscal disturbances it encountered in
the mid-seventies. In real terms, annual debt issuances fell from over $1.0
billion to about $600 million. Then, in 1976, debt skyrocketed to over $2.5
billion, as the city underwent massive financial reorganization (see Chapter
3 for detailed discussion). In the meantime, capital outlays plummeted.
The relationship between debt, aid, and outlays, which up until the point of
the fiscal crisis appeared somewhat consistent, suddenly fell apart.
Regression Results
Perhaps it was a bit unrealistic to expect New York City to behave
like other cities in the U.S. It was, therefore, not surprising to find that the
regression equations could only explain about 2 to 3 percent of the total
variation in capital outlays. As such neither the lagged model nor the
unlagged model were of use in this analysis.
The city's fiscal crisis brought much to bear upon the appearance of
the graph of outlays, debt and aid. In more recent years, the city has turned
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the corner on its past, and should, eventually, acquire a pattern of spending
and borrowing in which the models should have more relevence.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
New York's capital needs are massive. In spite of its size, and
tremendous revenue generating capacity, it too will suffer in the wake of
the New Federalism. Restoring to order its fiscal house is a necessary first
step to ensure that it can borrow to meet its future needs. New York is an
example of city in which capital needs will continue to expand, first
because of its role as a regional, if not national center of social and
economic activity, and second because of the ontinuous deterioriation of
capital stock. New York's massive size, density, and the age of its
infrastructure suggest that capital needs will continue to grow, further
widening the gap between needs and ability to finance them.
Oakland
Socio-eonomic Trends
In 1980, Oakland had a population of 339,000. This represented about
6 percent less than its 1970 population. While the city lost population,
the metropolitan area grew by 13 percent. Oakland can be described as a
city with a relatively low population density (9 persons per acre), large
non-white population (61 percent), with a size proportion (41 percent) of
its housing built before 1940. Oakland was also run by the city manager
form of government.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and FederalAid
Oakland experienced three peaks in capital spending: 1972, 1976, and
1981. The city experienced slight peaks in borrowing and intergovermental
assistance in 1972 and 1976. The heaviest borrowing occured in 1979 and
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1980 ($55 milllion and $45 million). Like other California cities, Oakland
experienced a boost in state aid n 1979, following Proposition 13.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-25), Oakland's heaviest capital
spending occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There were also
noticeable bulges in spending in 1976 and 1980-81. Over time, there has
been nceased use of federal aid and debt in financing these improvements.
Regression Results
The lagged model produced an R2 of 37.1 percent (F-ratio = 4.42),
almost double the R2 produced by the unlagged model. While the lagged
model did produce a positive coefficient on both terms, only the debt term
was statistically significant.
CAPOUT = 12.3 M + .018 FEDAID + .817 DEBT
(.13) (2.69)
It was surprising to find that Oakland's federal aid was not more
significantly related to capital spending.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
One of the more unique features of Oakland is the extent to which
federal aid fluctuated so widely across the time series. In many cities, the
pattern of federal assistance was much more steady, gradualy increasing or
decreasing over a number of years. In Oakland, however, federal aid doubles
in a single year, then drops below previous levels, only to jump up to new
heights in the next year. Simiarly, capital spending exhibits this pattern of
rising and falling.
While only the debt term was statistically significant, there is
evidence support the contention that the loss of federal funds will hamper
Oakland's ability to finance its capital outlays. First, relative to borrowing,
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Oakland has received extraordinarily large federal grants at key Doints Drior
to, or immediately following large capital expenditures. Second, the uneven
distribution of federal grants too closely resembles the lumpy pattern of
financing of capital projects rather than "flatter" pattern of spending
associated with operating budgets. In all likelihood, a large proportion of
the federal grants went to finance infrastructure in Oakland.
Oklahoma City
Soc/o-economc Trends
Oklahoma City has the distinction of being the most sparsely
populated city with a population greater than 300,000. There was less than
1 person per acre in 1980. Although its population grew by over 10 percent,
the pace of growth for the region was 20 percent, or double the rate of the
central city. With only 16 percent of its housing stock built before 1940
and close to 30 percent built since 1969, Oklahoma City showed all the
signs of a growing city in the 1970s.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Over the period 1965-1976, Oakland spent about $20 million annually
on capital projects. The first increase occurred in 1977, when spending for
that year surpassed $50 million. Capital spending continued to grow to a
high point of nearly $100 million in 1981. In 1982, however, capital
spending dropped to just below the $50 million mark. Oakland exhibited a
fluctuating pattern of borrowing over the 18 year period. Debt issuances
peaked in 1969 ($45 million). There were smaller peaks in 1971, 1974-75,
1978, and 1981.
In many ways the graph of outlays, debt and aid (see Figure VIII-26)
for Oklahoma bears some resemblance to Kansas City's graph. Both cities
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issued large amounts of debt in the early 60's and 70's, when interest rates
were low. Also evident is the relationship, particularly in the later years
of the series, between outlays and debt.
Regressfon Results
The unlagged model produced the highest R2 value, 51.5 percent (F-
ratio = 7.96). The federal aid term was positive and significantly related.
However, the debt term was negative, though not statistically significant.
When the lagged model equation was run, although a lower R2 value resulted,
there was a significant federal aid term, and a positive debt term (although,
unfortunately, the debt term was again not statistically significant).
CAPOUT = 13.3 M + .623 FEDAID - .08 DEBT
(3.87) (-.65)
CAPOUT = 10.6 M + .639 FEDAID + .06 MADEBT
(3.90) (.33)
The use of the two year moving average helped to smooth out some of the
lag betweeen debt and outlays. Perhaps a three or four year moving average
may have even produced a statistically significant coefficient.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
The available data suggest that Oklahoma City will experience a
growth in capital needs. Not only is the central city growing, so too is the
region. As a result, there will be increased pressure to allow for a higher
density of development and to build more public facilities.
In real terms, Oklahoma City has been increasing its level of capital
spending. The methods of financing appear to have changed over the time
series. In the early years, most of the capital outlays was financed with
debt. In 1977, federal aid takes over as the primary means of financing
infrastructure. As federal cuts increase in size, Oklahoma City may find it
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necessary to revert back to borrowing as the primary means of financing
capital outlays.
Omaha
Socio-economic Trends
While Omaha's metropolitan area grew by 5 percent, Omaha itself lost
almost 10 percent of its population in the 1970s. A city where only 14
percent of the population was non-white in 1980, Omaha had one of the
highest rates of homeownership (58 percent), surpassed only by Phoenix and
Toledo. The smallest of the 37 cities with more than 300,000 in 1980
population, Omaha also had a below average population density (6 persons
per acre).
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Omaha's capital spending peaked in 1975, at approximately $70
million, two years after it borrowed approximately $33 million. Another
slight peak in capital spending occured in 1978, the same year that Omaha's
federal aid reached an all-time high.
Inflation-adjusted figures (see Figure VII1-27), show that Omaha's
heaviest spending occured in 1974, when it expended over $50 million on
capital projects. Other large outlays occurred in 1969 and 1977. For the
most part, federal aid increased steadily over the 18 year period.
Regression Results
The lagged model produced the best R2 value, 43.9 percent (F-ratio =
5.87), while the unlagged regression could muster only 17.8 percent. In
Omaha, debt, more so than federal aid, was significantly related to outlays.
CAPOUT = 6.6 M + .129 FEDAID + 1.31 MADEBT
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Omaha was a particularly interesting test of the model, because its pattern
of outlays, over time, was quite irregular. Even with Its extremely "lumpy"
appearance, Omaha's spending could be explained through the use of this
model.
Assessment of Capital SpendinRngecord
The fact that debt is so strongly related to outlays while federal aid
is not, represents both good news and bad news for city such as Omaha. On
the one hand, it proves that this city is capable of planning and arranging
financing through the bond market for infrastructure. On the other hand, it
raises some serious questions as to what the federal funds were used for--
since there is no strong connection between capital outlays and federal aid.
If the weak relationship between aid and outlays is indicative of "lost
opportunities," then the onset of the New Federalism represents, even more
so, foregone funding for infrastructure.
Because Omaha's metropolitan area is growing, because of the low
population density, and because of the high rates of homeownership, this
city is likely to experience some enlargement of capital needs.
Philadelphia
Socio-economlc Trends
With a population of 1.6 million, Philadelphia is one of the largest and
oldest cities in the nation. Only Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York were
larger. Although the central city population dropped by 13 percent, the
metropolitan area lost only one percent of its population during the 1970-
80 period. With 20.5 persons per acre, Philadelphia is one of the most
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densely populated or the 37 cities. Fifty-eight percent of its housing stock
was built before 1940. Forty-one percent of its residents were non-white.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal aid
Capital outlays peaked in 1980 ($350 million), following a period of
heavy borrowing, 1976-79 in which the city issued $220 million to $240
million in long term debt. Simultaneously, the city began receiving
increased state and federal aid. The high level of borrowing and federal aid
received in 1982 suggests the possibility of increased capital spending in
the coming years.
In examing the graph of inflation-adjusted outlays, debt, and federal
aid (See Figure VIII-28) it is apparent that Philadelphia had particularly
heavy outlays in 1970, 1975, and 1979. It is difficult, on the basis of this
graph alone, to determine if debt was issued before or after outlays.
Similarly, while periods of increased federal aid occurred close to the time
of large outlays, the matter of sequence is unresolved.
Regression Results
Perhaps it was because of the indeterminant order of outlays, debt,
and aid, that the regressions yielded such unimpressive results. Although
the lagged model managed an R2 of 26.8 percent (F-ratio = 2.75), this
equation did produce a debt term which was just barely statistically
significant (t-value = 2.33) at the 95 percent confidence level. The
unlagged regressions produced an R2 value of merely 15.1 percent. Neither
term on the unlagged model was significant.
There is some evidence, gleaned from inspecting Figure VIII-28, that
the lag between debt and outlays may be either longer than one or two years
and, also, outlays may occur before either debt or federal aid. Further data,
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Figure VIII-28.
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perhaps, only available from Philadelphia financial officers, are needed in
order to make a more definitive assessment.
Assessment of Capital Spendhng Record
As a large old city, experiencing some population decline, but located
within a stable metropolitan area, Philadelphia will encounter a pattern of
changing capital needs characteristic of many cities in the frostbelt region
of the country. While pressures to provide infrastructure to accomodate
regional needs expands, the ability to finance these improvements will be
hampered both by the loss of federal aid and the disadvantageous position of
the central city vis-a-vis the surrounding suburbs. There is particular
reason for concern in Philadelphia: since 1976, with the exception of one
year (1982), this city has issued progressively less and less debt. Whether
the increase in borrowing which began in 1982 continues remains to be seen.
Phoenix
Soclo-economic Trends
Phoenix, which grew by more than 35 percent over the decade 1970-
80, was fastest growing of the 37 largest cities. The Phoenix metropolitan
area also grew by 55 percent during the same period. With a density of less
than 5 persons per acre, and less than 5 percent of its housing stock built
before 1940, Phoenix displayed all the characteristics of a growing city.
Phoenix is run by the city manager form of government.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Phoenix displayed a familar pattern of capital spending: low capital
spending throughout the 60s and mid 70s, and rapidly increasing
expenditures in the late 70s and early 1980s. between 1970 and 1982,
capital outlays grew from less than $20 million to over $130 million,
-288-
annually. Phoenix's borrowing patterns exhibited similar growth, peaking in
1975 ($80 million) and 1978 ($160 million). Steadily increasing state and
federal aid helped Phoenix to increase its capital outlays in the 1980s.
In viewing Figure VIII-29 (graph of outlays, debt and aid in real
dollars), it is apparent that Phoenix is a city in which there is a strong
relationship between the three financial variables. There was steady,
almost linear growth in aid and outlays, and periodic swells in borrowing.
Phoenix paints almost a picture perfect model of how one expects debt, aid
and outlays to be related.
Regression Results
Both models produced R2 in excess of 82 percent (F-ratio = 34.5). The
unlagged model performed slightly better. The unlagged model, however,
produced a negative debt coefficient. Lagging the debt term changed the
sign on the coefficient, although the two year moving average failed to
produce a statistically significant beta coefficient.
CAPOUT = 17.1 M + .95 FEDAID + .05 MADEBT
(3.79) (.30)
It was somewhat surprising to find that federal aid is strongly related to
outlays in Phoenix. The fact that debt term is not statistically significant
is probably a function of the lag between debt and outlays which in many
instances exceeds one year. As such, a different smoothing technique may
yield a more significant debt coefficient.
Assessment of Captal Spending Record
Because of the almost phenomenal level of growth occurring in
Phoenix, there has, undoubtedly, been a tremendous expansion in capital
needs. Perhaps the best way to view Phoenix's record is in terms of a
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comparision with a city, such as Detroit, or Cleveland, which is in a
declining region of the country. Phoenix represents, in this light, an area
of considerable advantage: not only is there growth in population and
income, but also an increased level of public investment. Because of its
growth and prosperity, Phoenix is able to take on more debt. Because it has
fewer socio-economic problems, more of the federal aid went towards
capital spending. With greater capital investment, Phoenix can attract
even more population and jobs. The fact that Phoenix is one of the only
cities with such unmistakeable growth in outlays and debt is, in effect,
empirical confirmation of its comparative economic advantage.
Portland
Soclo-economc Trends
Although the City of Portland lost about 4 percent of its population,
the metropolitan area grew by 24 percent. Portland has a sizeable amount
of older housing--46 percent of its housing stock was built before 1940.
Fifty percent of its residents are homeowners.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Portland's capital spending grew from just over $5 million in 1965 to
over $20 million in 1970, to over $40 million in the early 1980s. Portland
exhibits a pattern of slow growth until the late 70s when capital outlays
nearly doubled. Federal revenue to Portland peaked n 1978, Just as it
launched its own program of debt financed capital projects. The city
borrowed more than $60 million annually from 1978 to 1981.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-30), Portland's heaviest capital
outlays occurred in 1968-69, when the city spent more than $20 million on
infrastructure. Other periods of heavy investment occurred in 1972, and in
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Figure VIII-30.
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1978 to 1980. In general, debt issuances and federal aid allotments
occurred at about the same time as large outlays.
Regression Results
The results were disappointing; R2 values equaled 20.9 percent for the
lagged model and 30.1 percent (F-ratio = 3.23) for the unlagged model.
Several factors contributed to the unimpressive results. Although the
heaviest capital investment occurred in the late 1960s, the largest volume
of debt was issued in the late 1970s, at a time when federal aid was at an
all-time high. Moreover, in some cases it appeared as though debt was
issued after and not before outlays.
Assessment of Captal Spending Record
The fact that Portland is in a growing region as well as being a city
with a relatively old housing stock, suggests that there may be some need
for increased capital investment. Although outlays have declined, in real
terms, since the late 1960s, there has been a general growth in debt,
especially towards the end of the time series. While some of this debt may
go towards the financing of projects already built, more than likely, this
debt will go towards new projects which have yet to show up as outlays.
San Antonio
Soc/o-econom/c Trends
San Antonio grew by almost 26 percent during the period 1970-80.
Its rate of growth even outpaced its metropolitan area which grew only 21
percent. While showing many of the famliar signs of growth (26 percent of
its housing was built after 1969, and 56 percent of its residents were
homeowners, San Antonio also had a very low per capita income ($5672).
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This city was the only city above 300,000 in population to be run by a
commission form of government.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Capital spending grew from $30 million to $40 million in 1976, to
$60 million in 1980, and to over $75 million in 1982. Accompanying this
steady rise in capital spending was a gradual growth in borrowing, from $25
million in 1967, to $100 million in 1975, to a peak of almost $300 million
in 1981. The similarity between San Anotonio's capital outlays and debt
profiles is quite striking. Capital outlays, debt and intergovernmental aid
increased most during the late 70s and early 80s.
Of all the cities examined, San Antonio had the highest debt to outlay
ratios, issuing often two to three times the annual volume of capital
outlays. The volume of debt in San Anotonio grew to exceptionally high
levels in the mid to late 1970s. Most of this debt was non-guaranteed debt,
issued for purposes other than infrastructure. For example in 1979, $150
million of the $151 million in long-term debt was non-guaranteed debt (only
$1 million was general obligation debt). In 1977, San Antonio issued $128
million in non-guaranteed debt, but only $21 million in general obligations.
As a result of its heavy usage of non-guaranteed debt (primarily to
finance home mortgages, industrial development, and other non-traditional
forms of public investment), the regression equations must be nterpretted
cautiously. In fact, the graph of outlays, debt and aid (see Figure VIII-31)
acquires a somewhat altered meaning. Rather than view the relationship
between debt and outlays in the manner of other cities, it makes more sense
to envision this relationship as indication of the extent to which debt is
used to finance non-traditional forms of infrastructure. Debt over and
above capital outlays, therefore, is likely to be non-guaranteed debt.
-294-
Figure VIII-31.
t.: "\ N " i_ ,7r N I 1-) Of 68I-,.AFE IiFiI , E T-I -N , ,'Tc.'
FMED~A,~.L AtD, DEST, AND 'OUTLr'A'-z
5 85 87 B 89 70 1 72 73 74. 75 7e 7 7 79 5 1 2
"Ea4R
4. DEBT SS U ED ;) CAF1T4L OU DLTL 4
-295-
110
90
0 -7'-
U
1
,m
-I -n
,D
"-'
z_
-c
.
IT
- C!
20
10
1 i~i U i~ A -
RegressIon Results
In spite of the obvious problems with using these models to explain
the relationship between outlays and debt, they produced high R2 values --
between 65 and 69 percent. In both models the debt term was positive and
statistically significant.
The fact that statistically significant results were attained is no
substitute for a clearly inappropriate model specification. In all
likelihood, the relationship between debt and outlays, in this instance is
spurious since most of the debt proceeds, by their very nature would not go
to public capital projects.
A clearly superior model would have regressed general obligation debt
on capital outlays. There are some problems with using this approach for all
cities. In many cities, there is a substantial volume of revenue bond
financing (which is counted towards the non-guaranteed debt total). In
these cities, debt goes towards the financing of self-liquating projects--
water systems, municipal recreational facilities, that do represent public
capital investments. As such, to examine only general obligation debt,
rather than total debt issued could lead to an undercounting of the volume of
debt applied to the infrastructure. Moreover, San Antonio, is somewhat
unique in terms of its zeal for non-guaranteed debt. As such, the decision
to use total debt issued, rather than simply general obligation debt seems
justified, at the possible expense of producing inaccurate estimates for
cities such San Antonio.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
In addition to sharing a growth rate similar to Phoenix, San Antonio
also exhibits a similar pattern of incrementally increasing outlays over the
18 year period. The fact capital needs have grown seems to be reflected in
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both the steady increase in capital investment as well as the volume of new
debt issued. Even though the debt may not all go towards infrastructure,
the fact that it is so large indicates a sizeable amount of economic activity
in San Antonio.
San Diego
Socio-economic Trends
San Diego's population grew from 697,000 in 1970 to over 876,000 in
1980. The region grew by 37 percent, surpassed only by growth in the
Phoenix metropolitan area. With only 13 percent of its housing built before
1940 and 33 percent built after 1969, San Diego also had an above average
per capita income ($8027). Forty-six percent of its residents were
homeowners.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Like other cities in the West, San Diego's capital budget grew most in
the 1980s, reaching $70 milion to $90 million annually. Between 1965 and
1977, capital spending fluctuated between $20 million and $40 million.
While the pattern of state and federal aid receipts was quite similar, San
Diego's borrowing fluctuated widely over the period. In fact, San Diego
borrowed more in 1968 ($27.5 million), than it did in any of the subsequent
peak years ( 1969, 1971, 1975, 1978, and 1981). In seven of the 18 years in
the series, San Diego issued no debt whatsoever.
In real dollars (see Figure V111-32), San Diego displays a pattern of
capital investment similar to other growing cities. Although there is one
pronouced peak in spending in 1971, there is a general increase in the level
of capital investment over time.
Regression Results
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Figure VIII-32.
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Neither model produced an P2 in excess'of 21.1 percent. Although the
lagged model performed slightly better, neither model produced a
statisticily significant coefficeint on either the debt or federal aid terms.
In reviewing the graph of outlays,.debt and aid, there is an apparent
lag between debt and outlays in excess of one or two years. As such, the
regression equations were not sensitive enough to detect the relationship
between debt and outlays in San Diego.
Assessment of Captal Spending Record
If the trend towards increased capital investment continues, then San
Diego will, most definitely, need to increase the volume of long-term debt
that it issues. Not since 1971, has this city issued more than $10 million in
long-term debt. In fact, during a number of years, San Diego issued no debt
whatsoever. Given proposed cuts in federal aid, the pattern of minimalist
borrowing is likely to become a characteristic of the past. Two points
suggest that borrowing is likely to increase. Given the fact that in 1966,
San Diego issued almost $30 million in long-term debt, it has some track
record in issuing relatively large bonds. These bonds, with maturities of 20
to 30 years, will shortly be completely paid off. Given its prosperity, its
growth, and its low levels of outstanding debt, San Diego stands out as an
excellent credit risk. It should have few problems in raising all the capital
it needs.
San Francisco
Soc/o-economc Trends
Among the largest cities in the country, San Francisco had the second
highest level of per capita income ($9267) behind only Seattle. With a
population density of 23 persons per acre, only New York City was more
densely populated. Although San Francisco lost over 5 percent of its
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population in the 1970s, its metropolitan area grew by 13 percent. Fifty-
eight percent of its housing was built before 1940, and 34 percent of its
residents were non-white.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Although San Francisco experienced a modest increase in capital
spending in 1971, the major growth in capital outlays occurred between
1976-82. Capital outlays grew from $60 million to over $200 million. San
Francisco borrowed large amounts in 1968 ($75 million), 1976 ($130
million), and 1979 ($200 million). Intergovernmental aid increased
steadily over the 18 year period.
When viewing the graph of outlays, debt and aid expressed in real
dollars (see Figure VIII-33), it is apparent that capital spending first
peaked in 1970 at over $70 million, and then again in the late 1970s at over
$80 miillion. The city issued large quantities of debt just prior to these
heavy capital outlays. From the mid-seventies, a general rise in federal aid
accompanied the growth in capital spending.
Regression Results
While the city generally issued debt two to three years prior outlays,
federal grants generally coincided on a year to year basis with capital
outlays. Thus, it was not surprising to find strong positive coefficients on
the federal aid terms, and positive (though not statistically significant)
coefficients on the debt terms. The lagged model, with an R2 of 64.8
percent (F-ratio = 13.81 percent) performed slightly better than the
unlagged model.
CAPOUT = 26.4 M + .527 FEDAID + .081 DEBT
(3.99) (.38)
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Figure VIII-33.
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These results suggest that San Francisco is heavily dependent upon federal
aid for the financing of infrastructure. Moreover, the relationship between
debt and outlays is complicated by both the irregular pattern of borrowing
as well as the lags between debt and outlays.
Assessment of Capita Spending Record
Located in rapidly growing metropolitan area, the demand public
improvements in San Francisco is likely to come not only from residents,
but from commuters and others who use this city as center of social and
economic activity. The relatively high personal income also suggests that
there may be a higher than normal willingness to pay for public
improvements and ammenitles. Adding to these conditions is also the
requirements associated with any large, densely populated city, with an
aged housing stock. As such, the pattern of increasing capital investment
characteristic of growing areas is likely to hold, if only to a somewhat
lesser degree, in San Francisco. While the debt term failed to turn up
significant in either equation, San Francisco has demonstrated a strong
capacity to issue large amounts of debt prior to making capital investment.
As federal aid continues to slip downward, this city will begin to borrow
increasingly large amounts.
Seattle
Socio-economic Trends
Although Seattle lost about 7 percent of its population during the
1970s, its metropolitan area grew by 14 percent. Seattle's per capita
income ($9282) was the highest among all 37 cities. A city with relatively
low population density (9 persons per acre), 40 percent of its housing was
-3 02-
built before 1940 and 10 percent was built after 1969. Seattle is run by the
city-manager form of government.
Trends n Outlays, Debt, and FederalAid
From 1965 to 1969 annual capital spending remained at less than $20
million. In the mid 70s, it grew to $40-50 million. The major increases,
however, occurred in 1981-82, when annual outlays exceeded $80 million.
While outlays peaked in the 80s, Seattle's debt peaked in 1974, when the
city issued about $90 million in long term debt. Other small peaks in
borrowing occurred in 1971, 1978, and 1982.
In real dollars (see Figure VIII-34), Seattle had two periods of heavy
capital investment: 1970-74 and 1980-82. During these years, the city
expended more than $30 million annually on capital improvements. Debt in
Seattle appears to have been issued well in advance of outlays. While
federal aid increased until the late seventies, there is no easily discernable
relationship between outlays and federal grants.
Regress/on Results
Neither model produced strong results. The R2 value on the unlagged
model(13.4 percent), however, was twice as high as the R2 value on the
lagged model (7.7 percent). While not significant at the 95 percent
confidence level, the regressions produced positive coefficients on both
federal aid and debt.
These results suggest that a lagged model utilizing a two year moving
average performs no better than the simple, unlagged model. The lags
between debt and outlay in Seattle, moreover, are generally more
complicated and longer than in other cities. For example, the 1974 debt
issue occurred at least six years beofe the next major capital outlay.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
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In spite or being a growing city, located in a growing metropolitan
area, Seattle displayed a relatively flat pattern of capital spending. One
would expect a greater level of investment, particularly given the sizeable
debt issued in the mid-seventies. Given the fact that Seattle has the
highest level of personal income among all 37 cities, one would expect a
greater willingness to pay for capital improvements. The prospects for
increased capital spending appear likely. Seattle, moreover, appears to be
in a strong enough financial position to avoid any major levels of unmet
capital needs.
St. Louis
Socfo-economc Trends
St. Louis, which lost over 27 percent of its population between 1970
and 1980, declined more than any other city in the country. The
metropolitan area dropped from 2.4 million persons to 2.3 million. Its per
capita income, $5880, was lower than all cities except Detroit, Baltimore,
Newark, and San Antonio. Sixty-one percent of its housing stock was built
before 1940. Forty-sxi percent of its residents were non-white.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, and Federal Aid
Between 1965 and 1974, capital spending in St. Louis remained fairly
flat at less than $20 million, annnually. Between 1975-79, spending on
capital improvements grew slightly, to just over $30 million. In 1980-81,
however, capital spending shot to over $55 million. In 1979, the city issued
over $50 million in long term bonds and over $60 million in 1982. St. Louis,
capital spending, however, was more directly related to its federal aid
allotments which peaked in 1980-81 and, to some extent, to state aid which
peaked in 1981.
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In real dollars (see Figure VIII-35), much of the early levels of
capital spending appear to financed with debt. From 1973 on, however,
federal aid appears to exert a stronger influence over capital spending.
Regression Results
The R2 value of 37.7 percent on the unlagged model (F-ratio = 4.54)
was slightly higher than the R2 value on the lagged model (36.5 percent).
This was somewhat surprising, given the amount of fluctuation in both the
debt and federal aid variables.
CAPOUT = 12.5 M + .151 FEDAID + .159 DEBT
(2.90) (1.77)
These results suggest that St. Louis is a city in which the general model, as
specified, works quite well.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
St. Louis' record of capital spending needs to be viewed in the context
of its population loses, and the relatively low level of personal income.
Given these conditions, it is not at all surprising to see that- outlays in St.
Louis have been virtually flat, since the mid-sixties. Cuts in federal aid
stand out as particularly damaging in this city which has exhibited a strong
dependency on intergovernmental aid. Moreover, the irregular pattern of
borrowing suggests that St. Louis may not be able to raise the necessary
capital through the bond market. The loss of nearly 30 percent of its
population during the decade of the seventies casts a rather dark shadow
over this city's future revenue raising capabilities. The exodus of residents
and jobs to other areas means that St. Louis will need to adopt strict
policies regarding the management and financing of infrastructure.
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Figure VIII-35.
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Toledo
Socio-economic Trends
Although the Toledo metropolitan area grew by 2 percent, Toledo's
population fell by more than 7 percent during the period 1970-80. Toledo, a
city run by the city-manager form of government, had a high percentage of
homeownership, 59 percent (only Phoenix was higher), and a sizeable
proportion (42 percent) of its housing built before 1940.
Trends n Outlays, DeDt, and Federal Aid
Toledo experienced slight peaks in capital spending in 1969 and 1976.
Its major growth in capital outlays occurred in 1981 and 82, when annual
spending surpassed $55 million. State and federal aid has increased
steadily over the period. Borrowing increased from about $8 million in 1972
to $15 million in 1976, to $22.5 million in 1979.
In real dollars, (see Figure VIII-36), Toledo had heavy levels of
capital spending (over $18 million) in 1968, 1975, and 1981. In 1968, 1972,
1976, and 1979, the city issued about $8 million in long-term debt. Federal
aid grew from 1970 on, but the most pronounced increases occurred in 1974,
and 1977. Between 1977-79, while federal aid was over $16 million,
capital spending was at an all-time low (below $10 million).
Regression Results
Given the fact that much of Toledo's capital spending occurred in the
late 1960s when debt and federal was quite small, the prospects for either
model do not appear to be particularly promising. Consequently, the R2
values, ranging between 5 to 10 percent, were not surprising. Moreover, the
negative, though not statistically significant debt term, resulted in all
likelihood because of the lag between debt and outlays.
Assessment of Capftal Spending Record
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Although the regression equations failed to produce a satisfactory
explanation of Toledo's capital investment and borrowing practices, several
points emerged out of this analysis. First, Toledo managed to finance a
large amount of capital outlays without using much debt or federal funds
during the late 1960s. Second, outlays, which dropped off in 1977 to 1979,
rebounded to levels higher than ever before in 1981 and 1982. Third, debt
issuances, as irregular as they have been, have been relatively constant,
ranging between $8 and $10 million in real terms over the entire 18 year
period.
Washington, D.C.
Socio-econ7omic Trends
Washington had the largest non-white population (73 percent), of the
37 cities. It also had the third highest level of per capita income. While
Washington lost more than 15 percent of its population, the metropolitan
area increased by 7 percent, growing from 3.0 million in 1979 to over 3.2
million in 1980.
Trends in Outlays, Debt, alndFedera Ai l
Washington experienced three peaks in capital spending. These peaks
occurred in 1972-73, 1975-76, and 1981-82. Although Washington receives
no state aid, federal aid has increased steadily across the 18 year period.
Borrowing peaked in 1972, 1975, and 1977. Annual debt issuances ranged
between $150 million and $200 million during these peak years. Although
borrowing decreased slightly for the period 1978-80, it began to grow again
in 1980-81.
In many ways, Washington, D.C. is an anomaly. Because of the massive
amounts of federal revenue it receives, the hypothesized relationship
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between aid and outlays needs to be treated with special care. On the other
hand, because Washington, D.C. has issued a large amount of debt to finance
capital outlays, it bears certain similarities to other large cities in the U.S.
In real dollars (see Figure V111-37), capital outlays have declined over the
18 year period. Debt, which increased in the late 1960s, paralleled the
general movements in outlays.
Regresson Results
Both models produced R2 values in excess of 40 percent. The unlagged
regression achieved the best results, (R2 = 43.9 percent). With both models,
the federal aid term was negative, not because of a negative relationship
between aid and outlays, but more likely because of the general pattern of
decreasing capital spending in spite of growing federal aid allotments.
Washington's federal aid went to general government operations as well as
towards the financing of infrastructure.
CAPOUT = 100M - .169 FEDAID + .635 DEBT
(-2.52) (3.41)
These results confirm the existence of a strong postive relationship betwen
debt and outlays.
Assessment of Capital Spending Record
Demands to increase capital investment in Washington, D.C. are likely
to result from the growth in the metropolitan area, and from the role that
this city plays as a center of social, political, and economic activity, for
not just the region, but the nation as a whole. The loss of population, the
large non-white resident population, and the general pattern of falling
capital outlays by the city itself, suggests that in spite of the pressure for
added investment, Washington has, and will continue to experience a gap
between capital needs and investment.
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Summary of Findings from Case Histories
The case histories in this chapter serve. to empirically confirm a
number of important ideas regarding debt and capital spending. There is, as
has been suspected, a strong link between capital outlays and debt, a link
that becomes more apparent when year to year variations in outlays and
debt are viewed simultaneously. There is, also, in most cities a lag between
debt and outlays. The experience of these 37 municipalities suggests that
in most, but not all instances, large debt issuances precede large outlays by
one to two years. There are some instances where the lag is longer, or,
perhaps reversed (outlay precedes debt), but such patterns are unusual.
Compared to this lag between borrowing and capital outalys, there appears
to much less of a lag between the receipt of large intergovernmental grants
and capital outlays. Peak years in state or federal aid generally seem to
correspond with peak years in capital outlays.
The regression equations met with mixed results. On the one hand,
the equations were able to achieve statistically significant results in 22 of
the 37 cities. In some cities, such as Boston, Detroit, and Phoenix, the
unlagged model performed better than the lagged model. In other cities,
such as Alanta, Buffalo, and Omaha, the lagging of the debt term (using the
two year moving average technique) produced results which were far
superior to the unlagged model results. The R2 values ranged betweeen 2
percent to over 80 percent. It is clear that in some cities, such as Boston,
Phoenix, and San Antonio, the regression models worked quite well, while in
others (Minneapolis, New York City, Kansas City), neither model, as
specified was able to achieve significant results.
In viewing the 37 case histories, it is quite apparent that a single
explanation for borrowing and capital investment decision-making is not
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likely to hold for all cities. As such, the need to develop a behavioral
perspective, which focuses on how decision-makers respond to key inputs
over time, is quite apparent.
The regression analysis shows that in slightly more than half of the
37 largest cities, annual capital spending could be predicted on the basis of
debt and federal aid. While to some extent this represents a tautology
(since debt and federal aid are used explicitly for capital investment), the
fact that more significant results were not achieved, both in individual
cities and across all cities represents an important finding.
In a perfectly functioning world, one would expect all debt and a large
proportion of federal aid to go towards outlays. Increases in either debt or
aid, should result in high levels of investment. The empirical results
suggest otherwise. Not only is it difficult to specify a regression equation,
it is also quite difficult to discern obvious patterns and relationships from
inspecting the graphs of debt, aid, and outlays over time.
Several other findings emerge from the case histories. First, when
examining capital investment in real terms, there are some cities, such as
Detroit, Memphis, and St. Louis which exhibited relatively constant levels of
capital investment over the 18 year period. Other cities, such as those in
Texas, as well as Phoenix and others in the sunbelt areas, exhibited, in real
terms, growing levels of capital investment. Finally, the majority of large
American cities exhibited, in real terms, a pattern of declining investment
in capital spending. The cities in which disinvestment is most obvious
include: Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Milwaukee,
Newark, New York City, Portland, and Washington, D.C. In these cities, there
was an unmistakeable decline, in real dollars in capital investment over the
18 year period.
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By comparing the long run record of capital spending, borrowing, and
intergovernmental aid, to the theoretical models presented in the previous
chapter, this chapter further supports the notion that behavioral arguments
have much to do with understanding patterns of municipal borrowing. A
behavioral model suggests that decision-makers, base their decisions on a
variety of inputs, and it is the selection of these inputs, rather than the
attributes of a community per se, which ultimately shape the outcomes of
decision-making.
Cities in which decision-makers exhibit the postpone syndrome fall
quite easily into the trap set by the very nature of capital planning. The
facts are that infrastructure is built to last for many decades and
deterlorlation of public works occurs gradually over many years. As such,
decisions are made with a long range time horizon and problems associated
with infrastructure may remain buried for many years at a time. Quite
easily, cities can fall into the postponement syndrome: decision-makers
can end up keeping capital decisions on the back burner for too long. The
end result is the distinctive single peak pattern of capital spending and
borrowing observed in many of the largest cities. The city must therefore
play "catch-up" suddenly infusing the local economy with a large boom in
public construction. Such a boom can mean a windfall in terms of
employment, construction contracts, and spin-off economic benefits. But,
just as suddenly as it arrives, the heavy dose of public investment is cut
off. The "boom and bust" pattern of resource allocation is a natural
consequence of the postponement sydrome.
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In contrast to the postponement sydrome are other patterns of capital
spending and borrowing. In some cities, such as those n the sunbelt and
growing areas of the country, the single peak pattern of outlays and debt is
a consequence of growing capital needs. In these cities, expenditure
profiles remain flat not so much because of deferred decision-making, but
rather because the growth in capital needs has occurred more recently. The
pattern of capital outlays and debt exhibited by these cities resembles an
incline: both are steadily increasing over time. There is, moreover, a
distinct difference between the shape of expenditure profiles in sunbelt
areas (Houston, San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, Phoenix, etc.) compared to
frostbelt cities (Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Kansas, New York,
etc.). While sunbelt cities exhibit gradually increasing levels of capital
spending, frostbelt cities show much wider fluctuations in capital spending
over the 18 year period. To some degree, this finding serves to confirm the
idea of a city life cycle, the somewhat strained argument that all cities
experience a similar pattern of aging--from youth through old age. In this
case, the sunbelt cities as a group have only recently begun their large scale
investments in infrastructure. The arguments can be extended further to
encompass patterns of debt use. Several cities (Houston, Phoenix, Portland,
and San Antonio) began to borrow heavily for the first time in late 70s and
early 80s. Identified as "first time borrowers," their debt profiles were
markedly different from "seasoned borrowers,." older cities (Boston,
Washington, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Philadelphia), which have
floated large bond issues throughout the 18 year time series.
The fact that a certain class of problem borrowers exists has long
been recognized. The existence of bond ratings since the early 1900s
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suggests that at least from the market perspective, there has been a clear
recognition of differences in financial status. When comparing bond ratings
to patterns of debt issue, the results are somewhat mixed. On the one hand,
cities with low bond ratings (Boston, Detroit, Newark, and Philadelphia)
appear to be more prone to having fluctuating patterns of debt issuance. On
the other hand, there are some cities with high bond ratings (Indianapolis,
Minneapolis, and San Francisco) which also exhibit fluctuating borrowing
patterns. There are high debt cities with high bond ratings (Minneapolis,
Dallas) , as well as low debt cities (Newark) with low bond ratings.
Problem borrowers can be characterized as those cities which experienced
interruptions in borrowing throughout the decade of the 70s. These cities,
in addition to having low bond ratings, also went several years without
issuing any debt whatsoever.
The case histories also support the contention that financial
managers in some cities, are quite attuned to fluctuations in interest rates.
In comparing 18 year graphs of interest rates and long term borrowing,
there is some correspondence between periods of low interest and peaks in
borrowing. The record of some cities, however, with regard to financing
during periods of low interest rates is better than other cities. Cities such
as Atlanta (1978), Boston (1972), Cleveland (1978), Dallas (1971), Denver
(1978), Detroit (1971), Fort Worth (1972), Honolulu (1978), Indianapolis
(1972), Memphis (1977), Milwaukee (1978), Newark (1972), Phoenix (1978),
and San Diego (1978) borrowed unusally large amounts during periods of low
interest rates. On the other hand, cities such as Baltimore, Buffalo,
Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit, Houston, Long Beach, Minneapolis, New
Orleans, New York, Oakland, St. Louis, Toledo, and Washington have floated
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their largest bond issues at times during which interest rates were
relatively high. Many of these cities, therefore, have had to shoulder
interest costs two times the level of those cities which have managed to
time their offerings with periods of low interest rates.
Another input into the decision-making process pertains to the
availability of federal funds. To some extent, the presence of state aid
poses similar issues. However, on inspection of the state aid graphs, it was
determined that there was far less fluctuation in state allotments than in
federal aid receipts. In general, state aid to the 37 cities has increased
gradually, and steadily, over the 18 year period. In contrast, federal aid
increased suddenly in the early 70s and then again in the late 70s. Because
of its variability, federal aid stands to have a much greater impact on
capital spending and borrowing.
The case histories provide support for two different views on the role
of federal aid. On the one hand, there is a noticeable connection between
peak years in capital spending and peak years in federal aid. This would
suggest that federal aid stimulates capital spending. This should come as
no surprise since many federal grants were intended to support
infrastructure projects. In many instances, the receipt of large federal
grants coincided with large time-lag adjusted debt offerings. In other
words, federal grants, debt, and capital outlays are all positively related,
and grants and debt act to reinforce each other. In other instances, this
study found that federal funds may substitute for borrowed funds.
Particularly in those cities with high federal aid allotments (Newark, St.
Louis, Detroit, etc.), federal funds may have been used in lieu of borrowed
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funds. In fact, in these cities, federal funds rather than borrowed funds
stand out as the primary source of financing for capital projects. The
extent to which capital spending mirrors federal fund receipts in these
cities is especially striking.
One of the key underlying assumptions of a behavioral model is that
outcomes of decision-making processes can be explained in terms of the
actions ( or inaction) of decision-makers. Two behavioral patterns--the
wheeler-dealer urban financier, and the business as usual bureaucrat, stand
out as opposite extremes in terms of municipal finance decision-making.
The financier views public capital as a means of leveraging private
investment. This is the same perspective put forth by the entrepreneurs
who used municipal bonds to build railroads, canals, and communication
lines in the 1800s. Public investment will spark development, development
would bring increased private investment as well as new revenues to the
public sector, and any debt incurred in the process will be easily retired.
The conventional rules of debt preceding outlay need not apply. In fact, a
large capital outlay, financed with federal funds, short term debt, or
current receipts may provide the needed impetus to start the engine of
development. In a number of cities (Minneapolis, Baltimore, Kansas City,
Memphis, New Orleans, etc.) large capital outlays have preceded major
periods of borrowing. The opposite of the urban financier, is the bureaucrat
which treats the business of capital planning as an opportunity to maintain
the status quo. This behavioral pattern emerges whenever a city slips into a
static mode of spending and borrowing. In spite of changes in capital needs,
financial capacity of the city, interest rates, and other factors, the city
appears locked into a pattern of inactivity, spending the same amounts on
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capital projects year after year. The lockstep pattern can carrry over to
debt policy as well.
It is clear that several of these behavior pattern overlap with each
other. Over time, an individual city may be exhibiting multiple behavioral
patterns. Administrations change, decision-makers come and go, and
different political agendas must into and out of the limelight. As such, one
could hardly expect that borrowing patterns remain constant and easy to
interpret. It is clear that a set of unique circumstances, personalities,
events, and conditions shapes the borrowing decisions of large cities. No
formula, however, comprehensive can possibly hope to simultaneously
account for the behavior of all cities, at every juncture in time. At the
same time, this analysis does serve to identify anumber of clear decision
rules.
First, under ideal circumstances, borrowing decisions involve
consideration of the following inputs: 1) capital needs; 2) non-debt
resources (especially federal aid); and 3) bond market conditions. This
general framework has been developed nto both a normative model, as well
as several alternative models for describing the real world behavior of
large American cities.
Second, municipal attributes appear to be only loosely related to
actual patterns in borrowing. There does, however, appear to be a clear
difference in the spending and borrowing practices of "sunbelt" cities
versus cities. located in the "frostbelt." Where sunbelt cities have
incrementally increasing spending and borrowing levels over time, the other
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cities appear more prone to fluctuating patterns in capital spending and
debt.
Third, while many cities were successful in issuing debt during
periods of low interest rates, others were not. Interest rate watching
appears to have been more prevalent in the early 70s. Prolonged periods of
high interest (late 70s to early 80s) may have pushed otherwise prudent
managers into floating large bonds in spite of the heavy interest costs.
Fourth, federal aid, more often than not, appears to work hand in hand
with borrowing. Instances where municipalities reduced their borrowing
because of large federal aid allotments appear to be few in number. In
some cities, however, federal aid has greatly boosted capital spending, so
that capital projects could go ahead even in the absence of borrowed funds.
Fifth, factors such as outstanding debt burdens, levels of current
spending, and existence of limitations on debt, appear to have exerted little
if any influence over patterns of borrowing. Some cities borrowed
extremely large amounts in a single year and yet remain in relatively good
fiscal health (Atlanta, Minneapolis, Houston). Others (St. Louis, Newark,
and Detroit) borrowed comparatively little over the 18 year period, and yet
remain by most standards, in poor fiscal health.
Finally, in viewing patterns of capital spending over the 18 year
period, several cities appear headed for troubled times in the years ahead.
Cities such as Boston, Cleveland, Denver, Kansas City, Newark, New York,
Omaha, and St. Louis, show unmistakeable patterns of decline in capital
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spending over the 18 year period. Inflation ajusted curves reveal even
sharper decreases in capital spending. Some of these are high debt cities,
while others have issued relatively little debt over the 18 year period. It
remains to be seen whether or not a city with high levels of outstanding
debt, such as Boston or New York, can borrow amounts adequte to finance its
needed capital improvements. Can problem borrowers such as Newark,
Cleveland, and St. Louis, which have been shut out of the national bond
market for some time, regain the necessary footing to begin active debt
financing of capital projects? At the same time, when will cities such as
Atlanta, Washington, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, leading
the nation in terms of their 18 year record of spending and borrowing,
finally reach their limits? What effect will the apparent growing appetite
for capital investment and debt among sunbelt cities have, in the next
decade, upon the ability of older cities to attract needed investment
capital?
The rules of the road in terms of municipal borrowing appear to be
changing. Since the mid 70s, the municipal bond market has changed quite
radically. Previous chapters have described how there are new investors in
municipals, new debt instruments (moral obligations, zero coupons, small
denomination bonds), new regulations (elimination of bearer bonds and
disqualification of certain projects from tax exempt financing), new issuing
authorities (housing, transportation, high education), and a variety of other
changes which have made the bond market more competitive, more risky, and
more difficult for municipalities seeking to finance infrastructure. The
18 year capital spending and borrowing curves reveal how the bond market
has been more unstable. In the early years of the time series, the
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correspondence between debt and capital spending is much easier to follow.
By the mid 70s, however, capital spending and debt both began fluctuating
much more widely. The lag between debt and capital spending increased.
Municipalities began dropping out of the bond market altogether. Some
cities piled on huge amounts of debt, while others sank further and further
behind in terms of maintaining infrastructure. By the early 1980s, the
differences between prosperous and poor areas became even more
pronounced. With the planned shrinkage of federal aid to cities, and the
consolidation of 57 categorical grant programs into 9 block grants, the
federal government's role in redistribution of resources to cities has
greatly diminished. Increasingly, the rules of the road, with regard to urban
capital finance involve a Darwinian notion of survival.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions: The Role of Cities in Financing Infrastructure
Old Wine In New Bottles
Some years ago, Douglas Yates wrote a book entitled, The
Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy Making. He
argues that given its political organization and decision-making processes,
the large American city is fundamentally ungovernable. That is, cities are
"incapble of producing coherent decisions, developing effective policies or
implementing state or federal programs."' Although Yates does not treat
capital planning or borrowing decisions per se, his central argument2 could
just as easily be applied to the problems associated with financing
infrastructure. He maintains that cities are too decentralized to permit
coordinated planning, yet too centralized to support a responsive, flexible
system. Cities are at once too dependent on higher level governments to
initiate their own strong policy initiatives, and too independent to be
entrusted with the implementation of state or federal programs. Moreover,
the system of municipal government from the mayor, through various
administrators on down to street level bureaucrats functions largely as a
rudder-less vessel, and the principal actors have little control over their
subordinates and even less over the direction and future of the ship as a
whole. Finally, the city itself provides unique services which create
problems which are impossible to avoid, including absorbing the newest and
poorest immigrants, and accomodating a wide range of socio-economic
groups. Without shedding many of these burdens, cities will face chronic
1Yates, D. (1977) The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and
Policy Making. The MIT Press. Cambridge. p.5.
2 bid. pp. 6-7.
revenue shortages, continued competition between public service
beneficiaries, and basic structural weakness (tax base, employment
opportunities, etc.) compared to their more affluent suburban neighbors.
The problems associated with financing urban infrastructure are by
no means new. In fact, large cities have always seemed burdened with a set
of recurring problems.3 The "infrastructure crisis" is, in effect, "old wine
in a new bottle." An earlier chapter, in tracing the history of municipal
bonds, described how cities made large capital investments in
infrastructure and transportation networks in order to promote economic
development. Cities in the 1800s feared that without adequate investment
in public facilities, population and Jobs would go elsewhere. Mayors in the
largest cities make a similar argument today.4
Throughout history, cities have struggled to define their role in terms
of financing infrastructure. In the 1800s, tensions existed between
municipalities and state governments, many of which were constitutionally
barred from borrowing to finane infrastructure. Not until the Great
Depression did the federal government begin to alleviate some of the
financial pressure imposed on municipal governments. Following World War
11, states began to invest heavily in capital facilities, primarily in the areas
of higher education, transportation, housing, and health. At the same time,
suburban expansion and the movement of people out from the central city
stimulated the development of local government entities--townships,
3see for example, Banfield, E. (1968) The Unheavenly City. Little, Brown.
Boston; Pettergill, R. andJ. S. Uppal (1974) Can Cities Survive? St. Martin's
Press. New York; and, Bradbury, K., A. Downs, and K. Small (1982) Urban
Decline and the Future of American Cities. The Brookings Institute.
Washington, D.C.
4Morial, E. and M. Barry (1986) Rebuilding America's Cities. Ballinger
Publishing Company. Cambridge. Ma.
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villages, school districts, water districts, and other statutory authorities.
Central cities began to express a set of concerns that have become quite
redundant over the years. in addition to serving as a "dumping ground" for
the poor and immobile members of society, they also provide numerous
services which benefit a regional rather than local community.5 The topic
of infrastructure finance raises issues pertinent to intergovernmental
relations, not just between municipalities and state and federal
governments, but also between large cities and the various neighboring local
government entities.
In many ways, the "infrastructure crisis" bears certain similarities
to the problems of big cities in the 1960s. Although urban renewal, Model
Cities, 6 and other Great Society programs of the sixties were designed with
the intention of helping the urban poor and black communities, the problems
of poverty, unemployment, and inadequate housing opportunities for blacks
have not gone away; in fact, hispanics and other recent arrivals have joined
the ranks of the urban poor. Today, the talk of "rebuilding America's cities"
focuses on repairing sewer lines, water systems, public housing, schools,
jails, transit systems, and other forms of public works. One member of
Congress expressed a commonly shared belief: 7
Infrastructure and economic development are tightly
intertwined; it's time we put them together. It's time we made
our cities productive, so that their businesses and industries
can reach full productivity again...
5for data on city-suburb disparities see Department of Housing and Urban
Developement ( 1979), Changing Conditions in Municipal Areas. urban Data
Reports No. 1., Office of Policy Development and Research. Washington, D.C.
6 Frieden, B. and M. Kaplan (1975) The Politics of Neglect. The MIT Press.
Cambridge.
70berstar, J. (1983) Remarks to U.S. Conference of Mayors, January 27, 1983.
USCM. Washington D.C. pp. 5-6.
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The implication here, is that by investing in infrastructure, cities can
address many of the problems of poverty and unemployment which remain as
resilient as ever.
The notion that public works should be used as a countercyclical
measures was first introduced under Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal
Programs of the 1930s. Unemployed workers were put to work on large
scale infrastructural projects under federal programs such as the Works
Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the
Employment Service. Federal legislation in the sixties, such as the
Economic Opportunity Act and the Manpower Development Training Act, as
well as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in the
1970s, and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in the 1980s, reflect
the federal governnment's commitment to promoting full employment. Yet
unemployment, particularly in cities and among minorities and youths
remains a major problem. In recent years, decreased federal support
programs such as CETA and the Job Corps (for youth) has meant a shift
away job training and greater emphasis upon job creation.
The evidence in earlier chapters suggests that the pattern of capital
accumulation in sunbelt cities over the period 1965-1982 is different from
that of older, frostbelt cities. In the sunbelt areas, capital spending curves
resemble a steepening incline, while the patterns of capital spending in
other cities fluctuate much more unpredictably. The empirical results
suggest that sunbelt cities face fewer difficulties in arranging financing
for their capital projects. In addition to growing populations and tax bases,
8Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1978)
Countercyclical Aid and Economic Stabilization. U.S. Government Printing
Office. Washington.
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they have, in general, lower levels of current spending and outstanding debt
and higher bond ratings. Upon closer examination of the "infrastructure
crisis," it become quite clear that it is the cities in the Northeast, the
Industrial Midwest, and the frostbelt which face the most severe problems.
In this way, the "infrastructure crisis" can also be seen as part and parcel
of the decline accompanying regional shifts in population and economic
activity.9
Finally, the "infrastructure crisis" represents a reincarnation of the
fiscal crises which have periodically surfaced in large American cities.
The most serious fiscal emergencies occurred during the Panics of the
1800s and the Great Depression when thousands of local governments went
into default. Because of severe revenue shortages, heavy debt burdens, and
large expenditure commitments, cities were unable to finance capital
projects. New York City's fiscal crisis 1o in the mid-70s, and Cleveland's
near default in 1978, stand out as similar, yet more localized events. In
both cases, borrowing was curtailed and capital projects cancelled. A
9Miernyk,W. (1975) The Northeast Isn't What it Used to Be. in Balanced
Growth for the Northeast. New York State Senate, Albany; Bahl, R. et. al.
(1978) The Outlook for City Fiscal Performance in Declining Regions" in the
Fiscal Outlook for Cities. Syracuse University Press. Syracuse; Muller, T.
(1975) "The Declining and Growing Metropolis" in G. Sternlieb and J. Hughes,
Post Industrial America: Metropolitan Decline and Regional Job Shifts. The
Center for Policy Research. New Brunswick; and, Nathan, R. and P. Dommel
(1977) The Strong Sunbelt Cities and the Weak Cold Belt Cities. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the City of the House Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs. Toward a National Urban Policy. 95th Congress.
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.
o1 see for example, Clark, T. N. (1976) How Many New Yorks? The New York
Fiscal Crisis in Comparative Perspective. Report. 72. Comparative Study of
Community Decision-Making. University of Chicago. Chicago; also, Aronson,
R. and A. King (1978) Is There a Fiscal Crisis Outside New York?" National
Tax Jounal. 31. pp. 153-64.
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similar amount of brinksmanship was evident in the aftermath of many of
the tax-expenditure limitations" (Proposition 13, Proposition 2-1/2, etc.)
which were enacted in the late 70s and early 80s. In many of the affected
communities, the response was to cut capital budgets and postpone large
infrastructural improvements. Moreover, in some communities, such as in
Massachusetts following Proposition 2-1/2, the rating agencies suspended
bond ratings, thereby, putting a freeze on long term borrowing. As
communities devised new ways of increasing and diversifying local
revenues, garnering greater amounts of state aid, the effects of tax limits
have subsided. The backlog of postponed capital improvements, much like
that encountered after the Depression and World War 11, has helped to fuel
the "infrastructure crisis."
In summary, the problems associated with financing and building
urban infrastrastructure represent "old wine in a new bottle." In other
words, urban problems are pretty much the same, but the packaging is
different. Cities still face revenue shortages, commitments above and
beyond their financial means, and an assortment of economic externalities
over which they have relatively little control.
The Need for a Strong Debt Policy
The earlier chapters show that among the largest cities in the
country, there are wide variations in capital spending. In some cities, the
pattern of decreased capital spending is unmistakeable. In other cities,
levels of investment in infrastructure appear to be growing far beyond
previous levels. The analysis has shown that in general, long term debt
" lKirlin, J. (1982) The Political Economy of Fiscal Limits. Lexington Books,
Lexington.; Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. (1978) Local
Distress, State Surpluses, Proposition 13: Prelude to Fiscal Crisis or New
Opportunities. Hearings. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.
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precedes capital outlays by one to two years. Large federal aid allotments,
on the other hand, generally tend to occur in the same year as large capital
outlays. Over the past two decades, there has been a firm connection
between federal aid, long term debt, and infrastructure.
The present direction of federal policy towards cities suggests that
large federal grants for infrastructure are likely to become relics of the
past. Grants to state and local governments have declined from 1 1.7 percent
of the federal budget in 1978 to 6.2 percent in 1985 (amounting to an annual
loss of $52.7 billion in 1985).12 State and local governments have that
much less to spend, or, in other words, that much more to raise for capital
projects and general government operations. Lost revenues will need to be
made up if initiatives begun under federal programs are to be continued.
Second, more than ever before, municipalities will be left to fend for
themselves. While the "New Federalism" implies greater discretionary
authority at the state and local levels of government, it also suggests that
in terms of infrastructure, cities will have to develop and implement, their
own plans.
Large cities currently face a double-edged sword: there is at the
same time strong evidence of increasing capital needs and also a weakening
in the financial capacity of cities. There is physical evidence, visible signs
of deterioration of public facilities. Moreover, capital spending and
maintenance of infrastructure has diminished. At the same time, it has
has become increasingly difficult for municipalities to borrow in the bond
market. Traditional investors (banks and insurance companies) have been
12U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1985) Historical Tables for the
President's Fiscal Year 1986 Budget. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C.
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replaced by more fickle newcomers (individuals and bond funds).
Increasingly, the market has shifted away from general obligations
(marketed by competitive sales) and towards revenue bonds (arranged
through negotiation). New non-traditional units of local government
(special districts, statutory authorities, non-profits, etc.) have become
much more prominent. Finally, numerous changes in the federal tax code
have made municipals less attractive investments. The bond market has
become an increasingly unstable and risky environment for traditional
borrowers.
Long term debt and federal aid have played major roles in financing
local capital improvements. Reductions in federal aid suggest that
municipalities will have to become increasingly self sufficient in terms of
generating funds for infrastructure. At the same time, borrowing in the
bond market has become more difficult. Now more than ever before, cities
must adopt strong debt policies.
A strong debt policy begins with an accurate determination of capital
need. In earlier sections, a distinction was made between needs based on
physical standards, and needs which are based on the willingness to pay
among members of a community. A sound assessment of capital needs,
therefore, involves both a precise determination of what level of service a
particular facility will provide (e.g., millions of gallons of water treated,
number of patient beds, tons of garbage converted to energy, etc.), and what
the facility will cost, in terms of both capital and operating costs. Other
important information includes the expected service life of the facility, and
projections of income (if any) which may be generated by the project. By
combining project specific information with data on the community's
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willingness to pay for such a facility, the level of capital need can be
established.
A strong debt policy attempts to balance debt and non-debt resources.
A municipality has a number of different revenue sources which can be used
for financing infrastructure. Current revenues include: taxation, service
charges, miscellaneous revenues, and intergovernmental revenues. There
are only three basic sources of taxation: wealth (e.g. personal or real
property), inocme (earned or unearned), and business transactions (sales
taxes, licence taxes, utility taxes, and occupancy taxes): Service charges
inlcude those for water, electricity, gas, tolls, and transit fares. Also
included among these are fees for school lunches, sewage hook-ups, parking,
and admission reciepts. There are also a variety of current revenues which
are included in the category of miscellaneous revenues: special
assessments, sale of property, interest income, fines and forfeits, rents and
royalties, donations, net lottery revenues, insurance adjustments,
unclaimed moneys, and profits from sale of securities. Some
municipalities also collect revenues from the operation of liquor storkes
and insurance trust operations. Finally, there are a variety of
intergovernmental revenues, including various grants, shared taxes, loans,
and advances. A sound debt policy includes taking stock of all available
current revenues which can be pledged toward meeting capital needs. A
debt policy should distinquish between pay-as-you-acquire financing and
pay-as-you-use financing schemes. A pay-as-you-acquire financing plan
involves using current revenues to acquire needed capital facilities. A pay-
as-you-use plan involves using debt financing to spread costs of a facility
over time, so that future generations benefiting from the project share in
its costs. A city which depends entirely upon debt financing of capital
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facilties risks overloading its credit limit and increasing borrowing costs.
On the other hand, pay-as-you-acquire techniques may help to encourage
greater fiscal responsibility, reduce debt loads and borrowing costs, and
strengthen future efforts to borrow. Rather than view pay-as-you-acquire
and pay-as-you-use as mutually exclusive conditions, a strong debt policy
involves balancing debt and non-debt financing of capital facilities.
A strong debt policy allows for both flexibility in terms of the
selection of security ledged and in terms of the length of maturity of debt
instruments. Ideally, bonds should be issued during periods of comparably
low interest costs, or outstanding bonds with higher coupons should be
refinanced when interest rates come down. A sound debt policy should
encourage "interest rate watching." At the same time, cities with strong
debt policies will have at their disposal a wide range of instruments:
general obligations, revenue bonds (enterprise, special tax, lessee bonds,
special assessment debt, and moral obligations). While general obligations
(full faith and credit) have the lowest interest costs, they may require
special referenda and competitive sale to underwriters. Non-guaranteed
debt, while more expensive, may enable a community to evade debt limits
and ceilings, as well as avoid the more time consuming elements of floating
a general obligation. A strong debt policy specifies appropriate conditions
for the use of short-term debt. As events during the New York City fiscal
crisis illustrate, a city's long term debt market can be greatly affected by
short term borrowing practices. A strong debt policy goes hand-in-hand
with sound techniques of financial managment, accounting, and full
disclosure.
Finally, a strong debt policy encourages policy-makers and
administrators to track and monitor levels of debt, particularly in relation
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to changing revenues. Cities should work to develop their own "red flags"
indicating that outstanding debt has grown too large relative to equalized
assessed valuation or some other measure, such as total government income.
The notion of municipal debt carrying capacity13 is particularly important
and financial managers should track long term debt, short term debt, as well
as other liabilities, such as those resulting from unfunded pension plans.
Rather than suggest "rule of thumb" standards, the emphasis here is on
encouraging municipal fannce officers to develop their own information
systems, monitoring debt over time, in relation to key financial variables.
Because of the increase in unmet capital needs and the withdrawl of
federal government support of local infrastructure projects, municipalities
must develop strong debt policies. The pressure to do so exists now more
than ever before.
The Need for Additional Research
A obvious temptation upon completion of this or similar studies is to
call out for more research. While there have been virtually no longitudinal
studies of in this ilk, the general availability of data suggests that more
could be done. While this study focused mainly upon three variables: debt,
federal aid, and outlays, the Census of Government collects annual data, for
the largest cities on many other variables. It would be interesting, for
example, to find out how the long-term pattern of capital investment is
related to other revenue sources (i.e., charges and fees, sale of property,
interest income, etc.) Another set of analyses could attempt to relate
investment practices with cash management practices (i.e., do cities which
13see for example, Date, D. J. (1978) Municipal Debt Carrying Capacity Study.
New London Ontario.
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have reserve funds, investment funds, etc.) have greater levels of capital
spending.
Another set of research questions which should be asked include
those regarding the actual, physical condition of urban infrastructure.
Earlier, when existing studies and surveys were analyzed, the difficulties
and costs associated with conducting such an-assessment of capital needs
was discussed. As pointed out earlier, it is one thing to analyze spending
patterns and infer the condition of infrastructure, and quite another to
actually conduct a physical inspection of infrastructure systems. Empirical
research linking investment patterns to actual physical conditions of
infrastructure is sorely needed. It is not inconceivable to formulate a
regression equation, which has as the dependent variable an interval scale
measure of infrastructure condition, and several independent variables such
as age, volume of use, and level of maintenance. With such an equation, one
could estimate, with greater accuracy, the impacts of deferred maintenance
or project the required costs necessary to achieve an acceptable level of
infrastructure quality.
Along these wishful lines of thinking, one could also imagine a more
detailed set of case histories involving the collection of additional data
from the city officials responsible for decision-making. There are obvious
differences between cities. The cross-sectional analysis in Chapter 5
demonstrates that not only do cities differ in terms of their use of debt and
in their levels of capital investment, but certain attributes (i.e., size,
growth, density, age, etc.) can explain some of these differences. Perhaps
based on this cross-sectional analysis one could select a smaller sample of
cities to investigate in greater detail.
-335-
Once this subset of cities was identified, one could go about
conducting traditional case studies. Perhaps, the theoretical decision-
models presented in Chapter 7 could be confirmed or embellished with the
input of financial officers. Certainly it would be interesting to know how
they would categorize the style of decision-making which prevails in their
community. Similar to the community power studies of the fifties and
sixties, one could identify key decision-makers and test the accuracy of the
hypothesized models. It was also be valuable to hear, first-hand, why
certain decisions pertaining to borrowing and spending were made, and what
factors were considered. The longitudinal analyses in Chapter 8 enable the
pinpointing of many of the "big decisions" for each of the cities. Armed
with this level of specificity, one could certainly do much in the way of
establishing the connection between decisions and outcomes.
To suggest these possibilities, which for the most part require the
collection of new data represents, to some extent, a dodge of some of the
weaknesses inherrent in this particular study. In fairness, there are
several flaws in this study, which I acknowledge in a spirit of "academic
mea culpa," permissable in studies such as this. First, there should have
been greater emphasis upon identifying, describing, and developing a life-
cycle theory of cities as it relates to capital investment and borrowing
decisions. Only by conducting the longitudinal analysis did the striking
differences between growing cities and declining cities emerge. While the
cross-sectional analyses served to confirm some of these distinctions (note
in particular the W-statistic results) between sunbelt and frostbelt cities,
the declines in capital spending, the dependency on federal aid, and the
irratic nature of borrowing became even more obvious when they were
graphed. Second, this particular study may have suffered from the
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ambitiousness associated with research conducted in areas where "few have
ventured." In addition to the difficulties associated with theory-building,
the job of integrating all of the related historical, economic, and political
developments which have a bearing on municipal bonds and capital
investment, was left unfinished. The task was initiated, both in the cross-
sectional analysis and in the time-series analysis, but it was,
unfortunately, never fully completed. If debt was more narrowly defined
(i.e., the focus was only on general obligation bonds) or if infrastructure
was confined to a few specific areas (i.e., water, sewer, or streets),
perhaps, then a more complete integration could have occurred.
While a discussion of "what might have been" could continue until
virtually no stone is left unturned, a more useful and postive ending points
to the discovery that while the infrastructure needs of large American
cities differ widely, urban areas do share a strikingly common destiny.
Whether one views the current predictments of cities in the Northeast as a
long run harbinger of things to come for sunbelt cities, or if one takes the
position that regardless of geographic location, the disparities between
wealthy and poor cities continue to grow, the end result is much the same:
all cities need to invest in infrastructure and all cities face new challenges
in capital finance.
The system of Fiscal Federalism has taken a rather sweeping turn--
some would argue for the worse, others would maintain the opposite, but
few would deny it. It is clear that under the new system, cities and states
will have to become increasingly self-sufficient. Cities will have to look
more within their own boundaries to find the necessary resources to finance
not just infrastructure, but many other social programs. Adjusting to these
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times means rethinking local service priorities, reorganizing public
services, cultivating new financial arrangements, and bolstering
productivity.
One might argue, moreover, that the current infrastructure crisis
spells the end of the large general purpose municipal government.
Increasingly, solutions to the infrastructure problem point to the need to
create more special purpose districts, regional authorities, or other
statutory entities which remove from cities their capital planning
responsibilities. At the same time, the idea that certain urban problems
(i.e., crime, poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing etc.) continue to
bear signs of incurablity, a condition which tends to stifle innovation or at
least the willingness to try new solutions. Often, remedies are perceived
as political infeasable, economically unreachable. In a sense, urban
problems are what they are because few care enough to think about them and
even less are willing to tackle them. As such, the anticipated demise of
municipal government seems highly overrated; in the absence of big city
governments, who would pick up the pieces?
In the final assessment, it is up to municipal government to develop a
strong debt policy, to squeeze state and federal agencies for continued
support, to explore the use of new debt instruments, to encourage greater
savings and investment, to forge new partnerships, and to institute the
organizational reforms necessary to promote better infrastructure planning.
Municipal attributes and behavioral patterns are quite diverse. The range of
potential solutions to the infrastructure crisis is quite wide. In the end, it
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might be said even among cities, 14
natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout
the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are
bad, preserving and adding up all that are good; silently and
insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers,
at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its
organic and inorganic conditions of life. We see nothing of
these slow changes in progress, until the hand of time has
marked the lapse of ages, and then so imperfect is our view
...that we see only that the forms of life are now different from
what they formerly were...
14 Darwin, C. (1975) The Origin of Species. The W.W. Norton Company. New
York. p. 47.
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